Should Brazil Turn Right, What’s In It for Israel?
With the election of Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia and Keiko Fujimori in Peru, Latin America is once again shifting from left to right. The pink tide of the early 2000s saw the rise of left and center-left governments, enjoying years of economic growth that allowed some countries, such as Brazil, to bolster their social welfare and punch above their weight in international affairs. Brazil took an active part in developing the Responsibility While Protecting doctrine as an alternative to the current intervention doctrine, emphasizing accountability and diplomacy against what it sees as an uneven application of intervention against the Global South. It bet on an active role in brokering a nuclear deal with Iran and raised its tone against the United States on several occasions.
Most of these attempts failed, mainly because these countries lacked the power to carry them out. When the 2010s economic slowdown hit, most initiatives were dropped or ignored. The only one that persisted was the animosity towards Israel. The pink tide viewed the Global South as a bet for the next decade, increasing trade with China, Russia, and India to lower its dependence on the United States. This also meant a stronger pro-Palestinian stance: several countries recognized Palestine in the 2010s — Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador with Venezuela leading the way in 2009. The only exception was Chile, whose conservative president, Sebastian Piñera, was the one who recognized Palestine and deepened ties with Israel at the same time.
The pink tide eventually faded away as a general economic slump, continued corruption, and the left-right political divide eroded public support, leading to the rise of a new right. Jerusalem saw it as an opportunity to renew ties, and Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro is an emblematic example. Enthusiastically embracing the new president, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu attended his inauguration and publicly called for moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a promise made during Bolsonaro’s campaign. The move never happened because Brazil feared a backlash from Arab countries that could affect agricultural exports, so it opened an office of its trade promotion agency instead.
Brazil is the wildcard in this equation. Milei is a strong supporter, Kast in Chile has clearly expressed a pro-Israel stance, and Fujimori’s party has traditionally been pro-Israel. Honduras has a pro-Israel president, and Ecuador leans pro-Israel. Moreover, Brazil is the largest country and economy in Latin America. Its political orientation influences how the region is perceived and might also nudge some of its neighbors.
Brazil will see new presidential elections in October 2026. The current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, defeated Jair Bolsonaro in 2022, shifting the government from a right-wing, Israel-friendly orientation to a left-wing one that has put it on a collision course with Jerusalem. His main opponent is Flavio Bolsonaro, Jair’s son. Jair Bolsonaro is currently ineligible and under house arrest. He was convicted of plotting a coup, abusing his power, and undermining democracy after claiming that electronic ballots were vulnerable to hacking. Barred from running, he endorsed his son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro.
The young Bolsonaro gradually trailed behind Lula in polls, reaching a tie around March 2026. Then, leaked audio recordings showed him asking a local banker embroiled in a major fraud case for money to finance a film about his father’s 2018 electoral run. The episode negatively influenced the polls; however, he is still considered the strongest opposition candidate. His pledges are similar to his father’s: tough on crime, economic recovery, supporting conservative values, and support for Israel. This includes moving the embassy to Jerusalem and, quoting from his X account, “to restore the strategic relationship they once had.”
In fact, Lula reversed most of Jair Bolsonaro’s pivot towards Israel: voting at the United Nations turned against Israel, the commercial office in Jerusalem was quietly transferred back to Tel Aviv, and during the protracted war in Gaza, the Brazilian president publicly called Israel’s actions a genocide and quietly recalled its representative in Tel Aviv. Israel attempted to appoint a new ambassador, and Brasilia declined to respond. Lula compared Gaza to the Holocaust, joined the ICJ case against Israel, and left the IHRA alliance, creating a deep rift that most likely will continue if Lula is reelected. Relations are at an all-time low.
How can Israel navigate this scenario and mend relations? If Bolsonaro wins, several factors would need to be considered. The first is that polarized elections are usually an indicator of a troubled presidential term. If Bolsonaro wins by a small margin, this might limit his legitimacy and support to change course. Moreover, any decision perceived as negative by a significant part of the electorate will be met with resistance. The abrupt rapprochement with Israel will be criticized and amplified in the media. While foreign affairs are not a deciding factor for Brazilian voters, they have been increasingly used to delegitimize political opponents. Flavio Bolsonaro himself has said that the elections are a choice between him and supporting Hamas and Hezbollah.
The criticism is not voiced only by pro-Palestinian figures. Brazilian foreign policy is mainly driven by a powerful Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Itamaraty. It is a historically risk-averse institution in its orientation, whose diplomatic corps would balk at moving the embassy and disrupting Brazil’s tradition of following a multilateral consensus. During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, even the military expressed discomfort with the possibility, as it could hurt Brazil’s relations with Arab and Islamic countries.
Despite being perceived as a strongman, Bolsonaro was the president of a democratic country and had to respond to the National Congress and other stakeholders who limited his power. His decisions were severely constrained by competing actors, such as the Minister of Agriculture, Tereza Cristina, whose interest in exporting to Arab countries elevated her to the position of a “parallel Minister of Foreign Affairs.” Any political rapprochement must take into account the correlation of forces within and outside the government.
