Israel-Saudi Normalization Won’t Happen—Here’s Why

In the months leading up to October 7, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia was widely expected to be a transformative geopolitical shift. It promised to redefine power dynamics in the Middle East, aligning strategic interests and opening major economic opportunities. Spearheaded by US diplomacy, the agreement seemed within reach.

However, the violent escalation on October 7 and the subsequent Gaza war have dramatically altered this trajectory. The political landscape in both countries has shifted, and the momentum for normalization has significantly weakened.

While some analysts argue that the war has only delayed normalization—and that strategic interests will soon regain dominance—this view underestimates how deeply the regional and domestic landscape has shifted. I believe normalization is off the table for the foreseeable future. Four deeply interconnected factors now make such a deal far less likely.

Changed Strategic Calculations: Saudi Arabia’s Diminished Urgency in Countering Iran

Since October 7, Saudi Arabia has observed a notable weakening of Iran’s regional position. With its proxy network under heavy strain, the urgency to align with Israel has diminished.

Hamas was severely weakened by Israel’s military response—its leadership was targeted, much of its tunnel and weapons infrastructure was destroyed, and its operational capacity reduced. Once a key Iranian proxy, Hamas is now a diminished force.

Hezbollah, after extended clashes along Israel’s northern border, also paid a steep price. Several top commanders were reportedly killed, and Israeli strikes degraded much of its arsenal. The group was eventually pushed into a ceasefire and partial withdrawal, weakening its deterrent posture.

In Syria, the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 struck a serious blow to Iran. Syria had served as a logistical corridor to Hezbollah; with Assad gone, that bridge has collapsed.

Elsewhere, Iran’s influence is waning. In Yemen, it has stepped back from the Houthis. In Iraq, Tehran’s militias are facing growing restrictions. Across the region, Iran’s proxies are fragmented and weakened.

As a result, Riyadh sees less strategic need to rush into normalization with Israel. With Iran on the defensive, Saudi Arabia is choosing caution and flexibility over urgency. This strategic recalibration was underscored by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, who stated at the Future Investment Initiative forum in Riyadh: “Normalization with Israel is not just at risk—it is off the table until we have a resolution to Palestinian statehood.“

Rising Public Sentiment in Saudi Arabia

Domestic public opinion in Saudi Arabia presents a significant obstacle to normalization. The country’s digitally connected population—especially its younger generation—is highly engaged with events in Gaza. Through social media platforms, graphic imagery and emotionally charged narratives have spread widely, fueling strong public outrage and a sense of solidarity with Palestinians.

Prominent Saudi influencers, journalists, and activists have openly condemned Israeli military actions, often framing them in deeply personal and moral terms. This has created intense social pressure on the government to take a firm stance, and to resist any diplomatic moves perceived as aligning with Israel.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while seen as a bold reformer, has also shown caution in navigating public sentiment. His ambitious Vision 2030 agenda relies heavily on maintaining social stability and public trust. In this context, normalization—particularly in the wake of ongoing violence—risks appearing tone-deaf or detached from popular emotion.

Under such emotionally charged conditions, even a symbolic agreement could be seen as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause, potentially undermining the Crown Prince’s reform momentum and eroding legitimacy among key demographics. In the worst case, it could spark unrest or provoke backlash within more conservative or activist segments of society.

As a result, the political cost of normalization has increased sharply. Until public anger subsides or the regional narrative shifts, Saudi leaders are likely to view rapprochement with Israel as not only diplomatically sensitive, but domestically dangerous.

Limited Israeli Diplomatic Flexibility

Israel’s internal political climate has hardened significantly since October 7. Before the war, even right-leaning governments occasionally entertained symbolic gestures toward a two-state solution, recognizing that such moves could help unlock normalization with Saudi Arabia. The prospect of regional integration offered a rare incentive for diplomatic creativity.

Now, however, national priorities have shifted decisively toward security and internal cohesion. The shock of the Hamas attack—and the perception of intelligence and military failures—has triggered widespread public anger, fueling political polarization and deep mistrust of external diplomatic pressure. As a result, the space for compromise has sharply contracted.

Any Israeli concessions tied to normalization, especially regarding the Palestinian issue, risk provoking intense backlash from both the political right and a traumatized public. Even moderate leaders are constrained, wary of appearing weak or out of touch. While some argue that normalization itself could serve as a stabilizing achievement, the prevailing mood makes bold diplomatic overtures politically untenable.

In this climate, Israeli policymakers are focused on reinforcing internal stability and deterrence. This significantly limits what Israel can credibly offer Saudi Arabia in return for normalization, especially in the near term.

Saudi Arabia’s Renewed Leadership on the Palestinian Issue

A final, and increasingly significant, factor is Saudi Arabia’s reassertion of its traditional leadership role on the Palestinian issue. Historically associated with King Faisal and the Kingdom’s post-1967 pan-Arab stance, this leadership had been somewhat eclipsed in recent years by more vocal regional actors, particularly Iran and Turkey.

However, dissatisfaction across the Arab world with Iran’s largely rhetorical support—and its failure to deliver tangible outcomes for the Palestinians—has created a vacuum. Likewise, Turkey’s influence, while loud and symbolic, has not translated into sustained diplomatic clout. This has opened a strategic space for Riyadh to step back in and reestablish itself as the primary Arab voice advocating for Palestinian rights.

By emphasizing its historical legitimacy and moral authority, Saudi Arabia seeks to bolster its broader regional influence, particularly among Arab populations disillusioned with other power centers. This move also aligns with Riyadh’s broader goal of shaping the post-war Middle East order on its own terms, rather than ceding that role to others.

Normalizing relations with Israel at this juncture would directly undermine that effort. It would hand rivals like Turkey an opportunity to accuse Saudi Arabia of abandoning the Palestinian cause for geopolitical convenience. Instead, Riyadh is choosing to prioritize long-term credibility, regional leadership, and strategic patience over short-term diplomatic breakthroughs.

Conclusion: From Momentum to Stalemate, For Now

Taken together, these four interwoven factors illustrate how dramatically the geopolitical calculus has changed since October 7. What once appeared to be a near-certain diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and Saudi Arabia now seems increasingly remote.

Yet while normalization has clearly lost momentum in the short term, it may not be off the table forever. Strategic interests often reassert themselves over time, especially in a region as fluid as the Middle East. The shared concerns that once brought Israel and Saudi Arabia to the brink of agreement—mutual security threats, economic diversification, and US alignment—are not likely to disappear entirely.

In the long run, shifting regional dynamics or new leadership priorities could gradually reopen the door to engagement. But any future normalization effort would likely look very different: More conditional, more incremental, and far more sensitive to public opinion and regional optics.

For now, normalization has been overtaken by more immediate political realities. Still, its long-term return remains a possibility—one that will depend not only on strategic calculations but also on the region’s capacity to absorb, heal from, and adapt to the profound shocks of the current moment.