Syrian–Chinese Relations During the Tenure of al-Sharaa
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, profound and far-reaching changes occurred in Syria and the wider region. Within Syria, major transformations took place, most notably the transfer of power from the Shia (Alawite) sect to the Sunni sect for the first time in more than fifty years. This shift in the governing system produced two significant changes in Syrian foreign policy.
Regionally, Syria moved from being an ally of Iran to aligning with Sunni states such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Internationally, it shifted from an alliance with Russia and hostility toward the United States to a posture more closely aligned with the United States. In other words, Syria transitioned from the Russia – Iran axis – an axis generally friendly toward China – to another axis closer to the U.S. – Turkey (NATO) camp, alongside Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which maintain long-standing strategic relationships with the United States.
This realignment occurred despite repeated assertions by the new Syrian government that it is not hostile toward any country and seeks to remain neutral in regional and international conflicts. Nevertheless, the reality indicates that, from the perspective of the new Syrian government, its primary interests now lie in its relations with the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – states that are either allies or close partners of the United States.
In light of these developments, the nature, future, structure, opportunities, and challenges of Syrian – Chinese relations have also changed and continue to evolve.
China–Post-Assad Syria Relations
Initially, Syrian – Chinese relations during the current Syrian transitional period can be described as “not yet a primary or highly significant relationship for either side – cautiously open, marked by suspicion, anxiety, and various challenges, and therefore developing slowly and carefully.”
From the perspective of the new Syrian government, China is viewed as a supporter of the Assad regime, though to a lesser extent than Russia and Iran, which intervened militarily on Assad’s behalf. This perception constitutes the first factor undermining trust in the relationship, at least for a certain period. Following the fall of the Assad regime, the Chinese embassy in Damascus was looted – an event that also highlights early tensions in the relationship. Moreover, one week after Assad’s fall, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed his “deep concern” regarding the situation in Syria and urged urgent efforts to prevent “terrorist and extremist forces from exploiting the chaos.” In addition, reports circulated suggesting that China intended to use its veto power in the Security Council to prevent Ahmed al-Sharaa’s name from being removed from the list of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities targeted by sanctions. However, it appears that an understanding was reached with China – possibly through Saudi, American, or Russian mediation—to avert the use of the veto. Consequently, on November 6, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa and the transitional Minister of Interior, Anas Hasan Khattab, were removed from the UN sanctions list by the Security Council, with 14 out of 15 member states voting in favor. China was the only country that neither supported the resolution nor exercised its veto. This clearly indicates that China is hesitant, seeks to learn more about the new government in Syria, and still harbors doubts as well as certain expectations or demands.
The first contact between China and Syria during al-Sharaa’s tenure occurred on February 21, 2025, when al-Sharaa met with the Chinese ambassador in Damascus. This meeting marked the first official and public contact approximately two and a half months after Assad’s fall. This delay indicates that the relationship is not very important to both sides, or that there is some degree of mutual mistrust between them. Several subsequent official meetings followed, during which both sides affirmed their desire to strengthen relations and expand cooperation. The signing of a memorandum of understanding in May 2025 between the Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports and the Chinese company Fidi Contracting – to invest in free zones in Syria covering more than one million square meters for a period of twenty years – long with the recent visit of the Syrian foreign minister to China, may represent the most significant developments in the evolving relationship. However, despite these statements and actions, Sino-Syrian relations remain complex and multifaceted.
Main Concerns of the al-Sharaa Government
From the moment al-Sharaa assumed power, his government concentrated on several key priorities: securing international recognition of the new government – especially from the United States; achieving the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria; establishing control over the entirety of Syrian territory and restoring stability to attract foreign investment and begin reconstruction, a process that also requires the support of the United States, Turkey, and Arab states; and limiting Israeli intervention through U.S. mediation.
It is clear that all of the main objectives of al-Sharaa’s government are closely tied to the United States. This connection makes the new Syria, whether willingly or not, regard its relationship with the United States as central and paramount. Consequently, Syria finds itself constrained by American conditions and demands. This could pose one of the challenges to Chinese–Syrian relations.
What China Wants from the New Syrian Government
Although economic and trade considerations typically dominate China’s relations with most Middle Eastern countries, in its relationship with the new Syria the security dimension remains paramount. China’s chief concern regarding the new Syrian government is the presence of a large number of Chinese Uyghur fighters from the Turkestan Islamic Party within the ranks of the newly formed Syrian armed forces. China considers this group a terrorist and separatist organization, and therefore a direct threat to its national security.