Why outside? Israel’s public perception has fallen sharply amidst the accusations of genocide and war crimes, even in countries that historically supported the Jewish state. Many Brazilians remain sympathetic to Israel, reject extreme positions, and will favor a two-state solution. However, a sizeable majority also believes that Brazil should not take a side regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. Being far from the Middle East and not exposed to terrorism or the risks of war, the position is understandable. An extreme embrace of any position would be rejected or seen as undesirable and easily exploitable by political opponents. During Bolsonaro’s government, the frequent appearances of the Israeli ambassador with the president and Israeli flags in pro-government demonstrations were denounced as “foreign interference”.
This also applies to “natural allies”, such as the evangelical crowd and the Jewish community. Evangelicals in Brazil are a growing religious group, with an established presence in politics. Their political agenda, however, is criticized by progressive groups as religious coercion and is part of the acrimonious right-left divide in Brazilian society. The Jewish community, while pro-Israel, does not have the same apparatus as American Jews. It has historically preferred a discreet approach, supporting local candidates without openly endorsing them. The trend changed with Lula’s first administration in the early 2000s, when criticism of Israel began to be perceived by some in the Jewish community as lopsided. The situation deteriorated over the next decade and, following broader electoral trends in Brazilian society, a significant part of Brazilian Jews turned to Bolsonaro as a solution to the fractured ties.
Expecting the same level of mobilization from Brazilian Jews that is expected from the American Jewish Committee, AIPAC, or pro-Israel organizations in the United States would invariably end in disappointment. When criticism of Bolsonaro’s pro-Israel stances reached the mainstream political conversation in Brazil, Jewish organizations preferred to take a step back and reduce exposure to open conflict and potential real-world harm. While evangelicals in Brazilian politics openly advance their own agenda, they would also downplay the pro-Israel angle if it stands in the way of other interests, such as keeping tax benefits for churches and pro-family legislation.
How should Israeli decision-makers proceed? Adopt a moderate, low-ego approach at every step. Strong supporters can walk back, and allies also have pragmatic domestic interests. A good example is Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, who touted a pro-Israel orientation only to pivot to a critical stance when domestic opinion and other European countries turned increasingly vocal in their condemnation of the humanitarian plight in Gaza. Even Javier Milei had no issue reportedly halting the plans to transfer the embassy to Jerusalem when it was found that an Israeli company was involved in drilling close to the Falkland Islands, claimed by Buenos Aires as the Malvinas, with a British company. Despite the Israeli company being private, it was more than enough to upset the relationship. Israeli officials later argued that Milei was using a pretext not to transfer the embassy due to fears of an Arab boycott. Even a major ally has a domestic cost issue to contend with and has to back off from electoral promises.
An eager approach to boast about good relations can quickly turn into an issue. To announce, without coordination with Abu Dhabi, that Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the UAE during the 2026 Iran War was a faux pas that offended the Emiratis, who rushed to deny it. When Bolsonaro’s supporters took Israeli flags to demonstrate their support for the president, local Jewish communities felt like Israel was being hijacked to push a partisan agenda. The Israeli MFA knows how to navigate these complex situations: when Bolsonaro’s Secretary of Culture Roberto Alvim delivered a speech denounced as mimicking Nazi Culture Minister Joseph Goebbels, the Israeli ambassador reached out to the President via private channels, strategically taking a step back and allowing the Jewish communities to express their indignation in public.
Israel also attempted to convince Brazil to move the embassy to Jerusalem in the 1950s. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned that it was unfeasible, as the Catholic Church supported Jerusalem as a corpus separatum, and going against the Church would damage Brazil’s social fabric. The situation with Bolsonaro was slightly different: the move was halted for economic reasons, but it nonetheless shows how, sometimes, surprising factors can deeply constrain the foreign policy of middle powers. Flavio Bolsonaro will face the same constraints his father did if elected, and it is almost certain he will not be able to move the embassy.
The most prudent way is to build coalitions from the ground up, even now. Brazil has governors and mayors who are not burdened by overly ideological stances and are willing to reap the benefits of good relations with Israel. They do not necessarily embrace all Israeli positions, but can pragmatically build good ties between their states and cities with Israeli businesses, cultural institutions, and other relevant parties. A new and outspoken ally does not negate the need for a strong, ground-up network of like-minded, pragmatic actors to carry the practical aspects of the relationship.
One last consideration is that even if Brazil continues under a left-wing government hostile to Israel, a region that is otherwise friendlier than it has been in years is a net gain. Brazil would be an isolated holdout, and despite its importance as a regional player, its positions would be offset by other actors through diplomatic cover at the United Nations and coalition-building at international organizations.
Presidents get impeached, lose reelection, or change course. No one knows what will happen in four years. Using this time to implement a plan that will absorb the next turbulence is a good way to ride the potential good years ahead.
