Is This Time Different? Will Israel Be Allowed to Win?

War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy
–Clausewitz, On War[1]

Amidst Israel’s war and the U.S. bombing of Iran, an unspoken question is whether Israel will be allowed to win this time? This underscores the notion that ever since creation of the State of Israel, each time its enemies tried to destroy it, they lost but Israel was prevented from winning.[2] Time after time, Israel’s enemies have been able to regroup, rearm and attack again. The reality proves more complex, however, as war involves the collision of forces within a political environment.[3] Israel is a very small country the size of New Jersey or Slovenia. It has been able to ward off existential threats largely due to allies who provide military resupply at critical times.[4] This dependence–which survives the transition from large-scale conventional wars to hybrid and asymmetric warfare–places it within a permission structure that ultimately constrains its agency in shaping military outcomes. To ultimately prevail, Israel needs to ensure tight alignment with its allies so that underlying political issues are resolved in alignment with its military goals.[5] 

1948 War of Independence

Israel’s need for foreign military supply (including rifles and heavy weaponry) and political support was apparent at the outset. On May 15, 1948, the British withdrawal from Palestine[6 ]spurred the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian armies to invade the State of Israel.[7] (The prior year, Abdul Rahman Azzam, the Arab League’s first Secretary-General, warned that the establishment of a Jewish state would lead to “a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades.”)[8] But the U.S. State Department advised against U.S. intervention on behalf of Israel, due to concerns about potentially increasing the Soviet role in the Arab world and restriction of Arab oil supplies to the U.S.[9] During the war, the U.S. maintained an arms embargo against all belligerents.[10] The British, under a facade of impartiality, also placed an embargo on both sides, but supplied equipment and personnel to support the Arab States under the guise of pre-existing treaty and arms contract obligations.[110] Russia, however, looked to bring Israel into the communist fold and Stalin provided support. Israel obtained oil from Romania, guns and ammunition from Czechoslovakia and France.[120] According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, under “the inequitable and unfair rules of engagement: the Arabs could launch offensives with impunity, but international interventions always hampered and restrained Israel’s counterattacks.”[13] Under pressure from Britain and the U.S., Israel recalled its troops from Egyptian territory by January 2, 1949.[14] (Britain advised the U.S. that unless Israel withdrew, it would intervene to protect the Egyptian Army in Sinai, who were on the verge of defeat, under the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.) On January 7, 1949, a UN-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Egypt went into effect. (On January 8, British pilots were ordered to shoot down any Israeli aircraft infiltrating Egyptian or Jordanian airspace.) Israel went on to sign armistice, not peace, agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria.[15] 

Following the War, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, were occupied by Egypt and Transjordan (which annexed the West Bank), respectively, and used to mount terrorist attacks into Israel. Egypt subsequently blocked Israel’s access to the Suez Canal in violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. 

1956 Suez Crisis

By 1956, the Sinai peninsula had been converted into a huge Egyptian military base. On July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company (Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez), the joint British-French enterprise that had owned and operated the Suez Canal since its construction in 1869.[16] This action threatened to cut off Europe’s supply of Middle East oil. In October, Egypt and Syria formed a joint military command, which rapidly acquired Soviet-bloc weapons.[17] On October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite military alliance with Syria and Jordan, placing Nasser in command of all three armies.[18] On October 29, 1956, Israel–in an operation agreed with France–invaded Egypt. A few days later, on November 5, Britain and France launched a combined military campaign and landed paratroopers in the Canal Zone on the grounds of protecting it. In Israel’s eight-day campaign, the IDF captured the Gaza Strip and the entire Sinai Peninsula, halting 10 miles east of the Suez Canal. The Israelis seized Sharm al-Sheikh, giving it control of the Straits of Tiran. The Soviet Union protested and threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt, hinting that the Soviets might use nuclear weapons against London and Paris if hostilities continued.[19] The U.S.–concerned, in part, about dissociating itself from European colonialism–pressured Britain and France to accept a UN ceasefire on November 6. The U.S. first proposed (Oct. 31, 1956) UN Security Council resolution 119 calling for a ceasefire, which was subsequently adopted in the General Assembly as Resolution 1001. At midnight on November 6-7, Britain agreed to a ceasefire, followed by France and Israel. A UN decision to station an Emergency Force along the Egypt-Israel border and Egyptian assurances of free navigation in the Gulf of Eilat led Israel to agree to withdraw in stages. Israel evacuated the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in March 1957. 

