Narco-jihad networks and their evolution, who next?

Hezbollah, the Assad regime, Taliban. Apart from extremist Islam, all these groups had evolved to organized criminal activities, initially to sponsor their terrorist activities, then as means of obtaining geopolitical power in regions where there was a power vacuum, and eventually as it was financially extremely lucrative. The real order of the evolution of “narco-jihad” will never be known.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militant group, has long been implicated in global narcotics trafficking as a means to finance its operations. Beyond its involvement in the Captagon trade, Hezbollah has established extensive networks facilitating the distribution of various illicit drugs, including cocaine.

Investigations have uncovered Hezbollah’s significant role in the global cocaine trade. The organization manages cocaine shipments and engages in trade-based money laundering (TBML) to process the proceeds. This involves complex commercial schemes that intertwine legitimate businesses with illicit activities, enabling the group to launder substantial sums of money. Estimates suggest that the global cocaine trade is valued between $425 and $650 billion annually, with counterfeiting—another avenue exploited by Hezbollah—worth up to $1.13 trillion a year.

Integration with State Actors

Hezbollah’s narcotics operations have, at times, intertwined with state actors. The Assad regime in Syria, for instance, was heavily involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, a methamphetamine-like drug. This collaboration allowed both the regime and Hezbollah to share in the profits of a trade valued at approximately $10 billion annually. The recent downfall of Bashar al-Assad has disrupted this network, revealing the regime’s extensive involvement and straining Hezbollah’s financial resources.

The vacuum created by Israel’s war against Hezbollah and the capitulation of the Assad regime in Damascus, has now created the grounds for other state and non state actors to enter the void.

In recent years, Gulf nations have witnessed a troubling surge in criminal activities involving Pakistani nationals, leading to strained diplomatic relations and tighter immigration policies that adversely affect Pakistan’s economic interests in the region. A notable incident reported by the Saudi Gazette on January 12, 2025, detailed the arrest of ten Pakistani residents in Makkah. This group was implicated in approximately 31 financial fraud cases, amassing over SR 2.8 million through the sale of counterfeit gold bars.

The involvement of Pakistani nationals in such illicit activities is not isolated. Reports have highlighted their participation in crimes ranging from theft and fraud to more severe offenses like drug trafficking. For instance, in December 2024, Saudi authorities arrested two Pakistani individuals in Jeddah for promoting and selling methamphetamine, seizing about 9.6 kilograms of the drug, despite the death penalty for the crime.

The repercussions of these criminal activities are profound. Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have implemented stricter immigration regulations, including mandatory police vetting and verification for Pakistani citizens intending to travel to these nations. This development poses a significant threat to Pakistan’s fragile economy, which heavily relies on remittances from its expatriate community in the Gulf. Pakistan is a nuclear power which has been on the brink of financial disaster. It has also been vehemently critical of Israel. Social unrest in Pakistan puts a huge cloud on the security of West and South Asia.

Compounding these challenges is the burgeoning Captagon trade in the Middle East. Captagon, an amphetamine-like stimulant, has become a major illicit export from Syria, with the Assad regime and affiliated groups like Hezbollah deeply involved in its production and distribution. The trade, estimated to be worth billions annually, primarily targets markets in Gulf countries, exacerbating regional instability and complicating efforts to combat narcotics trafficking.

There is a serious danger of Pakistan’s entrant as a replacement to the networks of Hezbollah and Assad that have collapsed. Pakistan’s intelligence ISI, has links to extensive criminal networks in West and South Asia and have closely abetted the first Taliban regime in surviving using drug financing. They have the means, motive and the need to take over supply of narcotics to Gulf states, especially given the financial crisis and desperation in Pakistan.

The global community needs to carefully monitor the rise of new state and non-state actors in these narcotics power vacuums. While combatting terrorism is the first priority, combatting nacro-terror should be a close second.