Netanyahu and the Evolution of ‘Anyone But Bibi’

In the wake of the elections, some are arguing that national unity requires Bennett and Liberman to put aside their differences and join Netanyahu. But refusing to serve under Netanyahu is no longer simply a partisan “anyone but Bibi” position. His own conduct over the past decade has given us good reasons to question whether another government under his leadership can deliver the unity, security, and competent governance the country needs.

I’m seeing a lot of comments suggesting that the country “voted unity” and that the only reason for Bennett or Liberman not to join a Netanyahu government is “ego” or “anyone but Bibi.” I think that’s an oversimplification.

Firstly, Bennett ran on a policy platform: Haredi service and education, a state commission of inquiry into October 7, changing our approach toward Qatar and Gaza, introducing competition to lower prices, constitutional reform, etc. How much of that can Netanyahu realistically offer within the limits of his other political commitments and personal interests?

Secondly, the “anyone but Bibi” movement has changed considerably over the past decade. And I think Netanyahu himself bears much of the responsibility for that change.

“Anyone But Bibi” Evolution

The movement started as a divisive, partisan strategy by the left to unseat Netanyahu. It failed miserably.

It then expanded to include more center and left-wing parties in response to Netanyahu’s indictment. I still disagreed with it, both ideologically and strategically, and that approach also failed.

But something else happened along the way. Netanyahu embraced the polarization and created his own “Only Bibi” movement. He increasingly made himself, rather than policy, the center of his political appeal. “Vote for me to upset those leftists (סמאלנים)” became a central part of his message.

I think there were four major turning points that changed the nature of the opposition to his leadership.

Four Turning Points

1. The Gantz Rotation Agreement

During Corona, Netanyahu agreed to a rotation government with Benny Gantz, even introducing a new Basic Law to make it possible. He promised “no tricks and no shticks,” then exploited the budget loophole to avoid keeping his end of the agreement.

It was a pretty clear demonstration of how far he was willing to go to preserve his own position, even at the expense of an agreement he had personally signed.

2. His Behavior Toward the Bennett/Lapid Government

Firstly, there was his refusal to step aside.

I don’t necessarily think Netanyahu had done anything at that point that justified demanding his resignation. But when his presence was literally the only thing standing in the way of a Likud-led government, allowing that government to form was the right thing to do.

Particularly when he was claiming that a Bennett/Lapid government would be dangerous for the nation. If he really believed that, surely he should have been willing to do whatever was in his power to prevent it, including stepping aside.

Once in opposition, he crossed all norms of responsible parliamentary behavior. Likud voted against measures designed to protect Israelis from potential terrorists, increased benefits for reserve soldiers, and eventually legislation protecting the civil rights of those of us living in Yehuda v’Shomron.

I particularly remember Likud MKs chanting “shame!” at the coalition for failing to pass a counterterrorism measure that they had just voted down themselves!

3. The Judicial Reform Crisis

Perhaps in normal times, Yariv Levin’s extreme proposals would have been met with a greater willingness to negotiate a compromise. But after four elections and the behavior described above, trust was at an all-time low.

I don’t support much of the behavior of Lapid, Liberman, and the rest of the anti-reform movement. I refused to participate in the protests. But Netanyahu did practically nothing to slow a train that was taking us to a very dangerous place nationally.

He knew that firing Gallant in response to his warnings would be divisive, and he did it anyway.

When the coalition moved to pass the reasonableness law, Matan Kahana begged Netanyahu to adopt a slightly more moderate version, just to demonstrate some willingness to compromise. Nothing.

At every turn, Netanyahu and his MKs refused to show any understanding toward those who saw a series of laws that would remove checks on the governing majority, replacing one imbalance with another.

It didn’t have to go that way. There were reasonable compromises available, and Netanyahu had the power to change the course of events.

Again, I disagree with much of the opposition’s response. But the government was driving the process.

4. October 7

This was the most significant turning point.

Netanyahu had campaigned on the claim that he was the one who would prevent trucks full of terrorists from entering Israel. He held Bennett personally accountable for every terrorist attack during his term.

He had bragged in his book about rejecting Bennett and Liberman’s push to invade Gaza in 2014, after also pushing back against their insistence on addressing Hamas’s tunnels into Israel.

He personally presided over the policy of containing Hamas, including allowing Qatari money into Gaza, and his government softened aspects of the approach toward the Gaza border that had been adopted under Bennett.

Yet after the worst disaster in Israel’s history, he refused to accept responsibility.

Instead, we got blame directed at everyone else, resistance to a state commission of inquiry, as though no objective people could possibly be found to run one, and conspiracy theories about information supposedly being deliberately withheld from him.

Of course, there are plenty of other people and institutions whose decisions need to be examined. But the prime minister who built his political identity around being Mr. Security cannot simply exempt himself from accountability when that security collapses.

The Cost of Putting Political Interests First

On top of all this, as Netanyahu has devoted more and more energy to preserving his own political position, we’ve seen the consequences in the quality of government.

Consider the Qatar affair, involving reports that his closest advisers were being paid by a country that was spending enormous sums attacking Israel and its soldiers in the international arena while playing a deeply problematic role in the war.

Or the appointment of a minister of hasbarah who apparently thought that her civic duty, a week into the war, was to close down her ministry to avoid wasting government funds.

Or the appointment of nonprofessionals in the Transportation Ministry, where failures to properly screen foreign pilots nearly led to catastrophe in the FlyDubai incident.

And the list goes on.

Netanyahu isn’t personally responsible for every bad decision made by every minister. But the pattern of political appointments, misplaced priorities, and lack of accountability reflects the leadership at the top.

What Does Voting for Unity Actually Mean?

I have no idea how Bennett or Liberman will play the cards they’ve been dealt, and I’ll leave those decisions to them. There are legitimate questions about what compromises they should be willing to make, what kind of government they can realistically form, and how far they should go to avoid repeat elections. And that might mean coming to an agreement that includes Netanyahu remaining Prime Minister.

But I reject the idea that refusing to join Netanyahu is necessarily a matter of ego, or that national unity simply means putting as many parties as possible into one coalition.

The “anyone but Bibi” approach is no longer the tactical, anti-right-wing political movement it was in the mid-2010s. Netanyahu’s own conduct over the past decade has given people serious reasons to question whether his continued leadership is in the country’s best interests.

And that includes people on the right who once strongly opposed the movement.

There is plenty of reason to believe that achieving real unity, security, and competent government requires our aging, longest-serving prime minister to finally exit the stage and allow us to turn the page on Israeli governance.