Israel’s Diplomatic Problem

Israel is accustomed to criticism from abroad. What is harder to dismiss is the possibility that criticism is becoming a strategic problem. As Israel heads toward its October 27 election, public opinion in America and Europe is moving against it, relations with several traditional partners are under strain and support for the country is becoming more politically complicated in Washington. Yet the candidates competing for power are spending remarkably little time explaining how they would repair those relationships. That omission could prove costly.

Israel has never depended on being universally liked. Its leaders have long regarded foreign criticism as an unavoidable price of defending a country surrounded by hostile forces. Governments issue condemnations, international organizations pass resolutions and protesters take to the streets. Israeli politics generally moves on.

The circumstances in 2026 are harder to shrug off.

Israel’s international position has deteriorated across parts of Europe and the United States, including among constituencies that were once reliably sympathetic. The consequences are no longer confined to diplomatic rhetoric. Arms restrictions, sanctions, recognition of a Palestinian state and legal proceedings against Israeli officials all carry potential strategic consequences.

Yet as Israelis prepare to vote on October 27, foreign-policy isolation has barely become an election issue.

That is curious. Israel’s political debate is dominated by the aftermath of October 7, the conduct of the war, the fate of the hostages, military conscription and the performance of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Those are obviously consequential questions. But another one sits behind them: how does Israel maintain the alliances on which much of its military and diplomatic strength depends?

A widening gap with the West

Public opinion provides a warning.

A Pew Research Center survey published in April found that 60% of American adults held an unfavorable view of Israel, compared with 53% a year earlier. Among Americans under 50, unfavorable views approached 70%. Among Democrats, they were close to 80%. Even among Republicans, 41% expressed an unfavorable view.

British opinion has also moved sharply against Israel. The precise reasons vary, and polling questions can produce different results, but the broader direction is difficult to ignore.

The political implications are beginning to appear.

Calls for restrictions on arms sales to Israel have gained support on both sides of the American political spectrum, although for very different reasons. On the American left, the argument generally centers on Palestinian civilian casualties and the conduct of the Gaza war. Parts of the American right have developed a different critique, questioning whether America’s support for Israel serves American interests.

That convergence should command attention in Jerusalem.

It does not mean that American support for Israel is about to disappear. Nor does it mean that every criticism of Israel is legitimate. It means that the political constituency sustaining the relationship is changing.

Israel cannot assume that the American consensus of one generation will automatically survive into the next.

Criticism is not always hostility

There is an understandable reason Israeli politics tends to react defensively to criticism.

The October 7 attack shattered assumptions about Israel’s security. The killing of civilians and abduction of hostages created a trauma that continues to shape Israeli politics. Israelis also watched international sympathy following the attack diminish rapidly as the Gaza war intensified.

Antisemitism has complicated the picture further. Some protests and political campaigns against Israel have crossed into rhetoric that targets Jews rather than Israeli government policy. Israelis therefore have legitimate reasons to be wary when criticism of their country becomes indistinguishable from hostility towards Jews.

But treating every foreign objection as evidence of anti-Israel or antisemitic sentiment creates its own strategic problem.

A government can recognize the brutality of October 7, support Israel’s right to defend itself and still oppose particular Israeli policies. A European government can regard Hamas as a terrorist organization while objecting to Israel’s conduct in Gaza. An American politician can support Israel’s security while questioning the wisdom of a particular military operation.

Diplomacy becomes difficult when all these positions are placed in the same category.

A change of government would not solve everything

Israel’s opposition parties offer different prescriptions for domestic politics. Accountability for October 7, an investigation into the security failures, changes to military conscription and the cost of living feature prominently in their agendas.

But changing the government would not automatically restore Israel’s international position.

Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot might produce a different tone in Washington and European capitals. They might also find more room for diplomatic engagement. Yet neither is likely to accept Hamas retaining the military capacity to threaten Israel, nor would either leader subordinate Israeli security requirements to the preferences of foreign governments.

The underlying strategic disagreement is therefore narrower than some foreign observers might imagine.

Israel faces a diplomatic problem that cannot simply be solved by replacing Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Netanyahu factor

Netanyahu’s political durability is partly explained by his reputation for navigating international politics.

He has spent much of his career cultivating relationships in Washington and presenting himself as the Israeli politician best equipped to deal with American presidents. His supporters point to his close relationship with Donald Trump and his confrontations with Barack Obama as evidence of an unusual ability to operate at the highest levels of international politics.

His long campaign against Iran’s nuclear ambitions has also strengthened that reputation among many Israelis.

But diplomatic skill with one American administration cannot substitute for a broader foreign-policy strategy.

A close relationship with Trump does not guarantee influence with the next Democratic president. Strong ties with India cannot compensate for declining support in parts of Europe. Relations with Gulf states cannot replace America’s unique role in Israel’s defense architecture.

The question facing Israel is therefore bigger than Netanyahu.

New friends cannot replace old ones

Israel is right to diversify its international relationships.

India, the Gulf states and Asian economies offer valuable opportunities. Developing relationships with countries that can contribute to trade, technology, energy and diplomatic influence makes strategic sense.

But diversification is not the same as substitution.

American military assistance, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic support and access to advanced weapons systems cannot readily be replaced by a collection of newer partnerships.

Consider something as basic as Israel’s combat-aircraft fleet. If Washington were to restrict the supply of critical spare parts, maintenance support and other military inputs, no Asian partner could reproduce the American defense relationship within a few years.

That is why the state of Israel’s Western alliances belongs in the category of national security rather than public relations.

The election’s missing question

Israel cannot determine how foreigners vote, what European governments think or how American public opinion evolves.

It can determine how it conducts diplomacy.

The next government will have to answer several uncomfortable questions. What is Israel’s long-term political strategy for Gaza? How does it prevent military success against Hamas from becoming diplomatic defeat? How should Jerusalem respond when an ally criticizes Israeli policy? How can Israel maintain bipartisan support in America when the country’s politics are becoming increasingly polarized?

And perhaps most importantly: what does Israel want its relationship with the West to look like a decade from now?

These questions deserve more attention than they are receiving in the election campaign.

Israel’s security ultimately rests on its own military capabilities and the decisions of its government. But security also depends on intelligence-sharing, weapons supplies, diplomatic alliances, economic relationships and the willingness of friendly governments to stand alongside Israel when the costs become high.

Those relationships cannot be taken for granted.

Israel does not need to win a popularity contest. It does, however, need allies willing to pick up the phone when the next crisis arrives.

That makes the country’s deteriorating international standing much more than a diplomatic inconvenience. It is a strategic problem—and one that the election campaign has so far largely avoided.