Israeli Unity and the Independence of Nations

A Strategy to End the Threat from Tehran

The reported results of Israel’s election, with 53 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc, 48 for Eisenkot’s bloc, and 19 for the Arab-led parties, have underscored the need for political agreement, although formal certification of the results remains pending. Likud remains the largest party in the Knesset with 27 seats, but that lead is insufficient to assemble a coalition with a parliamentary majority. Netanyahu needs eight additional seats to reach the 61-seat majority, and his continued hold on power will depend on negotiations and the decisions of political forces outside his bloc.

Eisenkot, meanwhile, cannot treat the combined 67 seats of his bloc and the Arab-led parties as a coalition already formed. Opposition to Netanyahu does not, by itself, produce a shared program for government. Disagreements over cooperation with Arab-led parties, Haredi military service, and participation in a government that includes Netanyahu make it difficult to turn parliamentary arithmetic into a workable political majority. Eisenkot’s meetings with Bennett and other opposition leaders mark the beginning of this process; its success depends on agreement over both policy and the practical arrangements for governing. Netanyahu, too, will have to move beyond electoral dividing lines if he hopes to broaden his coalition.

The decisive question is therefore whether these leaders can translate electoral competition into an agreement capable of governing the country. Another election offers no guarantee of resolving their differences and could prolong instability. My appeal to Benjamin Netanyahu, Gadi Eisenkot, and their allies is clear: confronted by the Islamic Republic and the networks threatening Israel, the need for a responsible agreement is greater than ever. Such an agreement could take the form of a broad-based government or a pact across political blocs on security priorities and institutional stability, supported by a clear program, defined responsibilities, and effective accountability.

The credibility of any such agreement depends on respect for the electorate, judicial independence, parliamentary oversight, and equal citizenship. Allegations of foreign interference must likewise be investigated through lawful procedures. Opening an investigation does not establish wrongdoing or justify casting suspicion on an entire community of voters. Cohesion grounded in the rule of law and public trust strengthens Israel’s deterrence and creates space to manage legitimate political differences. National security should be central to coalition negotiations, and safeguarding democratic legitimacy is part of that security responsibility.

The urgency of this cooperation stems from the fact that weakening the Islamic Republic does not eliminate its capacity to regenerate threats. An October 14 assessment by the Foreign Policy Research Institute documented extensive damage to missile infrastructure while identifying underground activity and limited reconstruction. A Reuters investigation published on October 29 also revealed the continued operation of procurement networks. On the nuclear front, the inability to verify uranium stockpiles remains a serious concern, although Rafael Grossi reported that no efforts to rebuild the damaged nuclear facilities had been identified. The strategic implication is the need to maintain deterrence and effective verification: destroying facilities alone does not deliver lasting security.

In my view, the problem extends beyond the survival of the Islamic Republic. A change of government cannot guarantee a peaceful order if it leaves intact the monopoly on power, the denial of other peoples’ nationhood, and the instruments of regional domination. The Pahlavi government’s relationship with Israel does, of course, demonstrate that hostility toward Israel cannot be assumed inevitable under every possible future government in Tehran. The stronger argument is that Israel’s security should not depend on a successor’s promise of friendship. It should rest on institutional transformation, verifiable commitments, and safeguards against the restoration of capabilities for aggression.

As Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Independence Party, I view the central government’s rule over Eastern Kurdistan as foreign occupation and colonial rule. From this perspective, the official narrative of a single, unified nation obscures the existence of distinct nations and their right to sovereignty over their homelands. Documentation of structural discrimination, the suppression of political and cultural activity, and the treatment of Kurdish demands as security threats provides substantial grounds for challenging this order. Ending this relationship requires recognition of these nations’ right to determine their own futures. Responsibility lies with the institutions and policies of domination; it must not be turned into collective blame against the Persian people.

My political proposal is to establish a path toward seven independent states: Kurdistan, Baluchistan, South Azerbaijan, South Turkmenistan, Caspian, Al-Ahwaz, and Farsistan. Within the boundaries of the current state, the Kurdish component of this proposal concerns the independence of Eastern Kurdistan. Such a transition could dismantle the concentration of power and resources in a single center of domination and create the conditions for relations based on equality, economic cooperation, and nonaggression. The names, borders, and final constitutional arrangements of these states must derive their legitimacy from the freely expressed will of their populations and agreements among their legitimate representatives. The strategic value of this transformation would depend on the ability of the future states to build accountable institutions and peaceful relations.

Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the right of all peoples to self-determination. That principle does not, in itself, constitute legal endorsement of a specific seven-state map. Implementing this proposal would require free voting under credible observation, the peaceful resolution of border disputes, and guarantees for the rights of every resident. Agreements on water, energy, assets, debts, and the security of sensitive facilities would also be essential. Independence can bring liberation only when accompanied by equal citizenship, linguistic and religious rights, a prohibition on forced displacement, and safeguards against new forms of occupation.

Within this vision, an independent Kurdistan has the potential to become one of Israel’s most important allies in the Middle East. Netanyahu’s public support for Kurdish statehood in 2017, in the context of the independence referendum in Southern Kurdistan, provides a political precedent for expanding this dialogue. Future cooperation could encompass mutual recognition, security, technology, agriculture, water management, and academic exchange. Its durability would depend on democratic institutions and mutual respect. Kurdistan’s independence is a right belonging to the Kurdish nation. Its strategic value to Israel provides a basis for cooperation, but it is not the source of that right.

I urge Netanyahu, Eisenkot, and their allies to pair domestic cooperation with a reassessment of regional policy: preventing the Islamic Republic from rebuilding its military threats, providing political and diplomatic support for the democratic struggles of nations under domination, and opening serious dialogue with their representatives about a future beyond the Islamic Republic. Israel must defend its right to exist and the security of its citizens while recognizing the right of nations living under domination to freedom and independence. Bringing these principles together could lay the foundations for an order in which Israel’s security and Kurdistan’s liberation reinforce one another.