The relationship between al-Sharaa and the Uyghurs dates back to the arrival of Uyghur militants in Syria via Turkey and Southeast Asia between 2012 and 2013. They settled in Idlib province, which is controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani (formerly Ahmed al-Sharaa). The total number of Uyghurs residing in Syria is estimated at around 15,000, including 5,000 fighters, and approximately 3,500 of them have recently been recruited into the Syrian Army’s 84th Division. This development has intensified China’s concerns, as Beijing has repeatedly expressed apprehension regarding both the Uyghur presence in Syria and their integration into the Syrian military.
China fears that this group could target Chinese interests in the region, return to China as trained fighters, or provide financial and logistical support to the Turkestan Islamic Party inside China to conduct operations against the Chinese government. For example, Abdulhaq Turkistani, the leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party, issued a strongly worded warning a week before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to HTS, declaring that “the infidels of China will soon meet the same fate as the infidels of Syria.”
This constitutes a serious and immediate concern for Beijing, as it cannot overlook such a sensitive security issue merely to pursue economic, trade, or diplomatic interests – especially given that Syria is a country exhausted both economically and politically and unable to offer much to China even in these areas, particularly since the United States holds the greatest influence over the new Syria and may use those Uyghur fighters as leverage against China in the future.
Despite these concerns and doubts – and despite China not yet having fully, officially, and publicly recognized the new Syrian government – Beijing has kept its channels open with the new Syria. It is maintaining cautious and gradual relations in order to contain the threat posed by Uyghur fighters and to benefit from potential economic, investment, and political opportunities in Syria, particularly within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, given Syria’s strategically important geographic location.
How Do Syria’s New Leaders View China and Its Demands?
As previously noted, the new Syrian government’s policy is primarily based on improving its relations with the United States and gaining its favor. From this perspective, it views its relations with Russia and China as less important than its relationship with Washington. There is a common perception that Turkey holds the greatest influence over the new Syrian government, but the facts on the ground do not support this. For example, Turkey wants the new Syrian government to join it in fighting the U.S.-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whereas the United States opposes such a move. To date, the al-Sharaa government has not fought the SDF, in accordance with Washington’s position. This indicates that the United States exerts greater influence over al-Sharaa than Turkey does.
Nevertheless, the al-Sharaa government is attempting to maintain open channels of communication and to establish political and trade relations with other states, including Russia and China. Al-Sharaa recently visited Moscow and met with President Putin, and diplomatic and commercial ties with China have also been initiated. (Given the presence of Russian military bases in Syria and Russia’s historically significant influence over the country, the al-Sharaa government views Russia as more important than China.)
However, these relationships operate within the limits of American approval, which explains why relations with China and Russia are developing slowly and cautiously and have had limited practical impact. For example, in response to Chinese concerns about Uyghur fighters, Ahmed al-Sharaa stated explicitly, “I sympathize with the Uyghurs, but their struggle against China is not our struggle.” Additionally, the Syrian Ministry of Defense compelled the Turkestan Islamic Party to dissolve itself in June in an effort to address China’s security concerns. Yet these steps have not significantly reassured Beijing, as reliable local Syrian sources report that Uyghur fighters still maintain substantial influence and activity, much as they did previously.
According to informed sources, the United States – despite demanding that the new Syrian government combat terrorism and remove extremist Islamic groups from the army and state institutions – has agreed to allow Uyghur fighters to remain and be integrated into the Syrian army and its institutions, even as Washington encourages Syria to fight and expel other Islamic groups. This Uyghur exception by the United States, if it indicates anything, suggests a message to China or a potential pressure tactic directed against it.
The steps taken by the Syrian government in response to China’s concerns have so far been largely formal and symbolic. Damascus seeks to maintain open relations and communication channels with Beijing without seriously or substantively implementing China’s demands. Likewise, China aims to keep diplomatic channels open without fully recognizing or formally endorsing the new Syrian government. The Syrian – Chinese trade memorandum signed in May exemplifies this mutual caution and hesitation. According to local sources, the memorandum is vague and appears to lack seriousness and depth. Even the Chinese company that signed the agreement is not among China’s major or well-known firms. It seems that the primary purpose of the memorandum is simply to keep the door open, rather than to establish a major economic partnership with tangible on-the-ground impact.
