Scenarios for the future of Israeli democracy
Israel is entering the upcoming elections in a highly polarized political and security environment, which makes the elections far from being a periodic competition to form a government coalition; at the same time, it tests the ability of the Israeli political system to produce a stable government, and the limits of the relationship between security and politics, the place of Arab citizens and Arab lists in the parliamentary system, as well as the future of managing the conflict with the Palestinians and regional relations.
The elections scheduled for October 27, 2026 are of additional importance due to the acute polarization around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the future of his camp, and the possibility of forming an alternative bloc.
This paper proceeds from four main scenarios:
1. Turn the security escalation into a gateway to postpone the elections or disrupt their course.
2. An inconclusive election result leads to Netanyahu’s continuation and re-election within a short period.
3. The victory of the opposition and the formation of a government depend to various degrees on the support of the Arab lists, which makes it vulnerable to instability.
4. Netanyahu was able to form a government by defecting or transferring deputies from the opposition to his camp.
The significance of these scenarios lies not only in their immediate consequences, but also in what they reveal about three deeper transformations: the future of Israeli democracy, the nature of the Israeli–Palestinian relationship, and the future of regional balances between Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Iran and the Arab countries.
The Israeli elections are taking place against the backdrop of the transformation of the relationship between politics and security into one of the main determinants of electoral behavior. Since the Gaza war and the subsequent regional confrontations, the security file has become a central part of the internal political conflict.
This is politically important, because it means that the elections themselves take place within an exceptional security environment, which opens up the possibility of a greater overlap between security considerations and electoral considerations.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is running in the elections clearly based on the rhetoric of security and protection in the face of regional threats, while the opposition is trying to present a political and security alternative. According to recent reports, Netanyahu is focusing his campaign on presenting himself as capable of dealing with regional threats.
Military escalation and turning the war into an entrance to postpone the elections
This scenario is based on the assumption that Israel will move to an open or large-scale military confrontation on one of the fronts: Syrian, Lebanese, and Iranian or in Gaza, creating a security environment that can be used to justify postponing or rescheduling elections.
But a distinction must be made here between the outbreak of an actual war and the legal and political ability to postpone the elections, for there is a basic law: the Knesset defines the elections as General, direct, equal, secret and relative elections, and the extension of the Knesset’s mandate is subject to strict conditions, The official information of the Knesset states that changing some basic provisions related to elections requires a special majority, therefore, the war does not automatically mean the possibility of postponing elections, but postponement becomes a political and legal issue that needs clear institutional arrangements.
The main danger in this scenario is not the war itself, but the normalization of the relationship between the state of emergency and the postponement of the electoral entitlement, and in Gaza, escalation may lead to the freezing of any political course related to a ceasefire, reconstruction or governance arrangements.
In the West Bank, the Israeli focus on security is likely to lead to an increase in the priority of military and security considerations over political ones, which may be reflected in movement, settlement and relationship with the Palestinian Authority.
Inconclusive elections: Netanyahu’s continuation, then new elections
This scenario is based on the failure of either camp to obtain a majority that would enable it to form a stable government, with the main parties not accepting or unable to rely on the Arab lists, The importance of this scenario increases in the light of developments related to the participation of Arab parties, as the Central Election Commission voted to exclude “Raam” and the Joint List, with the decision remaining subject to judicial review.
In this case, the inability to form a government may become the political outcome of the elections, and Netanyahu may continue to head the government during the coalition formation phase, and then if it is not possible to form a new government, Israel may head to another election round, and here the elections turn from a means of resolving the political conflict to an additional stage of the conflict itself.
This scenario may result in what can be called a “democracy of repeated elections without a governmental decision”, that is, the problem is not in the absence of elections, but in the ability of the electoral system to produce a governable parliamentary majority, and this can lead to increased polarization, a decline in trust in parties, the continuation of transitional or fragile governments.
The victory of the opposition and the formation of a government with Arab support.
This scenario consists in the opposition being able to reach the number necessary to form a government, with the need to support the Arab lists directly or indirectly, and here it is necessary to differentiate between joining the government coalition and providing external support to the government in voting on specific issues, This difference can be decisive in determining the stability of the government, because a government based on divergent ideological and political alliances can face disagreements on the Palestinian issue, the status of Arabs inside Israel, judicial reform, religion and the state. This government may be able to come to power, but it will face a more difficult test of viability.
If Arab parties participate in the formation of the government or support it, this could mark an important shift in the relationship of Arab citizens with the Israeli political system, But the success of this transition will depend on whether the participation will turn into an influential political representation within the governing institutions, or remain a temporary parliamentary arrangement to bring down the Netanyahu government.
Netanyahu reshapes majority through defections from opposition
This scenario is based on the failure of the opposition to maintain its parliamentary bloc, and the transition of members or parties from it to the Netanyahu camp, allowing him to form a government without the need for new elections, which is a different scenario from Netanyahu’s electoral victory, as the election results can be inconclusive, and then there is a reconstitution of the majority within the Knesset during the negotiations to form a government.
Its political danger lies in the fact that it shifts the center of gravity from the will of the voter on Election Day to the negotiations, splits and alliances that occur after the elections, and this does not necessarily mean that the transition between blocs is undemocratic, parliamentary systems are originally based on the formation of governments through coalitions. But frequent transitions and defections can create a gap between the election result and the final government composition.
Conclusion
The most important indicator in the 2026 elections is not only who gets the most seats, but whether Israel can turn the electoral result into a governable government without deepening the crisis of political legitimacy and internal polarization, and here two main tracks are manifested:
The first path is to reproduce the existing situation through Netanyahu, whether through direct victory, indecision, or the reconstitution of the majority after the elections.
The second path: a political transition towards an opposition government, with the possibility of its dependence on Arab support and the consequent coalition challenges.
In both cases, three issues will remain the most sensitive: the relationship with the Palestinians, the status of Arab citizens within the political system, and the relationship between security and democracy. The elections will not necessarily end the political instability; the crisis may move from a crisis of forming a government to a crisis of the government’s viability.
The decisive factor in all scenarios will be not only the number of seats, but the ability of the winner or the largest bloc to turn electoral superiority into a stable and governable coalition, while maintaining the rules of democratic competition and political participation.
