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Adam Gross

Is there a deal that could satisfy both Israel and Iran?

Israel has, for now at least, turned the tables somewhat on Iran, thank G-d. The decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership and the degradation of its capabilities in Lebanon combined with the continued war of attrition against Hamas in Gaza has given Israel new impetus.

Iran decided that to rebuild deterrence, it had to carry out a second and highly risky direct strike on Israel. Like the first, it seems to have inflicted minimum damage, thank G-d. Israel is now deciding its response.

Many commentators feel the situation has worked out to Israel’s advantage giving it free rein and ample justification to now target any number of Iranian assets. These may include an economically crippling strike on Iranian oil infrastructure or a direct strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Others are more cautious, pondering the response of Iran amid concerns about all-out regional war.

At present, what few if any seem to have presented is a realistic way out.

For sure, some have offered unrealistic ways out – the ceasefire call by the likes of French President, Emmanuel Macron, is one such example. No Israeli leader could agree unilaterally to a ceasefire while hostages remain in Gaza, while Hamas remains in power with its unrevised intent to repeat October 7th ‘again and again’, and while Hezbollah remains on Israel’s northern border and 60,000+ evacuees remain out of their homes.

And at present time, there doesn’t seem to be a realistic possibility of resurrecting the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas brokered by the US, Egypt and Qatar.

This leaves us with one route apparently not yet explored – a deal between Israel and Iran that puts all issues on the table.

Of course, given Iran’s resistance to even entering the same room as the Americans to negotiate the nuclear deal, it is unlikely that Iran would sit around the table with Israel. So negotiations would need to be conducted through intermediaries – the Swiss, for example.

But if one could get past the protocols, would such a deal be worthwhile for the parties? What could it involve?

We do not know the strategic calculations of either party, including the surprises that each may have in store for the other. Given the past history, it is likely that Israel’s response, at least, will involve some level of imagination and innovation. It may be that such plans may bring about, G-d willing, a decisive strategic outcome. Unfortunately, the opposite may also be true, G-d forbid.

However, both parties may foresee that no such decisive strategic outcome could be achievable. If so, the way forward would seem to involve continuing rounds of destructive strike and response, at potentially huge human and economic cost. In this situation, both parties may consider as preferable a negotiated outcome, as unlikely as that may seem.

From Israel’s perspective, it may be hoped that Iran could enforce upon its proxies  compliance with Israel’s minimum demands – Hamas frees the hostages and Hezbollah withdraws from the border to north of the Litani River.

A ceasefire from Iran’s other proxies – the Houthis and the Iraqi militias – may be part of this package, as per previously stated declarations that they would join a Gaza ceasefire.

In return, perhaps, as per previous negotiations, Israel could agree along with the ceasefire some token release of Palestinian prisoners and military withdrawal from built-up areas of Gaza.

Iran may have additional demands – for example, some loosening of international sanctions to provide economic relief.

This would look somewhat similar to the envisaged Phase I of the negotiations with Hamas, but with Israel’s red lines respected on prisoner release and full Gaza withdrawal, and some respite for Iran’s flagging economy.

But then, if the same sequencing logic holds as with the Hamas negotiations, a potential Phase II could be quite interesting.

Iran, once upon a time, a long long time ago, endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative, the Saudi framework for full recognition and normalisation with Israel by Arab and Islamic countries in return for a two-state peace on the 1967 borders.

We can safely assume that Israel would be willing to reciprocate and normalise with Iran. However, Iran has never categorically stated that its beef with Israel would end if an Israeli-Palestinian peace could be negotiated. Nor has it stated specifically how it would respond.

Therefore, it would be good in the context of Phase II negotiations to see emerge from Iran a clear statement on the nature of its response if such a peace was reached.

Would it support it? Would it respect it? Would it represent the end of resistance? Would it commit to recognise and work with only the Palestinian government, rather than its favoured factions? Would it abide by the terms of the peace agreement if they involve a demilitarised Palestine? Would it support the disarmament of its proxies, and commit to their participation in politics only? Would it permanently end its nuclear activities beyond legitimate civil use? Would it really recognise Israel? Normalise ties? De-escalate hostilities?

And for its part, could Israel trust any assurances that Iran provided? Are there confidence-building measures that could help build trust over time? Or would the theocratic regime be considered inherently untrustworthy such that Israel could never really let down its guard?

It seems to me this is the crux of the matter.

So long as Iran’s intentions are unknown, irrespective of any other factor, including a sincere commitment by the Palestinians to coexist with Israel (another key prerequisite which I have argued previously requires an Abraham Accords-style reframing of the narrative to achieve), Israel could not commit to the kind of two-state solution that the Arab Peace Initiative calls for (or, preferably, a more imaginative alternative).

And so long as the core Israel-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, Iran will have a pretext for its stated mission to destroy Israel as a step towards its long sought-after regional hegemony.

Therefore, what it comes down to is whether Iran, facing the decimation of its proxies, as well as worsening economic woes that could imperil the regime, would be willing to give up its quest for regional hegemony? And whether, if it would, could Israel take some risks for a far-reaching regional peace?

About the Author
Adam Gross is a strategist that specialises in solving complex problems in the international arena. Adam made aliyah with his family in 2019 to live in northern Israel.
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