Iran’s Curious Choice of Targets
I find it curious that Iran has chosen to retaliate against the United States by attacking American military installations in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and elsewhere in the region, while avoiding direct attacks on Israel during this latest phase of the conflict. There may well be military or strategic reasons that are not known. Tehran is conserving its missile arsenal, recalculating its priorities, or waiting for a more advantageous moment. But I doubt the explanation is simply fear of Israeli retaliation. Iran has never shown much hesitation to challenge Israel, whether directly or through its extensive network of proxies, when it believed doing so advanced its interests.
A more persuasive explanation, in my view, is political rather than purely military. Iran’s leaders understand that modern wars are fought not only on the battlefield but also in the arena of public opinion. The regime has long invested enormous resources in information warfare, propaganda, and diplomatic messaging designed to shape international perceptions. Military operations and media strategy are not separate enterprises for Tehran; they are complementary weapons.
By directing its retaliation primarily against American forces while sparing Israel, Iran can reinforce a narrative it has promoted for decades: that the United States is fighting Israel’s wars rather than defending its own national interests. This message is intended for multiple audiences. It appeals to anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East, seeks to encourage criticism of U.S. policy among European allies, and aims to deepen divisions within the United States itself, where debates over American involvement in the region remain politically contentious.
If Iran were to unleash a major attack on Israel today, it would certainly provoke a massive Israeli military response. International headlines would once again focus on Iran’s aggression against the Jewish state, making it more difficult for Tehran to cast itself as the victim of American and Israeli policies. Instead, by concentrating its retaliation on American military assets, Iran keeps Washington at the center of the story and encourages the perception that the United States is the principal combatant. That distinction matters in the battle for global opinion.
This approach also offers Tehran a potential diplomatic advantage. If the conflict can be framed as primarily an American-Iranian confrontation, pressure may grow within the United States for de-escalation, while some foreign governments may become more reluctant to support continued American military operations. At the same time, Iran can continue to portray Israel as dependent upon U.S. military protection, reinforcing its longstanding effort to drive a political wedge between the two allies.
None of this is to suggest that Iran has abandoned its hostility toward Israel. On the contrary, the Islamic Republic’s leaders continue to define opposition to Israel and its eventual total elimination as a central pillar of their revolutionary ideology. Rather, if this interpretation is correct, Tehran may simply believe that the more effective strategy at this stage is to attack the alliance rather than its individual members—to weaken American resolve, isolate Israel diplomatically, and erode international support for their partnership.
Whether this hypothesis proves correct remains to be seen. Governments rarely reveal the full strategic logic behind their military decisions until long after the fighting has ended. But if Iran’s objective is to fracture the U.S.-Israel alliance in the court of public opinion, then limiting its direct confrontation with Israel—at least for the moment—may represent a calculated strategic choice rather than an act of restraint. Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the Islamic Republic’s longstanding doctrine of combining military operations with psychological and information warfare, recognizing that in the twenty-first century, victories are pursued not only through missiles and drones but also through narratives and perceptions.