1967 Six-Day War

The 1967 Six-Day War was triggered by Egypt’s May closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. By the end of the War, Israel gained an area four times its own size, including all of Sinai, the Golan Heights, the headwaters of the Jordan River at Baniyas, Gaza, all of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The U.S.–with a goal of preventing Soviet dominance in the Middle-East–pressured Israel to conclude the War when the IDF appeared to be moving toward Damascus and the Soviets threatened to intervene.[20] In the aftermath of the War, in August 1967 the Arab League Summit conference issued the Khartoum Resolution known as “The Three No’s”: No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel. Later in the year, in November 1967, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242–drafted by the UK and supported by the U.S.–that calls for establishment of peace in line with principles calling for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967 and Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a state.[21] 

War of Attrition (1967-70)

Following the Six-Day War, a War of Attrition (מלחמת ההתשה) was waged against Israel by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria from July 1967 to August 1970.[22] After suffering many deaths[23] and capture of a dozen IDF soldiers, the Israelis seized the initiative beginning in September 1969 and destroyed the Egyptian air defenses along the whole Suez front. In January 1970, Egyptian President Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for Russian help. The Russians provided arms, air defense equipment, 30 Soviet-manned SA-3 battalions, and five squadrons of MIG-21 fighters with Soviet pilots. Fearing that direct Russian involvement would escalate into nuclear confrontation, the U.S. and USSR agreed to end the war with a “cease-fire stand-still” formula, approved by the UN Security Council in July 1970. The night the cease-fire went into effect, on August 7, 1970, Egypt breached the agreement by immediately moving anti-aircraft batteries into the Canal zone (presaging the Yom Kippur War), and the U.S. failed to protest.[24]

1973 Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War began, on October 6, 1973, with a simultaneous attack by Egypt (east of the Suez Canal) and Syria (in the Golan Heights) on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.[25] By October 9, Israel was able to contain the threat from both countries, but could not take the offensive without a weapons resupply. The U.S. was initially reluctant to aid Israel, but rapidly changed position when the Soviet Union began to resupply Egypt and Syria.[26] U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did not want to let the Israelis be overrun militarily (letting Soviet arms defeat American arms), but at the same time, he did not want the Egyptians to be defeated and humiliated because he was looking forward to starting a peace process. As Israel and Egypt seemed to reach a stalemate, and the Syrians were virtually out of the War, Russia–worried that Egypt would be defeated again–reached out to the U.S. to seek a cease-fire. On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling for an immediate end to the fighting. The UN-brokered ceasefire was agreed by Israel and Egypt, but it collapsed almost immediately amid mutual accusations of violations. The hostilities continued and Israel encircled and cut off the Egyptian Third Army and Suez City, bringing the IDF within 62 miles of Cairo.  On October 25 and 26, the Soviet Union threatened to send troops into Egypt to save the Egyptian Third Army.[27] In response, the U.S. raised a nuclear alert (DEFCON III) and demanded that Israel halt military action and permit non-military supplies to reach the Third Army. Kissinger told the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz, “that ‘You will not be permitted to destroy the army’ and it was ‘inconceivable that the Soviets’ would allow that to happen.’”[28] The War ended on October 26, with Israel and Egypt entering into military talks the next day under UN auspices.[29] Israel signed a formal cease-fire agreement with Egypt on November 11 and with Syria on May 31, 1974. On March 26, 1979, Israel and Egypt entered into a permanent peace agreement, which led to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and normalization of ties (becoming a Cold War) between the two countries.

1981 Osirak Raid

In June 1981, Israel destroyed Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor[30] (timed to occur before the reactor became operational). President Reagan’s contemporaneous reaction was that, “Boys will be boys!”[31] But to appease Arab anger, the U.S. suspended delivery of six F-16 aircraft to Israel and voted to support a UN Security Council resolution condemning the raid.[32]

1982 First Lebanon War

In June 1982, Palestinian terrorists attacked Israel’s ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov.[33] The failed assassination came on the heels of PLO attacks against Israel and Israeli targets internationally. It triggered a ground operation and ensuing war known as Operation Peace for the Galilee, or the First Lebanon War. This Operation marked a transition from large-scale conventional warfare, which was the model for the first three decades of Israel’s existence, to the hybrid and asymmetric warfare that would follow. At the time, there were 23,000 terrorists in Lebanon.[34] 

