OMAN, the Exception within Islam: Neither Sunni nor Shiite
Or the Ideal Mediator. The Facts: The End of the Myth of Non-Alignment in the Middle East
Oman, the Only Ibadi State, Confronted with a Coercive Regional Order
For a long time, non-alignment was presented as a viable strategic option in the Middle East. A cautious posture, inherited from the Cold War, allowed certain states to remain outside rigid blocs, to act as mediators, and to turn neutrality into a diplomatic asset. That era is coming to an end. The sequence opened by the Abraham Accords did not merely normalize relations; it reconfigured the regional architecture around explicit security blocs, drastically reducing the space for “neither-nor” positions.
Within this new order, Oman occupies a unique — and therefore fragile — position. Not only has the sultanate historically remained non-aligned, but it is also the only state in the world whose majority population adheres to Ibadism, a branch of Islam distinct from both Sunnism and Shiism. This confessional singularity is far from anecdotal: for decades, it formed the foundation of Oman’s internal stability and international posture. Today, it is being put to the test.
Oman, the Only Ibadi Exception in a Confessionally Polarized Middle East
With nearly 2 million Ibadis out of an estimated 2.5 million worldwide, Oman is the only state whose dominant religious identity lies outside the two major confessional poles structuring the region. Historically, this exception allowed the sultanate to keep its distance from the Sunni–Shiite rivalry and to avoid the religious instrumentalization of political power.
Ibadism, morally rigorous yet non-proselytizing and non-messianic, has produced a political model centered on stability, moderation, and the accountability of the ruler rather than on ideological projection. This religious matrix explains why Oman has never sought to export a model or to position itself as a regional doctrinal pole.
For decades, this confessional dissociation constituted a decisive strategic advantage. It allowed Oman to exist as a distinct actor, acceptable to all precisely because it threatened no dominant narrative.
The Abraham Accords: The End of Tolerance for the Exception
The Abraham Accords marked a qualitative turning point. By formalizing a security alignment between Israel, several Gulf monarchies — notably the United Arab Emirates — and the United States, they transformed the Middle East into a space structured by integrated security architectures.
Within this new framework, neutrality is no longer perceived as a stabilizing factor, but as a strategic anomaly. States are increasingly assessed not on their ability to avoid conflict, but on their degree of integration into collective deterrence mechanisms. Non-alignment ceases to be a status; it becomes a temporary exemption.
Oman: From Useful Exception to Suspicious Exception
Oman has neither joined the Abraham Accords nor adopted a confrontational posture. This continuity is consistent with its Ibadi heritage and its long-standing tradition of mediation. Yet in a system now based on the visibility of alliances, this restraint is reinterpreted as a failure to position itself.
The paradox is stark: what once constituted Oman’s strategic value — its confessional and ideological exteriority — has become a source of vulnerability. Being the only Ibadi state in the world means being unable to rely on any form of regional confessional solidarity at a time when blocs are hardening.
Iran: Ibadi Neutrality Confronted with the Logic of Deterrence
Oman’s relationship with Iran perfectly illustrates this shift. For many years, Muscat served as a discreet channel between Tehran and Western powers. This mediating role rested precisely on Oman’s religious singularity and its absence of doctrinal hostility.
In the post-Abraham order, this posture has become increasingly costly. When Iran is defined as the structuring threat to the regional system, not being aligned against it becomes problematic — even without being aligned with it. Ibadi neutrality, once protective, now exposes Oman to a diffuse yet persistent suspicion.
Militarization of the Gulf and the Gradual Extinction of Non-Alignment
The growing deployment of integrated defense systems — missile defense, naval cooperation, military interoperability — is transforming the Gulf into a space of coercive collective security. In such an environment, non-alignment becomes structurally unstable.
For Oman, the dilemma is all the more acute given its lack of strategic, demographic, or military depth to sustainably impose its exception. Being the only Ibadi state also means being structurally alone in the face of pressure from hardened blocs.
Ibadism: Internal Strength, External Isolation
Ibadism continues to fully play its internal role: social cohesion, low confessional conflict, and institutional stability. But in a regional order dominated by hard power, this strength no longer translates into external protection.
This is the core of the argument: Ibadism protects Oman internally, but no longer shields it from the regional system. It generates neither alliances, nor security guarantees, nor automatic mechanisms of solidarity.
Conclusion: Ibadi Singularity Tested by the End of Non-Alignment
Non-alignment in the Middle East is not eroding; it is disappearing as a stable strategic option. The post–Abraham Accords order imposes a simple logic: be integrated or be peripheral.
Oman represents the ultimate test of this transformation. If the only Ibadi state in the world — historically respected for its neutrality and its capacity for mediation — can no longer preserve an autonomous space, then the message is clear: confessional singularity no longer protects against systemic coercion.
Ibadism remains the key to Omani coherence. But it is no longer sufficient to guarantee a durable position outside the blocs. With Oman, it is the very myth of Middle Eastern non-alignment that is coming to an end.
