The Gulf’s Expanding Role in Red Sea Security

The Red Sea has long served as a strategic corridor linking continents and their interests, and as a theater of intense geopolitical competition among regional and global powers. Yet in recent years, the security landscape of this vital region has undergone significant changes. At the forefront is a shift in the Gulf States’ role—from mere financiers or intermediaries in maritime security arrangements—to direct and effective contributors in shaping both institutional and strategic frameworks. This evolution reflects a more autonomous Gulf political dynamic and raises important strategic questions worth exploring.

Over the past decade, the Gulf’s reliance on proxy force projection has declined, accompanied by an increase in the deployment of military assets and infrastructure. The United Arab Emirates established military bases in Eritrea, later shifting to logistical operations on Yemen’s Mayyun Island. Saudi Arabia bolstered its presence in Port Sudan as part of broader security arrangements, while Bahrain expanded its maritime activities in coordination with international partners. Such deployments signal a Gulf ambition to shift from being consumers of security to its providers, and demonstrate heightened awareness of the Red Sea’s role in safeguarding Gulf economic and strategic interests—especially amid transnational threats like terrorism, weapons trafficking, and competition over key maritime trade routes.

Alongside these military steps, institutional initiatives have emerged to establish more sustainable regional cooperation frameworks. Chief among these is Saudi Arabia’s initiative to create the “Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,” designed to unite eastern and western littoral states under a coordination umbrella. Informal cooperation forums have also surfaced, aimed at trust-building and policy alignment. Though these efforts are still maturing, they suggest a Gulf transition from crisis management to environmental engineering of regional security—and they open doors for a homegrown deterrence model led by regional players rather than external powers.

Israel’s evolving footprint in the Red Sea must also be considered within this shifting landscape. While not a littoral state, Israel has accelerated its engagement with regional actors through normalization agreements and informal security coordination—particularly with UAE-backed entities in Yemen and Sudan. This has allowed it to counter Iranian maritime influence, combat arms smuggling to Gaza, and fortify its naval posture in response to Houthi aggression. Nonetheless, its presence adds complexity to the region’s power matrix, especially given rising anti-Israel sentiment and asymmetric threats triggered by conflicts in Gaza and beyond. While Gulf and Israeli interests often align tactically in securing maritime routes, their strategic calculations diverge across broader geopolitical fault lines.

However, the Gulf’s drive toward “security sovereignty” in the Red Sea faces structural and political challenges. Internally, the fragility of adjacent African states poses barriers to effective security integration. Externally, divergent Gulf interests vis-à-vis global powers like China and Russia complicate efforts to build independent security architecture. Some Gulf-led initiatives are accused of projecting influence rather than responding to collective security needs, raising questions about the depth and credibility of this transition—especially as Gulf states sit geographically detached from the African coastlines and face volatile geopolitical crosswinds.

The central question remains: do Gulf countries possess sufficient leverage to transform the Red Sea from a space of geopolitical competition into a model of regional collective security? Success will depend on their ability to transcend narrow considerations, enhance institutional coordination internally and externally, and build alliances that accommodate diverse interests without defaulting to external power blocs.

There are realistic prospects for an enhanced Gulf role, yet the initiative remains in its formative stages and will require ongoing scrutiny to ensure sustainability and minimize conflict and improvisation. The Gulf’s move from a “proxy” to a “sovereign” model of Red Sea security is not a mere tactical shift—it reflects a recalibration of self-perception and strategic role. But this transformation will only succeed through robust institutional engineering, realistic partnerships, and a strategic vision that looks beyond circumstantial calculations toward a stable and secure regional order.