Strategic Prudence in Israel–Russia Ties
NATO expansion, Russian concerns and what Israel must understand
What should Israel do when a war in Europe reshapes the global balance of power? How should a small state behave when its main ally confronts Russia in Ukraine while Iran works more closely with Moscow?
The core argument is one of strategic prudence, not moral endorsement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely condemned as a violation of sovereignty. Yet condemnation does not remove Russia from Israel’s strategic environment. The question for Israeli decision-makers is not whether they approve of Russian conduct, but how they manage relations with a permanent nuclear power whose choices affect Israel’s security.
Any serious assessment must start with Russian threat perception. For Moscow, repeated signals that Ukraine might join NATO were interpreted as a military alliance extending along a long shared border and as a form of encirclement. Recognising this does not mean justifying the invasion. It means understanding how President Vladimir Putin and the wider Russian leadership read their environment. Israeli policy cannot afford to ignore the insecurity of a great power, because misreading that insecurity can lead to wider wars that reach the Middle East.
Russia is also more than a set of military capabilities. It is a long-term civilisational actor that has made major contributions to literature, music, science and space technology. Israeli diplomacy has long understood the need to stay engaged with large civilisational powers, even when disagreements on policy are severe. Treating Russia as permanently beyond engagement would be strategically reckless.
The case for a continued working relationship with Russia is especially strong in Israel’s immediate neighbourhood. Russian forces, aircraft and air defence systems in Syria can directly affect Israel’s ability to act against Iranian and proxy targets. Deconfliction mechanisms between the Israel Defense Forces and Russian forces have allowed Israel to operate in Syrian airspace while reducing the risk of direct confrontation. Preserving these channels is vital if Israel is to prevent accidental clashes and retain operational freedom.
There is also a direct human dimension. Jewish communities and Israeli citizens live in both Russia and Ukraine. Stable diplomatic and consular relations with Moscow improve Israel’s capacity to protect Jewish communities, provide assistance in times of crisis and enable emigration when necessary.
The international system is increasingly multipolar. While Israel remains closely aligned with the United States and the wider West, it gains from maintaining a diversified set of relationships with other major powers, including Russia. Total alignment with any single bloc reduces Israel’s room for manoeuvre, particularly when domestic politics in the United States are polarised and foreign policy priorities can swing sharply with each administration.
The recent American experience, including the Trump administration, underlines this. One administration promoted a particular approach to the Middle East, including pressure on Iran and support for normalisation agreements; later administrations may revise or dilute those policies. Israeli interests, however, do not change every four years. It would be unwise for Israel to base its planning solely on the assumption of any one American approach. Russia, by contrast, is a constant Eurasian power whose presence in the region will outlast individual Western leaders.
The Ukraine war has also disrupted energy and grain markets and has contributed to wider economic instability. Israel is not immune to changes in prices or supply. Russia remains a major actor in energy and commodity markets. A functional relationship with Moscow gives Israel additional options in dealing with such shocks.
None of this requires that Israel remain silent about the war in Ukraine. Moral outrage at aggression is legitimate. Israel can condemn violations of sovereignty, deliver humanitarian aid and support refugees, while still keeping diplomatic lines to Moscow open. Responsible policy separates the moral evaluation of a conflict from the duty to protect national interests. Diplomacy is not friendship; it is a framework for managing tensions.
There are also concrete dangers in trying to isolate Russia completely. One of the most serious for Israel is the possibility of pushing Moscow into deeper reliance on Iran and other hostile actors, reducing any incentive to limit Iranian ambitions in Syria and elsewhere. A measured, carefully managed relationship with Russia offers Israel some leverage in moderating this alignment.
From this angle, the issue is not whether Israel “chooses” Russia or the West, but how it preserves influence in both. Israel has condemned the war and assisted Ukraine, yet has avoided sanctions and kept coordination with Moscow where its security requires it. At the same time, it cannot ignore the Russian people themselves, whose culture, science and artistic life have shaped the modern world and enriched Israel directly through the large Russian-speaking community inside the country. Maintaining a working relationship with Moscow is therefore not only a tool of risk management in Syria and in relation to Iran; it also protects a long-standing bridge between two societies that have exchanged ideas, talent and people for decades. A conclusion that acknowledges this mixed posture and presents engagement with Russia as one practical tool among others, rather than a sign of endorsement, would describe Israel’s position more accurately and with greater balance.