The U.S. Reagan Administration was divided on how to respond. Its fundamental goal was to end Lebanon’s festering civil war and unify it under the Christian Maronites, while banishing occupying Israeli and Syrian armies.[35] U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that the United States should not pressure Israel to withdraw without demanding that the PLO and Syria do the same. After the IDF destroyed Syria’s missiles in the Bekaa Valley on June 9, raising the specter of a wider war, President Reagan sent emissary Philip Habib to Israel to demand a ceasefire. During July and August, the PLO was trapped inside Beirut and was bombed by Israeli aircraft. News coverage of the bombing began to turn international opinion against Israel. There was also considerable criticism inside Israel and the IDF had no appetite for going into Beirut to root out the PLO via building-to-building urban combat. The situation was resolved by a cease-fire agreement that went into effect on August 21, under the terms of which a multi-national force (MNF) was formed to evacuate the PLO by sea.[36] Israel remained in Lebanon for 18 years, ultimately empowering Hezbollah, which filled the vacuum when Israel left.

2006 Second Lebanon War

The Second Lebanon War–”the first open conflict in Israel’s ‘cold war’ with Iran”[37]–began in July 2006 after Hezbollah staged a cross-border raid from Lebanon in which three Israeli soldiers were killed and two captured. Israel’s goal was not to crush Hezbollah, but to drive it out of southern Lebanon and pressure the government to disarm it. However, its initiative proved to be “a witches brew of high tech fantasies and basic unpreparedness.”[38] Israel failed to incapacitate Hezbollah forces that had anticipated Israeli reliance on air power and precision weapons.[39] Further, the bombing infuriated the Lebanese, with a result that the Lebanese government was unwilling to disarm Hezbollah.[40] Israel became bogged down in Lebanon and failed to recover its two soldiers.  Hezbollah was launching 100 rockets a day into Israel until the U.S.–which had been uncompromising in its support for Israel–[41] spearheaded a ceasefire deal (UN Security Council Resolution 1701).[42]

Gaza War (2023 – present)

In 2024, as Israel was fighting Iran’s proxy Hamas and seeking to rescue the hostages it had taken into Gaza during the Black Saturday invasion, U.S. President Biden halted the shipment of some 3,500 heavy bombs to Israel in order to dissuade Jerusalem from launching a large-scale offensive in Rafah, and threatened to stop sending additional offensive weapons if the invasion went ahead.[43] In addition, many countries–including France, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia–called for a ceasefire due to the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the increasing death toll of civilians, primarily due to Hamas’ strategy of embracing and leveraging civilian deaths as “necessary sacrifices”.[44] In June 2024, the UN Security Council overwhelmingly approved a U.S.-backed three-phase ceasefire plan (Resolution 2735), with only Russia abstaining. Israel, however, vowed to press on to “ensure that Gaza doesn’t pose a threat to Israel in the future.”[45] Following the election of President Trump, the U.S. vetoed a UN Security Council draft resolution to demand “an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza” and revive the phased ceasefire framework outlined in Resolution 2735. Acting U.S. ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea said the draft resolution didn’t condemn Hamas, didn’t call it to disarm and didn’t call on it to leave Gaza.[46]

Iran War (present)

On June 13, 2025, Israel attacked Iran in order to eliminate the existential threat of Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile arsenal. Israel commenced the action after the expiration of a 60-day deadline U.S. President Trump had given the Iranians to come to an agreement to halt uranium enrichment.[47] Israeli airstrikes targeted Iran’s nuclear and military sites, top generals and nuclear scientists. On June 22, 2025, the U.S. helped Israel by sending B-2 stealth bombers to drop more than a dozen massive “bunker-buster” bombs on Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, while Tomahawk missiles struck the Isfahan nuclear site. 

For Israel, the question of whether it will be allowed to win–as it always has been–is inapposite. U.S. Major General McMaster cautions that military operations are not ends in and of themselves, but rather “one of several instruments of power that must be aligned to achieve sustainable strategic goals.”[48]  If Israel is to achieve its war goals–and ultimately win the peace–it needs to harness the collective political power of its allies to achieve the dominance necessary to command positive change. This time is no different.

