Indus Treaty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis Is Not India’s Responsibility

India cannot reasonably be held responsible for every failure of Pakistan’s internal water governance.

For decades, Pakistan has treated the Indus Waters Treaty as a fixed pillar of its relationship with India. Whenever New Delhi proposes a hydropower project or questions the treaty’s interpretation, Islamabad has often portrayed it as an attempt to deprive Pakistan of water.

That is only part of the story.

Signed in 1960 after negotiations facilitated by the World Bank, the treaty divided the six Indus rivers between the two countries. India received unrestricted use of the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — while Pakistan received the principal use of the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — subject to specified Indian rights, including domestic, agricultural and hydroelectric use. It also established mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution.

The treaty’s survival through wars and repeated crises was remarkable. But six decades have changed the region dramatically. India’s economy and energy needs have expanded, Jammu and Kashmir has undergone major political and developmental changes, and climate and water pressures have intensified across the Himalayan region. Pakistan’s own water crisis has also become harder to explain simply by pointing upstream.

India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance should therefore be seen in the broader context of its security, development and water interests.

Pakistan’s water crisis is not simply an Indian problem

Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus is undeniable. Its agricultural economy and irrigation system are deeply tied to the river. But Pakistan’s water crisis is also a problem of domestic management.

The World Bank has documented groundwater depletion, waterlogging, salinity and contamination across the country. In Sindh, the situation is particularly serious. The Bank has estimated that between 60 and 75 percent of water withdrawn in the province is lost through evaporation or seepage into saline groundwater, while agriculture accounts for roughly 90 percent of water withdrawals.

These are not problems created by an Indian dam. They reflect weaknesses within Pakistan’s own water system.

At the Geneva conference organized by the Shivi Development Society on September 17, speakers including Arif Aajakia, Mamun Rahman and Lakhu Luvana also drew attention to longstanding concerns over water and natural resources in Sindh and Balochistan.

That raises an important question for Islamabad: if water is a human-rights issue, as the United Nations has recognized, what happens to the rights of communities after the water reaches Pakistan?

India cannot reasonably be held responsible for every failure of Pakistan’s internal water governance.

India’s hydropower rights are not “water warfare”

Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of using dams and hydropower projects to block its water. The treaty itself is more nuanced.

India’s rights over the western rivers are restricted, but they are not eliminated. The agreement permits specified Indian uses, including hydroelectric generation, subject to technical conditions. Pakistan has challenged projects such as Baglihar, Kishenganga and Ratle through the treaty’s dispute mechanisms.

Those disputes are legitimate. But they do not establish that India has no right to develop its hydropower potential.

The rivers flowing through Jammu and Kashmir are an important source of renewable energy and development. Run-of-river projects, meanwhile, are not simply giant taps that India can turn off. They generate electricity from river flows and, subject to their design and operating rules, release water downstream.

The real disputes concern storage, pondage, design and operation. Those questions should be settled through engineering and law, not political slogans about India “stealing” Pakistan’s water.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s proceedings themselves show how complex these issues are, covering treaty interpretation, project design, maximum pondage and questions arising from India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance.

Security has changed the equation

India’s 2025 decision to place the treaty in abeyance fundamentally changed the debate. New Delhi linked the move to the security environment following the Pahalgam terrorist attack and said the treaty would remain in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably renounced support for cross-border terrorism.

India’s argument is straightforward: water policy cannot exist in complete isolation from the wider security relationship.

Pakistan is entitled to challenge that position diplomatically and legally. India is equally entitled to reassess an arrangement created in a very different geopolitical era.

The legal dispute has continued. On August 31, 2026, the Permanent Court of Arbitration published an award concerning the status of the treaty in relation to India’s decision on abeyance, along with an order concerning interim measures relating to the Ratle hydroelectric plant. The proceedings add an important legal dimension, but they do not erase the larger strategic question facing India.

Can an agreement negotiated in 1960 continue indefinitely to constrain India’s security and development choices when the relationship between the two countries has changed so fundamentally?

New Delhi increasingly believes it cannot.

India should not be held hostage to 1960

The Indus Waters Treaty deserves recognition for helping prevent water from becoming another permanent source of conflict between India and Pakistan. But its historical importance should not make it untouchable.

The Geneva conference was useful precisely because it broadened the discussion beyond the familiar India-Pakistan binary. The Indus affects communities across Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, each with their own interests and grievances.

India should therefore make efficient use of its legitimate water and energy resources while investing in hydropower, storage and modern water infrastructure wherever technically and legally feasible. Decades of diplomatic caution should not become a permanent developmental handicap.

Pakistan, for its part, needs to confront groundwater depletion, inefficient irrigation, waterlogging, contamination and internal distribution disputes instead of making India the explanation for every weakness in its water system.

The broader lesson is simple: a transboundary agreement cannot be frozen in 1960 while the strategic, demographic and environmental realities around it continue to change.

The next chapter should not be about preserving an old arrangement simply because it has endured. It should be about creating a modern framework that recognizes India’s legitimate development needs alongside Pakistan’s downstream interests and the rights of communities on both sides.

India does not need to apologize for developing its rivers. Its water, energy and development interests are legitimate national interests — not concessions that require Pakistan’s permission.