How an elected lower house and a traditional council of elders-built peace—and why reform can no longer wait.

Parliament is more than a lawmaking body. In states emerging from conflict, it can legitimize institutions, channel grievances into debate, oversee spending, and build a shared political project. Somaliland shows both the promise and the limits of that role.

Since reasserting its independence in 1991, Somaliland has built a comparatively stable order without broad international recognition. At its center is a bicameral parliament combining electoral politics with Somali customary governance.

A hybrid parliament built for peace.

Somaliland’s Parliament, or Baarlamaanka, has two 82-member chambers: the directly elected House of Representatives (Golaha Wakiilada) and the clan-based House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida). This design emerged from locally led peace conferences, especially those held in Borama in 1993 and Hargeisa in 1997.

The Guurti brought traditional elders and the customary law system known as Xeer into the formal state. Its authority helped mediate clan disputes, resolve political stand-offs, and reassure traditional leaders that modernization would not exclude them. The House of Representatives, meanwhile, supplied electoral legitimacy, legislative debate, and budgetary oversight.

Together, the chambers transformed negotiation into an institution. Somaliland’s peace was not simply imposed through a constitution; it was built through repeated bargaining among clans, elders, political parties, and communities.

Where the model has worked

The system’s greatest achievement is stability. The Guurti has often functioned as a political shock absorber, stepping in when elections, security disputes, or clan tensions threatened escalation. The elected lower house has also demonstrated meaningful political competition. In 2021, opposition parties won a parliamentary majority and selected the speaker without armed conflict.

Parliament has supported state-building through electoral, fiscal, commercial, and infrastructure rules. These have helped Somaliland operate institutions and attract investment despite its unresolved international status. Compared with many post-conflict legislatures, its institutions are notably home-grown and locally financed.

Where parliament falls short

Stability has come with democratic costs. The Guurti was last formally constituted through clan consensus in 1997. Its members have repeatedly extended their mandate, while vacant seats have often passed to relatives. A chamber created to safeguard peace has therefore become a major source of democratic concern.

Representation is another weakness. No woman won a seat in the 82-member House of Representatives in 2021, while some eastern communities report political alienation. Committees also lack researchers, legislative drafters, and specialist staff, increasing reliance on the executive and outside advisers.

Formal oversight remains uneven. Parliament approves budgets and questions officials, but the presidency retains considerable influence over finance, security, procurement, and administration. Informal mediation may resolve crises, yet it cannot replace strong audits, transparent hearings, and enforceable accountability.

Three routes to Guurti reform

The central question is how to renew the upper house without destroying the peacebuilding role that made it valuable. Three broad models dominate the debate:

1. Regulated clan selection. Regional and sub-clan councils would select qualified elders under clear legal rules and independent supervision. This would preserve customary legitimacy, but powerful patrons could still capture the process.
2. Direct election. Citizens would elect all eighty-two members by secret ballot. This would end indefinite mandates and could widen participation, but it might turn the Guurti into a partisan copy of the lower house.
3. A hybrid professional chamber. Seats would be divided among traditional elders, legal and civic professionals, and designated representatives of women and marginalized communities. This approach could combine mediation experience with technical expertise and broader inclusion.

Reform must confront constitutional ambiguity. The constitution refers to the “selection” of elders, not clearly to direct election. The Guurti must also approve changes to its composition and tenure, giving incumbents an incentive to resist. Disputed clan seat allocations and Somaliland’s three-party limit add further complications.

From peacekeeper to policymaker

Somaliland should not discard the hybrid system that helped secure peace. It should renew it. A credible transition could establish fixed, non-renewable terms; prohibit hereditary succession; create transparent regional selection procedures; reserve seats for women and marginalized groups; and strengthen conflict-of-interest and attendance rules.

Reform should also invest in parliament as a working institution. Better committee staffing, independent budget analysis, professional drafting, public hearings, and stronger audit follow-up would move both chambers beyond crisis mediation toward effective policymaking.

Somaliland shows that nation-building succeeds when institutions reflect local history rather than copy imported models. But institutions built for one era cannot remain frozen forever. The next stage is to preserve the Guurti’s peacebuilding legitimacy while making Parliament more representative, accountable, and capable of governing a modern state.