Operation Round House

“Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose. Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.” (Message from President Nikita Krushchev to President John F. Kennedy in the evening October 26,1962).

The current military escalation in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (supported by NATO countries) has been the largest escalation since the war began on February 24, 2022.

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when Soviets and Cubans built ballistic missile facilities in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba just 90 miles from the U.S. coast, there has been no open discussion about the likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia in the short term.

On that occasion, the defense condition of the U.S.” DEFCON” (an acronym for DEFense CONdition) was raised for the first time to level 2 (FAST PACE) in U.S. history, which implies the step prior to a nuclear war. The escalation ended that time when Russian President Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy understood that a nuclear war between Russia and the United States meant dooming the world in an unimaginable way. The second time would occur in the initial phase of Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War. For security reasons, the U.S. government does not publicly disclose the DEFCON level or any changes to it.

There are five DEFCON levels, with number 5 (FADE OUT), being the least severe and number 1 (COCKED PISTOL) being the most severe. “FADE OUT” refers to a geopolitical state of peace between the United States and the rest of the nations of the world. “COCKED PISTOL,” on the other hand, indicates an imminent nuclear attack against the U.S. military or territory and authorizes the immediate use of nuclear weapons in response to the attack.

It is estimated that the current defense condition of the United States is DEFCON 3 (ROUND HOUSE), in which troop preparation and mobilization increase, and the air force is ready to deploy within 15 minutes if necessary. However, the Russian attack on November 21 on one of the facilities of the Ukrainian defense industrial complex in Dnipro with a hypersonic missile Oreshnik (hazelnut tree in Russian) has raised alarms in the West. This new Russian ballistic missile has an intermediate range of up to 5,500 km, travels at about 3 km per second (10 times the speed of sound), and cannot be intercepted by any defense system in the world.

The time to find shelter (even for vital personnel of any European government) would be extremely limited in the event of a surprise launch of one or several missiles loaded with nuclear warheads. If launched from the Russian city of Kozeslk, they would reach Kiev in about 2 minutes, Paris and London in about 12 minutes, and Brussels, NATO’s headquarters, in about 10 minutes.

These missiles can carry six warheads (nuclear or non-nuclear), which, when directed at different targets on land, create a yellow luminous effect resembling the hanging, cylindrical, yellowish flowers of the hazelnut tree.

The use of this missile by Russia was in response to Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian oblast of Kursk starting on November 19 and subsequent days with ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, manufactured in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.

Earlier that same day, Russia officially announced its new nuclear doctrine (something President Putin had already hinted at on September 25), expanding it in several points where Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack with conventional weapons that poses a threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity, even if it comes from a non-nuclear power but is supported by other nuclear powers. It also considers the aggression of a member of a military coalition against the Russian Federation or its ally Belarus as an attack by the entire coalition.

The beginning of this dangerous escalation dates back to Ukraine’s surprising invasion of the Russian oblast of Kursk on August 6. It was the first time since World War II that an enemy army not only set foot on Russian territory but also took control of Russian settlements. In total, about 92 Russian settlements came under Ukrainian control in an area of about 1,250 square kilometers, according to statements made on August 19 by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

While the Russian army was conquering new territory in the Donbas region at a faster pace than in 2023, the Ukrainian army invaded Russia from a flank neglected by the Russians along an extensive land and maritime border of 2,295 km.

The reasons for this neglect may have been, first, the concentration of Russian troops in the Donbas, a region in eastern Ukraine that is very important to Russia geopolitically, militarily, economically, and culturally. The Donbas represents a broad land bridge to the Crimean Peninsula, vital for Russia’s maritime defense in the Black Sea.

Additionally, control of the Donbas gives Russia total control of the Sea of Azov, whose coasts it shared with Ukraine before the war. Because of this, in any eventual peace negotiation, it is very unlikely that Russia would relinquish the territory already gained in the Donbas region.

It should be remembered that the Crimean Peninsula was annexed to Russia through a referendum in 2014. Both the Donbas and Crimea represent very important land and maritime defense zones for Russia in the southwest in the event of a large-scale war with NATO.

The second reason for the Russian army’s neglect at the Ukraine-Kursk border may have been the extreme confidence that Ukraine and its allies would never dare to cross a red line that had not been crossed since July 5, 1943, when Hitler’s German army attempted to invade Russia after the failures of the “Barbarossa” and “Case Blue” operations in 1941 and 1942, respectively.

