From Kibbutz to the global stage
Netanyahu, Trump — and the Gap Between Declarations and Reality
Netanyahu, Trump — and the Gap Between Declarations and Reality.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to meet US President Donald Trump on December 29 at Trump’s Florida residence. Netanyahu planned an eight-day trip, but at this stage it remains unclear what his schedule beyond the meeting will include.
On Friday, Israeli media reported that the most urgent issues — a ceasefire in Gaza, the “day after,” Lebanon, and Syria — would all be discussed in the meeting with Trump, and that only afterward would it become clear whether progress, stagnation, or regression lay ahead.
Yet on that same Friday, December 19, three significant diplomatic meetings took place, underscoring the extent to which regional processes are advancing independently.
In Miami, US mediators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met with the countries mediating the Gaza talks: Qatar’s prime minister and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Turkey. During the meeting, the Americans presented the “Sunrise” plan for the reconstruction of Gaza, estimated at approximately $112 billion. The United States committed to covering about half the sum through loans and guarantees, with the remainder to be raised from international donors.
In Paris, another important meeting was held with representatives from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France, focusing on Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah. According to Lebanese officials, the first phase of the process is nearing completion.
Later that afternoon, the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem released a statement about a meeting that took place in Naqoura, on Lebanese territory near the Israeli border. The meeting included mediators from the United Nations and the United States, representatives of the Lebanese army and civil authorities, and two officials from Israel’s National Security Council.
Taken together, these meetings point to intensive and wide-ranging diplomatic activity that is unfolding in parallel — and at times independently — of the yet-unscheduled Trump–Netanyahu meeting.
Earlier that morning, December 19 (Israel time), remarks by Trump were reported in The Times of Israel and Haaretz in English, in which he said that the December 29 meeting in Florida had not yet been finalized and that Netanyahu had merely requested to meet him.
On Saturday morning, NBC News reported that Israel was deeply concerned about movements by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of a ballistic missile exercise, which could be interpreted as a hostile act. According to the report, Netanyahu sought American approval for a possible Israeli preemptive action. The story quickly made headlines in Israeli and international media. Later that evening, Axios journalist Barak Ravid sought to cool tensions, reporting that US intelligence was not aware of troop movements posing an immediate threat to Israel. This was not a contradiction so much as a gap between a more stringent Israeli assessment and a more cautious American intelligence picture.
As recently as Friday, Israel’s public broadcaster and Channel 11 had reported that all major issues were awaiting discussion in the Trump–Netanyahu meeting. By Sunday, however, doubts had emerged, in light of the flurry of diplomatic activity on Friday, Trump’s own remarks, and the new narrative introduced by the NBC report.
On Sunday afternoon, Israel’s public radio reported that many elements surrounding the Trump–Netanyahu meeting remained unresolved. Trump reiterated that Netanyahu had requested a meeting on Monday, December 29, but it remained unclear what the prime minister planned to do afterward. Trump is reportedly planning a major New Year’s Eve event. Netanyahu may wish to attend, but has not received a formal invitation, and the Prime Minister’s Office has provided no details about his plans. This lack of clarity has been echoed across additional Israeli media outlets.
Trump appears intent on avoiding any impression that decisions are being made in advance or over the heads of Arab partners and other Western stakeholders. It is possible that Israeli reports portraying the meeting as finalized — despite Trump’s own statements — caused some discomfort on the American side.
In any case, the manner in which the meeting has been handled does not resemble the careful coordination usually associated with high-level leadership summits. Public discussion of a potential pardon for Netanyahu has faded from the headlines, and in any event was never a source of diplomatic pride for Israel. Meanwhile, the dense schedule of diplomatic engagements across the Middle East and in global capitals points to additional, broader trajectories.
Egyptian media, for example, have written that the demilitarization of Hamas — as discussed in Miami — would entail the laying down and collection of weapons by Palestinian actors who would replace Hamas in governing Gaza.
Turkey is deeply involved in these processes as well, and meetings with Hamas representatives have reportedly taken place in Ankara. Turkish media have even carried headlines indicating an understanding of Israel’s desire to monitor Iran’s ballistic missile threats, while simultaneously calling for flexibility on Gaza. This appears to reflect a coordinated signal from above, distinct from Turkey’s earlier posture toward Iran, and also suggests the influence of Qatar’s gradual alignment toward Saudi Arabia.
In conclusion, headlines portraying escalating tensions between Israel, Turkey, and Iran do not necessarily reflect the substance of recent diplomatic contacts aimed at regional stabilization. In many cases, such narratives primarily serve domestic political considerations.
Iran today retains roughly half of the ballistic missile and launcher capacity it possessed prior to its confrontation with Israel in April 2024. The Iranian-Shiite axis has been significantly weakened, Iran’s economic situation is dire, and no meaningful improvement is visible on the horizon. Former partners such as China and Russia show little appetite for backing a new Iranian adventure. Vigilance regarding threats remains essential, but managing them through diplomatic and intelligence channels — rather than unpredictable, inflammatory headlines — is preferable.
Turkey, for its part, is still searching for its path. It observes the longstanding cooperation between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, the Israel–Egypt gas deal, and recognizes the need to compete for its role as a transit state for goods and energy to Europe, as well as a supplier of arms to NATO countries. Ankara is also watching the growing ties between India and the United States, and between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Turkey understands that access to major economic projects runs through the United States, Europe, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states — and depends on political, economic, and social moderation.
Momentum toward greater political and economic stability in the Middle East and beyond continues. With cautious optimism, attention now turns to the anticipated first convening of Trump’s proposed “Peace Council” for the reconstruction and governance of Gaza, which is expected, according to current assessments, to take place in January 2026.
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