Endnotes:

1. 1. Quoted in, STUDYING WAR AND WARFARE – BY MAJOR GENERAL H.R. MCMASTER, Modern War Institute (Oct. 26, 2014), https://mwi.westpoint.edu/2014111studying-war-and-warfare-by-major-general-hr-mcmaster/

   2. See, M. Wise, Israel has never been allowed to win a war!, Israel National News (Dec. 1. 2023), https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/381258; See, D. Greenfeld, Israel has the right to win, JNS (Sept. 5, 2024), https://www.jns.org/israel-has-the-right-to-win/; “What the West’s technocratic elite wants is to make Israel the Jew among the nations — despised, weak and pitiable — so that it will stop its ‘warmongering’” and adopt the West’s ‘self-evident’ four principles of international diplomacy and ‘make peace’ with the Palestinians, who are assumed to be just waiting for a call from Jerusalem so that they can agree to a two-state solution.” D. Saunders, Why Israel Is Not Allowed to Win Wars, The Future of Jewish (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.futureofjewish.com/p/why-israel-is-not-allowed-to-win; cf., R. Kelanik, A U.S. War With Iran Would Be a Catastrophe, NY Times (June 14, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/opinion/trump-israel-iran-war-attacks-nuclear.html

   3. See, H. Smith, Clausewitz’s Definition of War and its Limits, Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (Winter 2025), https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/clausewitzs-definition-of-war-and-its-limits/

   4. Israel receives the largest annual US foreign assistance and is the only one that does not have to account for how the economic aid is spent. Cf., J Bainerman, End American Aid to Israel?: Yes, It Does Harm, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1995), https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/end-american-aid-to-israel-yes-it-does-harm

   5. Cf., Z. Riboua, How the U.S. Attack on Iran Hurts Russia and China, Mosaic (June 23, 2025), https://mosaicmagazine.com/observation/israel-zionism/2025/06/how-the-u-s-attack-on-iran-hurts-russia-and-china/?utm_source=Klaviyo&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily-newsletter-unpaid&utm_content=6-17-25&_kx=E_MkTEXeU-374YnIroAt3ZvDf6oenErPx9yqkI87_3s.L87CGh

   6. The British divested itself from the Mandate “without handing over to a responsible authority any of the assets, property or liabilities of the Mandatory Power.” Sir Henry Gurney, last Chief Secretary of Mandatory Palestine, when asked, “And to whom do you intend to give the keys to your office?”, reportedly replied, “I shall leave them under the mat.” According to Shlaim, “Britain’s policy during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was essentially an exercise in damage control.” A. Shlaim, Britain and the Arab Israeli War of 1948, J. Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 50, 52, https://balfourproject.org/bp/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Britain-Arab-Israeli-War-1948-JPS-1987.pdf

   7. Israel was proclaimed an independent state the prior afternoon by the head of the Jewish Agency, David Ben-Gurion. It was immediately recognized by US President Truman.

   8. See, D. Barnett & A. Karsh, Azzam’s Genocidal Threat, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 2011), https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/azzam-genocide-threat

   9. Creation of Israel, 1948, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel

   10. Cf., Probable Effects on Israel and the Arab States of a UN Arms Embargo, Report by the CIA (Aug. 5, 1948.), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p2/d512

   11. See, Middle East (British Arms Supplies), Volume 448: debated on Monday 1 March 1948, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1948-03-01/debates/978b204b-a268-47c8-8bcf-81d723b32048/MiddleEast(BritishArmsSupplies)

   12. Cf., D. Axe, How Israel Won Its Independence—With Nazi Guns, Trench Art (May 17, 2025), https://daxe.substack.com/p/how-israel-won-its-independencewith

   13. B. Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, Yale U. Press (2008), p.404, quoted in, 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War; cf., A. Montenegro, 1948 Arab-Israeli War: Victory in Consolidation, School of Advanced Military Studies U.S., Army Command and General Staff College (2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1159457.pdf

   14. See, N. Aridan, Britain and Israel in 1948: A note in response to Ronnie Fraser, Fathom (June 2021), https://fathomjournal.org/britain-and-israel-in-1948-a-note-in-response-to-ronnie-fraser/

   15. Cf., J. Dickens, Israel’s elusive peace, Engelsberg’s Ideas (Jan. 23, 2025), https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/israels-elusive-peace/

   16. See, The Suez Crisis – a Brief Comint History (U),  National Security Agency Special series Crisis Collection  (1988), https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/Suez_Crisis.pdf; Suez Crisis, 1956, U.S. Dept. of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm

   17.  “[T]he massive influx of arms into Egypt indicated [to Israel] Arab plans for a full-scale war against Israel.” See, The Suez Crisis – a Brief Comint History (U),  National Security Agency Special series Crisis Collection  (1988), p.17, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/Suez_Crisis.pd

   18. See, The Sinai-Suez Campaign: Background & Overview (October – November 1956), Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-sinai-suez-campaign#google_vignette

   19. See, The Suez Crisis – a Brief Comint History (U),  National Security Agency Special series Crisis Collection (1988), https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/Suez_Crisis.pdf

   20. Cf., L. Wainstein, Critical Incident No. 114 – Some Aspects of the U.S. Involvement in the Middle East Crisis, May – June 1967 (U), Inst. for Defense Analyses Report R-132 (Feb. 1968), pp.121-23, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/CriticalIncidentNo.14.pdf; D. Ross et al., LBJ and the June 1967 War: Lessons from the American Role, Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 2819 (June 9, 2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lbj-and-june-1967-war-lessons-american-role; Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28165.htm

   21. Cf., Resolution 242 did not call on Israel to withdraw to pre-War lines of June 4, 1967, and does not reference “Palestinians” or any “right of return”. M. Rosene, Understanding UN Security Council Resolution 242, Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, https://jcpa.org/requirements-for-defensible-borders/security_council_resolution_242/

   22. See, The War of Attrition, IDF War and Operations (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/the-war-of-attrition/

   23. During the War of Attrition, Israel suffered 1,424 soldiers killed in action.

   24. See, M. Doran, The Hidden Calculation Behind the Yom Kippur War, Mosaic (Oct. 2, 2023), https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/israel-zionism/2023/10/the-hidden-calculation-behind-the-yom-kippur-war/

   25. It was also the 10th day of Ramadan.

   26. The Arab countries countered the US airlift by imposing an oil embargo against the US.

   27. Quoted in, W. Burr (Ed.), The October War and U.S. Policy, National Security Archive (Oct. 7, 2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm#doc51

   28. See, A. Atherton, Jr., Negotiating the End of the Yom Kippur War, ADST, https://adst.org/2015/09/negotiating-the-end-of-the-yom-kippur-war/

   29. Cf., J. Jonah, The Military Talks at Kilometer 101: The U.N.’s Effectiveness as a Third Party, Negotiation Journal (Case Study Jan. 1990), http://direct.mit.edu/ngtn/article-pdf/6/1/53/2397498/j.1571-9979.1990.tb00554.x.pdf

   30. Iran first bombed Osirak in September 1980 and shared its F-4E surveillance images with Israel. See, T. Cooper & F. Bishop, TARGET: SADDAM’S REACTOR – ISRAELI AND IRANIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQI PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Air Enthusiast, Issue 110 (March/April 2004), https://www.angelfire.com/art2/narod/opera/; cf., 38 years later, pilots recall how Iran inadvertently enabled Osirak reactor raid, Times of Israel, (June 10, 2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/38-years-later-pilots-recall-how-iran-inadvertently-enabled-osiraq-reactor-raid/

   31. See, R. Allen, Reagan’s Secure Line, NY Times (June 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/opinion/07allen.html; cf., Reagan wrote in his diary, “I swear I believe Armageddon is near.” Quoted in, A. Evans, A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak, Wilson Center Sources & Methods (July 10, 2017), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/lesson-the-1981-raid-osirak; G. Pulcini & O. Rabinowitz, An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 2 (Spring 2021), https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/23/2/4/101855/An-Ounce-of-Prevention-A-Pound-of-Cure-The-Reagan

   32. “During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney thanked Israel for destroying Osirak. Cf., CHENEY TO ISRAEL: THANKS FOR DESTROYING IRAQI REACTOR; WILL U.S. TAKE 10 YEARS TO ACCEPT ISRAELI STANCE ON PEACE?, Center for Security Policy  (Oct. 30, 1991), https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/cheney-to-israel-thanks-for-destroying-iraqi-reactor-will-u-s-take-10-years-to-accept-israeli-stance-on-peace-2/; J. Kirschenbaum, Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 2010), https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=jss; A. Segal, Netanyahu Passes the Begin Test, Wall St. J. (June 20, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/opinion/netanyahu-passes-the-begin-test-nuclear-weapons-israel-war-doctrine-ae5ccba4?mod=hp_opin_pos_4