Some observers believe that this memorandum and other steps toward greater openness with Russia and China represent a deliberate policy by the new Syrian government to seek alternatives to the United States. This argument has gained traction because the government’s main objectives – objectives it hoped to achieve through reliance on Washington – have not yet been fully realized. For example, While the United States has provided the new Syrian government with an opportunity and a degree of recognition, and has lifted some sanctions, many others remain in place. Israeli interventions continue, Syria remains territorially divided, and investment and reconstruction have not yet meaningfully begun. Based on this, some interpret recent Syrian outreach to China and Russia as a sign that the government has lost hope in Washington and is now seeking alternative partners. This interpretation also suggests that such outreach could serve as a message or pressure tactic aimed at the United States: if Washington does not meet Syria’s demands, Damascus might pivot toward China and Russia. This is especially relevant given that American support is often tied to prior conditions, including relations with Israel and other political requirements, unlike China and Russia, which do not impose such conditions.
However, this perception does not align with the realities on the ground, for several reasons:
Only the United States is capable of delivering the outcomes Syria seeks. Pressuring Israel, lifting sanctions, and resolving Syria’s territorial fragmentation are objectives that no other country – not China, not Russia – has the capacity to deliver.
Although China generally refrains from imposing political conditions on partner states, Syria is an exception. Beijing has its own demands regarding the Uyghur fighters – demands that the Syrian government finds extremely difficult to fulfill, especially at present, given the considerable influence wielded by Uyghur and other foreign fighters. Russia’s expectations are almost identical in this regard.
In practice, there are clear indications that the Syrian government still views its relationship with the United States as its top priority. For example, the number of American troops in Syria has increased, and there are plans to establish a new American military base in Damascus. Such developments contradict the notion that the al-Sharaa government seeks to replace American influence with that of China or Russia.
At present – and likely for the foreseeable future – American influence in the new Syria will remain the dominant force shaping Syrian foreign policy. Within this framework, Syria neither wishes nor intends to implement China’s security demands in a manner that would meaningfully reassure Beijing. This is partly because the United States opposes such measures, and partly because the al-Sharaa government itself relies heavily on foreign fighters, especially Uyghurs, for military and security purposes. Even aside from American and Chinese preferences, the fragile Syrian government may simply be unable to expel or dismantle the foreign-fighter presence: such an action could trigger a violent backlash, particularly given that a significant number of Syrian Islamist fighters – many formerly associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham—remain supportive of these foreign elements.
The Official Visit of the Syrian Government to China
On November 16, 2025, following visits to Washington and London, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani and General Intelligence Chief Hussein Al-Salameh visited Beijing, China, in the first official visit of the new Syrian government to the country. They met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi. In a joint statement, both sides emphasized the importance of diplomatic engagement and cooperation across various fields, as well as adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. They also stressed the need to combat terrorism in all its forms and agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation on counterterrorism and security matters. Minister al-Shaibani reaffirmed Syria’s unwavering commitment to the One China principle and its readiness to actively participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. He further underscored his concern for China’s security interests and pledged that Syria would not pose a threat to China, nor allow any entities to use its territory for activities that could harm China’s security, sovereignty, or interests.
These statements – particularly those regarding combating terrorism – are frequently reiterated in most speeches and declarations of the new Syrian government. However, on the ground, these commitments have not been implemented. No real arrests or removals of extremist groups have occurred; in fact, such groups constitute the majority of the current Syrian armed forces.
During this visit, news circulated widely that Syria will hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China. Agence France-Presse (AFP) published the claim, citing two sources, one governmental and the other diplomatic. However, an official source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly denied the report. According to the official Syrian news agency SANA, the source stated that “there is no truth to what AFP reported about the government’s intention to hand over fighters to China.” This contradiction highlights the ambiguity surrounding the issue. Officially, The Syrian government has not mentioned the matter, and on the ground the al-Sharaa government has taken no serious action in this regard. To verify the accuracy of these reports and determine whether the government is taking concrete steps, developments must be observed in practice. Even if, hypothetically, 400 Uyghur fighters were handed over, would this adequately satisfy China’s concerns, given the thousands of others still present in Syria? Therefore, it remains necessary to wait to determine whether the report is accurate and, if so, how any such handover would be implemented – superficially and partially, or genuinely and comprehensively.
