The world appears perfectly comfortable with Israel defending itself, provided that its defense never becomes effective enough to defeat the people attacking it.

That contradiction has become one of the strangest features of the international debate surrounding Israel. Israel is repeatedly told that it has the right to defend itself. Politicians make solemn statements about Israel’s security. Governments condemn terrorism and declare that Israeli civilians should not have to live under rockets, massacres, kidnappings or threats of annihilation.

But the moment Israel attempts to transform the abstract right of self defense into actual military results, the conversation changes.

Suddenly the question is not simply why Israel was attacked. The question becomes whether Israel’s response is too strong, whether the military operation should stop, whether international pressure should be increased and whether Israel should accept another ceasefire before the organization attacking it has actually lost the capability to attack again.

Israel is therefore confronted with an almost impossible expectation. It is expected to survive its wars, but increasingly it seems that it is not supposed to win them. That distinction matters.

A country does not defend its population merely by intercepting missiles. It does not solve terrorism simply by constructing better shelters. It cannot permanently answer massacres by developing faster warning systems. Defensive technology can save enormous numbers of lives, and Israel has demonstrated extraordinary innovation in protecting its population, but defense alone cannot eliminate the source of a continuing military threat.

Imagine applying that principle anywhere else. Would Europeans accept a neighboring armed organization deliberately firing rockets at Amsterdam, Paris, London or Berlin while openly announcing that it intended to continue? Would their governments be expected merely to intercept those rockets indefinitely? Would citizens accept being told that eliminating the military infrastructure responsible might create too much international controversy?

Israel is expected to live with circumstances that many countries would consider completely intolerable.

The geographical reality also matters. Israel is a very small country. Threats that appear distant when viewed on a television screen can be extremely close to Israeli homes, schools, airports and cities. Israel does not possess the enormous strategic depth enjoyed by many larger nations. A serious security mistake cannot always be corrected later.

This is why the discussion about Hamas cannot end with the question of whether the fighting stops.

The far more important question is what happens afterward. If Hamas retains weapons, commanders, tunnels, political influence and the ability to rebuild its military infrastructure, what exactly has been solved? If another generation is taught that the destruction of Israel remains an achievable objective, has peace really been created or has the next war merely been postponed?

The same principle extends beyond Gaza. Israel exists in a region where Iran has spent years supporting armed organizations and building regional influence. Hezbollah accumulated an enormous arsenal in Lebanon. The Houthis demonstrated that a conflict involving Israel could extend far beyond Israel’s immediate borders. Radical organizations have repeatedly shown that geography does not prevent them from participating in the campaign against the Jewish state.

Yet Israel is frequently expected to calculate its security according to what its enemies are doing today rather than according to what they have repeatedly declared they intend to do tomorrow.

That is a dangerous luxury. None of this means that Israel should receive unlimited freedom from criticism.

Supporting Israel should never require pretending that every Israeli government decision is automatically correct. Democracies make mistakes. Military operations deserve scrutiny. Political leaders should be challenged. Civilian suffering matters regardless of nationality, and international humanitarian law remains relevant even when confronting enemies that themselves violate it.

But there is an enormous difference between holding Israel accountable and creating standards under which Israel can never actually defeat a military threat.

That is where much of the international discussion becomes detached from reality. Calls for restraint sound morally attractive when separated from consequences. A ceasefire sounds compassionate. Negotiations sound preferable to military operations. Diplomacy should always be pursued when it has a realistic possibility of producing security and peace.

But a ceasefire is not peace simply because the shooting temporarily stops. If one side uses the silence to rearm, recruit, rebuild tunnels, manufacture weapons and prepare another attack, the international community has not prevented war. It has merely changed the date on which the next war begins.

Israel has experienced this dilemma repeatedly. There is also a deeper problem in the way Israel’s military success affects international perception.

Because Israel has shelters, warning systems, missile defense and a powerful military, Israeli casualties can sometimes remain lower than they otherwise would have been. That is an achievement, not evidence that the threat was insignificant.

Yet the imbalance in casualties is frequently presented as though morality can be calculated by comparing numbers. War does not work that way.

A country does not become guilty because it successfully protects its citizens. Nor does an aggressor become morally justified because the society it attacked developed superior defensive capabilities.

The purpose of a government is to protect its population. Israel has invested enormous resources in doing exactly that.

The uncomfortable question for the international community is therefore simple.

What exactly is Israel supposed to do? Should Israelis accept periodic rocket attacks because their missile defense systems intercept many of them? Should families near hostile borders repeatedly evacuate their homes? Should Israel wait until an enemy becomes stronger because preventive action might provoke international criticism? Should terrorists be permitted to rebuild because eliminating their infrastructure creates disturbing images on television?

Those are not theoretical questions for Israelis. They concern survival. Israel should be expected to respect international law. Israel should be expected to investigate mistakes. Israel should be expected to distinguish wherever feasible between civilians and combatants. And Israel should continue searching for genuine opportunities for peace.

But Israel cannot reasonably be expected to accept permanent insecurity simply to satisfy people thousands of kilometers away who will never have to live with the consequences.

Peace cannot mean that Israel stops fighting while its enemies stop only temporarily. Peace requires something much more difficult. It requires the abandonment of the objective of destroying Israel. It requires leaders prepared to build societies rather than mobilize generations for another war. It requires recognition that Jewish sovereignty is not a temporary historical accident waiting to be reversed.

Israel does not need endless wars. Israelis themselves have more reason than almost anyone to want those wars to end. But ending a battle and ending a threat are not the same thing.

The world cannot continue telling Israel that it has the right to defend itself while condemning every meaningful attempt to make that defense successful.

Israel has the right to survive.

And sometimes survival requires more than defending against the next attack.

It requires ensuring that the next attack cannot happen.