   33. See, Z. Rothbart, The Botched Hit That Sparked the First Lebanon War, National Library of Israel (Aug. 19, 2022), https://blog.nli.org.il/en/hoi-argov-lebanon-war/

   34. Lebanon had signed the Cairo Agreement of 1969, which allowed the PLO to arm and govern itself within the refugee camps, establishing a de facto state within Lebanon. See also, S. Cox, H-080-1: Operation “No Name”—The U.S. Navy in the Lebanon Crisis, 1982–84, Naval History & Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/about-us/leadership/hgram_pdfs/H-Gram_080-1.pdf

   35. See, D. Kennedy & L. Brunetta, Lebanon and the Intelligence Community, Kennedy School of Government (Case Study 1988), https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Lebanon-and-Intel-Community.pdf

   36. According to Dr. Jacques Neriah, a former senior Israeli military intelligence officer, “The Americans had made it very clear not to try to take out Arafat because he was really in the crosshairs of the snipers more than once.” 12 years after the PLO left, Arafat returned to Gaza and the West Bank as a result of the Oslo Accords. Neriah commented that,  “We just threw him out the door and he came back through the window.” M. Ben-Zeev, 40 years since Yasser Arafat left Beirut while Israel had him targeted, i24News (Aug. 28, 2022), https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/defense/1661709845-when-yasser-arafat-left-beirut-while-israel-had-him-targeted; cf., Israel: Begin Says Habib Promises PLO Evacuation Commitment, CIA (July 28, 1982), https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001102740011-0.pdf

   37. See, S. Farquhar (ed.), BACK TO BASICS – A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD, Combat Studies Institute Press (May 2009), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/farquhar.pdf

   38. See, S. Farquhar (ed.), BACK TO BASICS – A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD, Combat Studies Institute Press (May 2009), p.14, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/farquhar.pdf

   39. Hezbollah hid its mobile rockets in underground tunnels and bunkers and its organizational design also proved resilient to air power, having evolved into a system of discrete groups with little operational contact with one another. See, S. Farquhar (ed.), BACK TO BASICS – A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD, Combat Studies Institute Press (May 2009), pp.6-10, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/farquhar.pdf

   40. Cf., S. Niva, Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War, MER 255 (Summer 2010),  https://merip.org/2010/05/drawing-the-wrong-lessons-from-israels-2006-war/

   41. The Israeli action was aligned with the U.S. administration because it would reduce the potential threat of Hezbollah retaliation against Israel should the U.S. launch a military strike against Iran.  See, D. Glaister, Bush ‘helped Israeli attack on Lebanon’, Guardian (Aug. 13, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/14/syria.usa

   42. Cf., P. Rogers, THE LEBANON AFTERMATH, Oxford Research Group (Aug. 2006), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/25609/Aug06.pdf

   43. M. Schnell & M. Lillis, House passes GOP bill to undo Biden’s weapons freeze to Israel, The Hill (May 16, 2024), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4669080-house-passes-bill-undo-bidens-weapons-freeze-to-israel/

   44. Cf., S. Said & R. Jones, Gaza Chief’s Brutal Calculation: Civilian Bloodshed Will Help Hamas, Wall. Street J. (June 10, 2024), https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-chiefs-brutal-calculation-civilian-bloodshed-will-help-hamas-626720e7

   45. M. Knight et al., Israel vows to press on in Gaza after UN Security Council approves ceasefire proposal, CNN (June 11, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/11/middleeast/israel-gaza-un-security-council-ceasefire-intl-hnk/index.html

   46. See, D. Shea, Explanation of Vote on a UNSC Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East, U.S. Mission to the U.N. (June 4, 2025), https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-a-unsc-resolution-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east/; B. Ravid, U.S. vetoes UN security council resolution demanding immediate ceasefire in Gaza, Axios (June 4, 2025), https://www.axios.com/2025/06/04/us-vetoes-un-security-council-resolution-demanding-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza

   47. Cf., A. Ward et al., How a Once-Resistant Trump Decided to Back Israel’s Attacks on Iran, Wall St. J. (June 13, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-a-once-resistant-trump-decided-to-back-israels-attacks-on-iran-4e343fac?mod=WSJ_home_mediumtopper_pos_3

   48. STUDYING WAR AND WARFARE – BY MAJOR GENERAL H.R. MCMASTER, Modern War Institute (Oct. 26, 2014), https://mwi.westpoint.edu/2014111studying-war-and-warfare-by-major-general-hr-mcmaster/