According to a well-informed local source, most Uyghurs reside in Idlib province, where they hold considerable influence. Idlib is the stronghold of HTS the group led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, not Damascus or other regions, because HTS has controlled and administered the province since 2017, making its grip on the area stronger than its grip on any other areas in Syria. Furthermore, HTS relocated from Idlib to other parts of Syria during the battle to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. This means that the source of al-Sharaa’s power within Syria comes from Idlib, a stronghold for Uyghur fighters. Is al-Sharaa capable of making fundamental changes in that province and risking internal conflict or rebellion by these fighters? This may prove extremely difficult. Thus, it is necessary to remain cautious and avoid interpreting official statements or superficial declarations as evidence of a significant shift in Sino-Syrian relations. “Especially since the al-Sharā’ government has repeatedly affirmed that it will deal with all components of Syrian society in a peaceful, national, and lawful manner. However, contrary to these repeated statements, major violations and crimes have been committed by al-Sharā’s armed men against Alawites and Druze.
Thus, the official Syrian visit to China is most likely part of the slow and cautious relationship described above and reflects the al-Sharaa government’s policy of maintaining channels of communication and cooperation with all parties within the limits permitted by American hegemony.
Conclusion
The current Syrian–Chinese relationship – and most likely for the foreseeable future – will continue to develop slowly, cautiously, and with limited mutual trust. It may expand gradually, but it will not reach the level of Sino–Syrian relations during the Assad era, when the two states were strategic partners. This is understandable: Syria has shifted from being part of the Russia – Iran axis, the axis closest to China, to becoming a state heavily influenced by the United States. It has transformed from a country that enjoyed a strategic partnership with China to one that China now sees as a potential security threat due to the presence of large numbers of Uyghur fighters and opposition members. Moreover, the significant American influence in Syria deepens China’s suspicions about the new Syrian state.
From the perspective of Syria’s new leaders, the country’s primary objectives and the resolution of its major challenges lie chiefly with the United States, not China. Consequently, Syria is currently unwilling to offer China what Beijing demands, knowing that China cannot solve its core problems. At the same time, China’s security demands are extremely difficult for the new Syria to fulfill. As a result, Syria prefers to offer symbolic, rhetorical, and superficial concessions to China’s demands, hoping that these gestures will encourage China to invest economically in Syria.
The new Syrian leaders were formerly part of extremist Islamist groups, and their closest allies included the Uyghur fighters. Because of this strong relationship and trust, Uyghur fighters played a significant role in supporting the new Syrian leaders militarily. Moreover, the United States has shown acceptance of the presence and integration of Uyghur fighters into the new Syrian army. Even if the Syrian government wished to resolve the Uyghur issue in the manner China demands, it may simply be unable to do so, given the group’s military influence in areas controlled by the Syrian government.
The Uyghur issue is the most significant factor shaping China’s relationship with the new Syria. The notion that China is primarily worried about Syria’s close relations with the United States is inaccurate. While this may be one contributing factor, it is not the main one. China maintains strong relations with many American allies and partners in the region and internationally, including Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union. Therefore, China’s concerns about Syria’s ties with Washington are ultimately rooted in the Uyghur issue: Beijing fears that the United States may use Uyghurs in Syria as leverage against Chinese interests.
Thus, the issue of Uyghur fighters is paramount for China, and it represents a demand that the new Syrian government is unwilling, unable, and incapable of fully meeting – as current realities clearly demonstrate. To date, the Syrian government has taken no concrete measures to resolve the issue; on the contrary, Uyghur fighters have been integrated into the army and now hold significant influence in Syria. However, China may be able to reach a compromise arrangement with the Syrian government. Under such an agreement, Syria could prevent Uyghur fighters from taking action against China – whether within China, against Chinese interests in the Middle East, or through anti-China rhetoric in the media and on social media. In essence, the Syrian government could attempt to separate the Uyghurs in Syria from Uyghur networks abroad and inside China. This would be difficult, but it is more realistic than removing or disbanding them entirely.
Such an arrangement would allow the Syrian government to avoid directly confronting Uyghur fighters inside Syria, while restricting their activities to Syria itself and preventing them from acting against China. This could provide Beijing with a degree of reassurance. In exchange for this step, China could offer economic and investment support to Syria. Confining Uyghur activity within Syria, in return for Chinese economic assistance, would represent a pragmatic model of engagement – one that the United States might also accept.
Alternatively, China – through an understanding with the United States – could seek to have Washington pressure the Syrian government to resolve the Uyghur fighters issue, in exchange for China offering certain benefits to the United States. However, such a scenario could trigger tensions between the al-Sharaa government and the extremist Islamist groups that constitute a significant portion of the army and state institutions.
