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Sam Lehman-Wilzig
Prof. Sam: Academic Pundit

Lebanon and Syria Also Need to Learn from Israel’s Altalena Affair

One of the most controversial events in Israeli history – and certainly the one with the most potential for civil war – was the Altalena Affair in June 1948, a month after Israel declared its national independence. For those unfamiliar with that story, here it is in a nutshell. However, as the title of this blog post suggests, it carries an extremely important lesson for Israel’s two northern neighbors, Lebanon and Syria, which I’ll get to posthaste.

Pre-1948, the Jewish “government” had three fighting forces to harass and limit the British Mandate overlords: Haganah (mainstream Socialist, primarily defending against local Arab marauders), Irgun (right-wing nationalist, attacking British Mandate forces), and Lechi (extreme right-wing; ditto). Once the new state was established, Ben-Gurion declared that all had to subsume themselves under the newly formed Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The Irgun, led by Menachem Begin had managed to obtain a very large number of critical armaments overseas and sent a ship to Israel laden with the guns. As the Irgun (and Lekhi) had already joined the IDF, Begin told Ben-Gurion of the arms shipment, who then immediately ordered Begin to have the ship dock at a former Haganah port (north of Tel Aviv) so that the weapons could be safely handed over to the IDF. Begin agreed, with the proviso that 20% of the arms would go to his former Irgun (now IDF) soldiers. Ben-Gurion refused to allow this dual-track arming, and when the boat docked and the Irgun soldiers refused to hand over the weapons notwithstanding Ben-Gurion’s orders, the (now) IDF was given the order to fire on the boat. It exploded, and mutual shooting commenced, killing 16 members of the Irgun and 3 IDF soldiers.

What did Begin do? He went on the radio and ordered his Irgun soldiers not to fight the IDF: “Don’t raise a hand against a brother, not even today. It is forbidden for Jewish arms to be used against Jewish fighters” – this despite the huge anger against Ben-Gurion for his deadly directive. The tragic event basically ended there. The IDF stayed united – and ultimately won Israel’s War of Independence.

Who was right? In the long run, clearly Ben-Gurion did what had to be done, but Begin displayed the highest level of moral courage in the aftermath of the whole affair. As someone who was deeply steeped in Jewish history (especially the infighting 2000 years ago that led to the Second Temple’s destruction, and with it any hope of national sovereignty or even autonomy under the Romans), Begin understood full well what a civil war would lead to. One nation, with one army – the only way to guarantee political stability and realistic national security.

In Lebanon and Syria today, the reverse is the case. For different historical reasons (Lebanon, longstanding social fissures; Syria, over a decade’s worth of rebellion), both countries suffer heavily from the same syndrome: multiple armies – in large part a result of multiple religious and ethnic groups.

Lebanon has its (weak) official army alongside the (formerly dominant) Hezbollah militia. Israel is insisting that the latter be subsumed into the former, or at the least the Lebanese Army become the country’s dominant force. Otherwise, in a few years Israel would once again find itself facing a resurgent Hezbollah with all the security instability that entails.
Syria is in an even more precarious situation, given that the country is “home” to several different “armies”: Kurds, Shiite, Sunni, ISIS extremists, and so on. The new government there is slowly trying to bring them all into one big “Syrian Army” tent – an almost impossible task given the multiple (and contradictory) demands of some of these militia groups. None want to have their own Altalena, but some deeply distrust the new (formerly jihadist) government, and thus are not willing to give up their arms and military structure without ironclad guarantees that after doing so there won’t be bloodletting (a la the firings on the Altalena nearly 77 years ago.)

Beyond the purely national security aspect of a united army, the issue is national-social as well. Indeed, perhaps the army’s primary role is to enable a “coming-together” of the country’s multiple groups i.e., to function as the central “melting pot” in which each group can learn about each other first-hand, and ultimately start to trust the “other” in their midst. The armies of mono-ethnic countries such as Norway or even Saudi Arabia don’t have to play such a role because their societies start with a homogenized ethnicity and culture. But once a country is split along “cultural” lines (religion, ethnicity, ideology, etc.), the army becomes the main fulcrum upon which national unity can be built.

The IDF today is a highly successful “national assimilator.” It started off on the wrong foot with the Altalena Affair, but its leaders quickly understood the dangers of army fragmentation (or worse). The present Lebanese and Syrian leadership also understand this. The question is whether they can avoid their own Altalena and move on to a semblance of national unification.

About the Author
Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig (PhD in Government, 1976; Harvard U) presently serves as Academic Head of the Communications Department at the Peres Academic Center (Rehovot). Previously, he taught at Bar-Ilan University (1977-2017), serving as: Head of the Journalism Division (1991-1996); Political Studies Department Chairman (2004-2007); and School of Communication Chairman (2014-2016). He was also Chair of the Israel Political Science Association (1997-1999). He has published five books and 69 scholarly articles on Israeli Politics; New Media & Journalism; Political Communication; the Jewish Political Tradition; the Information Society. His new book (in Hebrew, with Tali Friedman): RELIGIOUS ZIONISTS RABBIS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH: Between Halakha, Israeli Law, and Communications in Israel's Democracy (Niv Publishing, 2024). For more information about Prof. Lehman-Wilzig's publications (academic and popular), see: www.ProfSLW.com
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