Coincidentally, “Operation Citadel,” the third and last of Hitler’s attempts to conquer the Soviet Union, was fought in the Kursk oblast. The modern German army encountered fierce Russian resistance, which it already knew in advance through its intelligence service about the Nazi strategy.

The Battle of Kursk is considered one of the largest and most important tank battles in history. The result was a war of attrition that ended with the retreat of the German army and the recovery of about 70,000 km² of territory by the Red Army, a figure exorbitantly greater than the 1,250 square kilometers gained by the Ukrainian in the last four months of invasion, of which they have already lost approximately 40% to date.

This means that Ukraine currently controls about 750 square kilometers of the more than 17 million square kilometers that Russia has. This amounts to 0.004% of Russian territory. This figure should not worry the Russian government in such a way that it considers the use of nuclear weapons, as it does not threaten its existence at all.

However, Russia considered that it could not afford to allow enemy advances that, if they continued in a straight line without adequate opposition, could have reached the vicinity of Moscow, located just over 500 km from the city of Kursk. Had the advance continued, Moscow would have been within the firing range of ATACMS missiles, which can accurately hit targets 300 km away. With winter approaching, the reinforcement of Russian troops in the Kursk region and the support of North Korean troops, it is unlikely that Ukraine can maintain control of the territory gained for much longer.

The number of missiles manufactured by NATO countries is limited, making it very unlikely that they can change the course of the war. Ukraine’s original plan was to weaken the Russian army on the eastern front so that Russia would mobilize troops from the Donbas to the north to halt the Russian advance, maintain control over all the territory gained in the Kursk region, and have a better position when negotiating a potential ceasefire with Russia.

In light of such failure on the battlefield, the new Russian nuclear doctrine and the demonstration of the power and range of its Oreshnik missile, the most prudent course of action for NATO is not to escalate the conflict further and to wait for the new mandate of elected President Donald Trump (who wants to end the war) in order to avoid an escalation similar to or worse than that of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

At this moment, it is unlikely that Russia will attack Ukraine or NATO countries with nuclear weapons, as it theoretically would have no reason to do so. Although NATO seems to be getting more involved in the conflict every day, it has not yet crossed any red lines imposed by the Kremlin’s new nuclear doctrine. The Russian government knows, on the other hand, that a nuclear war against NATO would mean mutually assured destruction.

Although Ukraine has been able to resist the onslaught of the Russian army thanks to NATO’s arms support since the beginning of the war, the pulse is being won by Russia 7 weeks before the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House. Both President Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin want to arrive at the “negotiating table” on January 20 next year in the best position not only diplomatically, but also militarily.

However, the battles before January 20 between the Russian and Ukrainian armies could be 2 stones colliding with each other about to produce the spark that will set everything on fire.

A nuclear war before Donald Trump’s inauguration would, on the other hand, cause unprecedented administrative chaos in the U.S. government and could create a power vacuum in the face of a crisis of such magnitude.

Given the likelihood of such a scenario, outgoing President Joe Biden and incoming President Donald Trump must sit down at the table and discuss all possible options to avoid a nuclear escalation with Russia and ensure that the U.S. government can continue to function normally on January 20, 2025.

From that day forward, President Donald Trump and his cabinet must begin the necessary negotiations with Russia and Ukraine to achieve a ceasefire as quickly as possible.

Russia, NATO, and Ukraine must adhere to a “preventive” utilitarian philosophy (applied in disasters of any kind) that focuses on seeking the well-being of the greatest number of people possible, as the other option equates to a nuclear escalation that would not only annihilate most of the world’s population directly through nuclear explosions and the medical effects of radioactive fallout, but also indirectly through the economic crisis and hunger generated by a nuclear winter that would significantly reduce the production of staple grains globally for an extended period.

Despite the events of recent weeks, which have dangerously escalated the conflict, the governments of the United States, NATO and Russia must strive at all costs to avoid military moves that would lead not only the United States to a DEFCON 2, or in the worst-case scenario, a DEFCON 1.

Reaching January 20, 2025 with a DEFCON 3 or “ROUND HOUSE” defense condition would be a decent starting point to begin negotiating a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.