The Abraham Accords’ Kurdish Blind Spot

Opportunity Knocks in Erbil, but on Whose Terms?
Among the questions raised by the expansion of Arab–Israeli normalization, the political future of the Kurds deserves greater scrutiny. Agreements that reduce interstate hostility can also consolidate a territorial order whose legitimacy remains contested by peoples living within it. For the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, this presents a consequential dilemma: the diplomatic integration of the Middle East could generate opportunities for security and prosperity while making Kurdish independence more difficult to achieve. Under less favorable conditions, it could also strengthen central governments at the expense of existing Kurdish self-government.
The Abraham Accords do not prescribe such an outcome. The 2020 Israel–United Arab Emirates treaty establishes diplomatic relations and extensive cooperation, emphasizing sovereignty, security and regional stability. It contains no prohibition on Kurdish independence and no undertaking to dismantle Kurdish autonomy. Its significance for the Kurdish question lies in the political incentives that a wider network of comparable agreements could create.
As governments develop interconnected arrangements for trade, infrastructure and security, they acquire additional interests in preserving the territorial framework within which those arrangements operate. Borders become embedded in investment decisions, diplomatic commitments and security calculations. Their alteration consequently carries greater costs for a growing number of states. A Kurdish claim to independence could encounter resistance from governments concerned primarily with protecting agreements from which they benefit, even where those governments harbor no particular hostility towards Kurdish aspirations.
This possibility requires neither a coordinated campaign against the Kurds nor a secret provision in a peace treaty. It can emerge through the cumulative preference of established states for predictable relations with other established states. A national movement seeking recognition must then overcome an increasingly consolidated diplomatic preference for continuity.
For Iraqi Kurdistan, however, the prospect of independence must be distinguished from the preservation of its constitutional position. Article 117 of Iraq’s Constitution recognizes the Kurdistan Region and its existing authorities as a federal region. Article 121 provides for regional legislative and judicial powers, subject to the Constitution and the exclusive competences of the federal government. Kurdish self-government therefore possesses an institutional basis within Iraq’s constitutional order.
International support for Iraq’s territorial integrity should reflect that distinction. Recognition of the state’s external borders does not establish that every contested internal competence belongs to Baghdad. An approach that equates stability with the progressive concentration of authority in the federal government could undermine the constitutional accommodation through which territorial unity and regional self-government coexist.
Were Iraq eventually to negotiate normalization with Israel, the distribution of diplomatic benefits would warrant particular attention. Agreements conducted exclusively through Baghdad could strengthen the federal government’s international standing while leaving Erbil with limited influence over arrangements affecting its economy and security. Israel, in turn, could acquire interests in its relationship with Baghdad that complicate its willingness to advocate Kurdish positions. These are conditional risks, dependent on the substance of any future agreement.
The diplomatic bargain accompanying Morocco’s normalization with Israel offers a relevant, although necessarily limited, comparison. In December 2020, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara alongside the announcement of normalization. The accompanying presidential proclamation endorsed autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and rejected an independent Sahrawi state as a realistic solution. A contested territorial question thus became part of a broader diplomatic transaction.
Western Sahara and Kurdistan have different histories, institutional circumstances and legal contexts. The comparison cannot establish an equivalent entitlement or predict an identical outcome. Its relevance concerns the conduct of diplomacy: a major power may revise its position on a territorial dispute to facilitate an agreement serving other strategic objectives. Kurdish policymakers have reason to examine what assurances their partners would offer or relinquish in future negotiations.
There is nevertheless a substantial argument for Kurdish engagement with regional normalization. Reduced hostility towards relations with Israel could widen opportunities for commercial and technical cooperation beside diplomatic contact. A more interconnected region could also provide additional partners for Kurdish institutions and businesses. These possibilities should be assessed seriously. Treating every initiative for interstate reconciliation as inherently adverse to Kurdish interests would unnecessarily restrict Kurdish diplomacy.
The decisive issue is who holds authority within the resulting arrangements. Economic integration could strengthen the Kurdistan Region if its institutions share in key decisions and receive predictable benefits, but deals that deepen dependence while limiting regional influence could leave self-government intact on paper and diminished in practice. Investment alone is a poor measure of political security.
Washington and its partners should consequently incorporate safeguards for Kurdish self-government into any relevant expansion of regional cooperation. Agreements affecting the Kurdistan Region should provide for its participation through arrangements consistent with Iraq’s constitutional allocation of powers. Commitments concerning revenue and security should specify implementation procedures and mechanisms for resolving disputes. General expressions of goodwill offer little protection when competing authorities disagree over their meaning.
Kurdish leaders also bear responsibility for the credibility of their position, which depends in considerable measure on their ability to establish a common negotiating platform on fundamental regional interests, strengthen institutional accountability and ensure transparent administration. These measures would improve their capacity to secure and sustain external commitments. Internal legitimacy gives Kurdish diplomacy substance; international sympathy cannot compensate indefinitely for weaknesses in representation or governance.
The long-term question of Kurdish independence will remain politically contested. Its peaceful consideration should not be foreclosed merely because existing governments find territorial continuity convenient. Meanwhile, preserving the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional self-government offers an immediate and defensible policy objective. A regional peace capable of accommodating Kurdish political agency would possess a stronger foundation than one that requires the Kurds to surrender influence over their future as the price of other states’ reconciliation.
