Israel does not need Trump to form our next government

Israel does not need Donald Trump to form its next government. It needs Israeli political leaders willing to sit together, reconsider their assumptions, and take responsibility for the country they have asked to lead.

Our relationship with the United States is indispensable. But the responsibility for translating an Israeli election into a functioning Israeli government belongs here. No American president can substitute for the courage our electorate and own politicians must now demonstrate.

People on both sides of the political spectrum in Israel have been depressed since election results were announced earlier this week. Since then, armchair quarterbacks (myself included) and studio pundits have been wrapping their heads around possible political scenarios that make political sense. One such scenario is that President Trump would call Gadi Eisenkot and force him to join Likud and Benjamine Netanyahu in a national unity government. This scenario would make most of those who voted for the opposition bloc cringe.

One thing that years of observing the Israeli political system has taught me, is that election promises and campaign positions are one thing. The day after, politicans deal with the hand dealt them by the electorate. And this election, where there is so much at stake, is no different than so many past Israeli election cycles.

So, keeping in mind that we must deal with real-world scenarios, not those we floated in our head leading into last Tuesday, here is a coalition worth discussing seriously: the opposition bloc, together with Ra’am and Shas. I beg you to keep reading, and not claim that I have completely lost my marbles.

According to results, this proposed coalition would produce sixty-two seats. A narrow majority, certainly, but a parliamentary majority, nonetheless. The obstacle is not a missing mandate. It is the political distance between parties that have spent the last few months explaining why they cannot sit together.

I believe that distance can be negotiated, if participants decide that governing Israel matters more than preserving the boundaries of their electoral blocs. So, sit back and follow my logic, whether you end up agreeing with my logic or not.

Let us start with Shas.

Shas is a Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party with a constituency, religious identity, and interests of its own. After a bruising electoral defeat, Shas needs a tangible achievement to put before its voters. Remaining in opposition out of loyalty to Netanyahu would offer little evidence that the party can still deliver for the communities it represents. Joining a government could give Deri something concrete to claim as a victory: influence over policy.

Breaking his promise not to join without Likud could carry a political price, for him personally and for his party. But he could argue that his deeper obligation is to his voters, and that securing their future matters more than keeping a promise that leaves him powerless to help them.

Political history shows us that participation in a government led by his “opponents” does not represent an unprecedented departure from the party’s history. Shas joined governments led by Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. Its current alignment is a political choice, not an immutable law of Israeli politics.

Though Aryeh Deri has ruled out joining an opposition-led government without Likud, and this is a substantial obstacle, it is also a decision he can reconsider. The question for Shas is whether another period of paralysis would serve its voters better than a negotiated place in a functioning government.

Now consider Ra’am.

Mansour Abbas has already demonstrated that an Arab party can participate in an Israeli governing coalition. Ra’am’s participation in the Bennett-Lapid government established a precedent that cannot simply be erased because acknowledging it has become politically inconvenient.

Arab citizens vote, pay taxes, work in our hospitals, build businesses, and raise children whose futures are bound to this country. Their representatives should be judged by their commitments and conduct, just as Jewish parties should be.

If a party accepts the responsibilities of coalition membership, negotiates an agreed program, and commits to maintaining the government, its Arab identity should not disqualify it.

The current opposition bloc must confront this directly. Leaders who promised change while ruling out potential partners now owe voters an explanation of how they intend to deliver it. Changing a campaign position requires honesty. They should explain what has changed, what safeguards they have negotiated, and why the agreement serves the interests of the country.

That is what leadership after an inconclusive election demands.

Such a coalition could deliver on the opposition’s central promises: a state commission of inquiry into October 7, an end to the outgoing government’s assault on judicial independence, and a fair, defensible framework for ultra-Orthodox men’s conscription into military service.

Most importantly it will remove Netanyahu from the premiership after nearly two decades in office across successive terms. Crucially, it would give Arab citizens, whose parties achieved a historic electoral showing, a meaningful share in governing the country. None of these achievements would be automatic; each would require an explicit, enforceable coalition agreement. But together they offer the opposition bloc a compelling reason to negotiate: the opportunity to turn its campaign promises into government policy.

These are substantial reasons to govern together.

If such a collation is formed, it will require tremendous discipline: an agreed prime minister and a mechanism for resolving disagreements before they become public threats to bring down the government.

With only sixty-two seats, no participant could pretend that another partner was expendable.

There would be crises. Security decisions could test Ra’am’s participation. Conscription would test Shas. Cooperation with both would test the government’s internal cohesion. Those are real risks.

But continued paralysis carries risks too.

A government bringing together Zionist opposition parties, a Sephardi religious party, and an Arab party could demonstrate something Israel urgently needs: the ability to turn profound differences into joint national responsibility.

It could also change the story Israel tells the world. Secular, religious Jewish and Arab citizens sharing responsibility for government, would give substance to our claims about democratic inclusion. Leaders reaching an honest compromise would show a society capable of repairing itself.

That outcome would have to be earned through governing.

The numbers provide an opening. The parties must decide whether to use it.

Israel does not need Trump to form our next government. We need our own leaders to stop explaining why partnership is impossible and begin negotiating the terms that could make it work.