Not a Ministry, a Vision

Yet it has never developed a coherent long-term framework for addressing the most fundamental question of all: how a Jewish and democratic state should structure its relationship with one-fifth of its citizens, a national minority with its own identity, language, and historical memory. The public debate in Israel repeatedly revolves around the identity of Arab citizens. Are they Israeli Arabs? Palestinian citizens of Israel? Arab Israelis? But the argument over labels distracts from the real issue. The question is not how they define themselves. The question is how the state defines its relationship with them.

In this context, it may be worth revisiting an institution that has all but disappeared from public memory: the Ministry of Minorities. The ministry was established in 1948, as Israel’s provisional government took shape during the War of Independence. It operated for only a brief period before being dissolved in 1949. Its responsibilities were quickly dispersed among other government ministries, including the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Education, and others.

Yet its very creation reveals an important insight on the part of Israel’s founding generation. In the midst of a difficult war, while the state was struggling for its survival, there were those who understood that security, economic development, and immigrant absorption were not the only challenges facing Israel. There was also a need to shape the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority that remained within the state’s borders once the fighting ended.

The dismantling of the Ministry of Minorities in 1949 was more than an administrative restructuring. It represented the triumph of the security ethos over the civic one. What is particularly striking is that the ministry was never conceived merely as a mechanism for distributing budgets. According to contemporary accounts, its mission was to protect the rights of the Arab population, assist in its social and economic rehabilitation, and foster constructive relations between Jews and Arabs. It dealt with education, employment, the establishment of community institutions, and the development of local leadership.

In other words, it sought to build a relationship rather than simply administer a minority population. That is the real lesson today. Not because Israel necessarily needs a new government ministry. Another ministry may well offer a bureaucratic solution to a problem that is not fundamentally bureaucratic. These responsibilities could be concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office, entrusted to an interministerial body, or handled through some other institutional framework. The organizational form matters less. What Israel lacks is not a ministry. It lacks a coherent framework.

For decades, the state has oscillated between two flawed assumptions. One assumed that the Palestinian identity of its Arab citizens would gradually weaken in favor of a shared Israeli identity. The other treated every expression of Palestinian identity as evidence of alienation or disloyalty. Reality has disproved both. Most Arab citizens of Israel have lived for generations with a complex identity. They are Israeli citizens. They vote in elections, work in state institutions, study at Israeli universities, and contribute to the country’s economy. At the same time, many see themselves as part of the Palestinian people. One may welcome this reality or be uncomfortable with it. But one cannot wish it away. Precisely for that reason, the central question is not how to change the identity of Arab citizens. It is how to build a stable civic framework within which Jews and Arabs can live together despite their differences. This is not merely a matter of budgets. It is a matter of trust. Functioning states build trust through institutions. They establish mechanisms that address conflicts before they become crises. They create permanent channels of dialogue. They develop long-term policies instead of reinventing their response with every news cycle.

Israel, by contrast, tends to focus on its Arab citizens primarily in times of crisis: when violent crime rises, when episodes of violence erupt, when unrest breaks out, or when an election approaches. Between one crisis and the next, there is remarkably little serious public discussion about relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. That is a strategic mistake. Ultimately, the future of Israeli democracy will not be determined only by its borders or its relations with neighboring states. It will also be determined by its ability to build a stable relationship with its Arab citizens. Not out of naivety, and not by ignoring profound disagreements, but out of an understanding that civic partnership is itself a national interest.

The question, therefore, is not whether Israel should recreate the Ministry of Minorities. The question is why the state abandoned the idea that stood behind it. As early as 1948, Israel’s founders understood that relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority were not a secondary issue that could be left to the margins. They viewed them as a national challenge requiring sustained attention, responsibility, and policy planning. Seventy-eight years later, perhaps it is precisely that insight that deserves to return. Not the Ministry of Minorities itself, but the recognition that partnership between Jews and Arabs is not an automatic byproduct of shared citizenship. It is a national project that must be cultivated, generation after generation.

Eran Eldar is a Visiting Professor of History at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.