India’s Western Indian Ocean Strategy: Partnership with Somaliland
India has a strong strategic case for deepening relations with Somaliland and considering eventual recognition. Its location, stability, commercial assets, and historic links with India make it a valuable potential partner in the Western Indian Ocean. Engagement could strengthen maritime security, expand trade with East Africa, and give India an alternative foothold in a region where China, Turkey, the UAE, Ethiopia, and Israel are already active.
Why Somaliland Matters to India
Somaliland occupies 850 kilometers of coastline along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea. Much of India’s trade and energy supply crosses this corridor. Cooperation with a stable partner could support naval access, anti-piracy patrols, maritime awareness, and protection of sea lanes.
It would also diversify India’s regional options. China operates a naval base in neighboring Djibouti, while Turkey has extensive political and security ties with Somalia’s federal government. Relations with Hargeisa would not displace them but could provide India a complementary logistics and diplomatic option centered on Berbera.
Somaliland has governed itself since declaring independence in 1991, maintaining institutions, security forces, a currency, and elections despite non-recognition. Recognition could reward locally rooted governance, but India would need to weigh Somalia’s objections, African Union sensitivities, and the precedent it might create.
Berbera as a Strategic Gateway
Berbera is Somaliland’s principal geopolitical asset. Near major Red Sea routes, its port connects maritime trade to Ethiopia and the wider Horn. DP World has modernized the port and developed the Berbera Economic Zone, while road improvements have strengthened the corridor to Ethiopia.
For the UAE, Berbera expands its commercial port network; for landlocked Ethiopia, it offers an alternative to Djibouti. For India, it could become a gateway for pharmaceuticals, textiles, machinery, and consumer goods entering Somaliland and Ethiopia. It could also support humanitarian logistics, shipping, and naval cooperation without requiring India to operate the port.
India should proceed in phases: establish a representative office, expand scholarships and development assistance, encourage private investment, negotiate maritime cooperation, and assess port-access arrangements. This would build practical ties while preserving diplomatic flexibility.
Cooperation with Israel and Regional Partners
India and Israel share interests in protecting trade corridors and countering piracy, armed groups, and instability. India brings commercial scale, Global South credibility, and a growing naval presence; Israel offers advanced surveillance, intelligence, and maritime-security technology. Carefully structured cooperation could improve situational awareness without turning Somaliland into an arena for bloc rivalry.
Coordination with the UAE and Ethiopia would also matter because both have direct stakes in Berbera. India’s most durable role would combine security cooperation with visible civilian benefits, including training, digital services, health care, agriculture, and port-linked trade.
A Shared Historical Foundation
India–Somaliland ties predate modern diplomacy. Merchants from Gujarat, Kutch, and the Malabar coast crossed the Arabian Sea using monsoon winds, exchanging textiles, rice, spices, and metal goods for livestock, hides, frankincense, and myrrh at ports such as Zeila and Berbera. Indian trading and credit networks became part of regional commerce.
After Britain established the Somaliland Protectorate in 1884, the territory was administered through British India until 1898, with links to the Bombay Presidency and Aden. Indian personnel served in administration, customs, surveying, policing, and security; legal practices influenced early institutions, and the rupee circulated for decades. Commercial connections endured after authority shifted to Britain’s Colonial Office.
This history should not be romanticized, but it offers useful familiarity. Shared maritime experience, legal concepts, and trading traditions allow India to frame renewed engagement as the recovery of a long-standing Indian Ocean relationship rather than a sudden geopolitical intrusion.
Conclusion
A closer India–Somaliland partnership could protect sea routes, diversify access in the Horn, expand trade into Ethiopia, and balance rival influence. Berbera provides a practical centre, while historic ties add depth. Recognition remains consequential and should follow careful consultation, but India need not wait to build meaningful relations. A gradual strategy focused on commerce, development, maritime security, and regional coordination would evaluate the partnership’s value while limiting political risk.
