Jose Lev Alvarez Gomez
The views expressed herein are solely mine.

Mafias of the Startup Nation

Itzhak Abergil at Ben-Gurion Airport in 2011, during his extradition to the United States to face federal drug-trafficking charges / AP.

This story starts with a cop. Not a street one but an investigator who once probed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself. This individual allegedly sold police intelligence to the Israeli Musli crime family for cash. Not rumors. Operational tips. Raid timing. Target lists.

Demonstrably, this was not gossip—it was proof of access. And access is what separates criminals from power brokers.

At present, the State of Israel does not have “organized crime” in the abstract; as a matter of fact, there are between 18 and 22 identifiable mafia families, depending on how police classify splinter groups. About half are Jewish, half Arab, and several operate jointly when profit overrides blood. These are not gangs; they are dynasties.

Among them, the Jewish families that defined the modern era include the Abergils, the Abutbuls, the Alperons, the Rosensteins, and the later Russian-speaking syndicates emerging in the 1990s.

Doubtlessly, their rise tracks perfectly with Israel’s social geography—development towns, ports, border cities, and ungoverned economic niches. Crime followed opportunity. Structure followed crime.

Over time, key moments hardened them into institutions.

In the 1990s, Israel saw its first true mafia wars—contract killings in Tel Aviv, car bombs in Netanya, executions in daylight.

In 2008, Ze’ev Rosenstein—a well-known local mafia boss—was extradited to the United States and sentenced to 27 years for running an international MDMA trafficking ring. That case alone exposed Israeli crime as fully transnational, operating labs in Europe, logistics in Israel, and distribution pipelines into the U.S.

In the 2010s, sustained police pressure weakened Jewish families—creating a vacuum that Arab-Israeli clans filled with ruthless efficiency.

As a result, today Arab crime families dominate Israel’s homicide statistics (accounting for over 60% of murder victims despite being one-fifth of the population), not because of culture but because of their current monopoly.

Rather, because power abhors a vacuum, Jewish mafias went global and financial. Arab mafias stayed territorial and kinetic.

Yet, the Israeli mafia’s real strength has never been violence but networking.

Historically, Moroccan-heritage Jewish families built bridges into Europe long before globalization became a buzzword. Through France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, Israeli crime figures integrated with Moroccan and Dutch-Moroccan syndicates that now control a large share of Europe’s synthetic drug trade. Dutch police data consistently identifies Moroccan-led networks as the backbone of MDMA production—and Israeli actors as trusted partners, financiers, and brokers.

At this point, the story becomes geopolitical.

Operationally, these mafias operate along the same routes that intelligence agencies monitor: ports, free-trade zones, offshore accounts, migration corridors. They understand borders better than diplomats do, and that is how they exploit extradition gaps, obtain dual citizenships, and slip through legal gray zones. In this way, they move capital faster than states move paperwork.

And yes— sometimes they grease diplomacy without intending to.

Over time, Israeli crime figures relocating to Morocco, Cyprus, Spain, or the Gulf created informal channels long before embassies followed. Money flows precede recognition. Familiarity precedes normalization.

Although the underworld does not make peace, it softens the terrain. Nevertheless, states arrive later and pretend it was all strategic vision. This is not praise. It is an acknowledgment.

Why? Because the Israeli mafia is not anti-state. It is post-state. It thrives where sovereignty is fragmented and authority is negotiable.

Simultaneously, it does not seek ideology, only predictability. That is why it penetrates municipalities, police units, licensing boards—never to overthrow, always to coexist.

Thus, the cop who sold intelligence did not betray Israel. He confirmed something older and more uncomfortable: power in Israel has always been layered. The state governs openly. The mafias govern quietly. Sometimes they collide. Sometimes they cooperate—but always watch each other.

In my assessment, Israel’s underworld is not a failure of the Zionist project; it is a byproduct of it—compressed immigration, permanent security pressure, global reach, and ruthless adaptability. The same traits that made Israel survive also made its mafias formidable.

While states fight wars, mafias endure them.

And ultimately, the most dangerous ones are not those who shoot—but those who already know what the police plan to do tomorrow.

About the Author
Jose Lev Alvarez is an American-Israeli scholar specializing in Middle Eastern security policy. A multilingual veteran of both the IDF Special Forces and the U.S. Army, he holds a B.S. in Neuroscience with a Minor in Israel Studies from American University, three master’s degrees (international geostrategy, applied economics, and intelligence studies), and a medical degree. He is currently completing a Ph.D. in Intelligence and Global Security in the Washington, D.C. area. In addition to blogging for the Times of Israel, he contributes to the Washington Examiner, is a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum, and regularly provides geopolitical analysis on Latin American television networks.
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