The illusion of deterrence: Hezbollah is rebuilding
Israel’s strategy on the northern front must focus on one goal: the security of its northern residents. To achieve that goal over the long term, Israeli policy must rest on two principles: setting firm red lines against Hezbollah’s rearmament and rejecting the doctrine of proportional responses.
The first principle concerns Hezbollah’s military buildup, already underway. At present, the IDF does not have complete freedom of action to halt this process deep inside Lebanon. In recent weeks, IDF strikes have mostly focused on southern Lebanon, within the security zone and its immediate surroundings, and appear largely aimed at eliminating immediate threats to IDF forces. Yet while the IDF focuses on threats to its troops, Hezbollah is rebuilding its capacity to pose a strategic threat to northern Israel’s communities. It is doing so through continued smuggling and the development of local production and assembly capabilities for drones, rockets and anti-tank missiles. Syrian and Lebanese authorities have intercepted weapons shipments intended for Hezbollah. Nevertheless, smuggling routes remain active and continue to support the organization’s military rebuilding.
We cannot accept a situation in which the IDF holds a security zone in southern Lebanon while Hezbollah rebuilds its strength beyond it, with only occasional, limited clashes between the two sides. History has already taught us that allowing such a situation to become entrenched only makes the problem worse. Nor does the solution lie in a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon: Hezbollah has no interest in a negotiated settlement, refuses to disarm and disregards the Lebanese government’s decisions on the matter.
This leads to the second principle: an unequivocally disproportionate response to any attack on Israeli territory or IDF soldiers. Adhering to a doctrine of proportional responses and tit-for-tat retaliation risks recreating the conditions that developed along the Gaza border over two decades of sporadic attacks and a policy of containment, with consequences that are now tragically clear. To avoid repeating the tragedy that befell those communities or the years of attrition in Israel’s former security zone in Lebanon, a different operational doctrine is needed.
Israel’s failure at the beginning of this century stemmed from an inability to identify when Hezbollah had completed its military buildup and considered itself ready for war. We must therefore assume that so long as the ayatollahs’ regime in Tehran remains in power, Hezbollah will continue rebuilding its military capabilities while maintaining civilian initiatives to retain the support of its Shiite base.
We must not mistake Hezbollah’s current restraint for a lasting change in its intentions. Hezbollah’s overriding interest at present is to rebuild, and it is therefore refraining from attacks targeting Israeli territory. It may even stay out of a conflict involving Iran. Nor should figures such as the reported destruction of about 20,000 buildings in southern Lebanon lull us into complacency or revive the illusion that quiet along the border means Hezbollah has been deterred.
The gains from Israel’s September 2024 campaign against Hezbollah, reinforced by growing domestic criticism of the organization in Lebanon and decisions by the Lebanese government, will erode and ultimately be lost if Israel fails to act further.
Israel must define in advance, regardless of who leads the government in Jerusalem or the administration in Washington, the thresholds that would trigger large-scale military action. The purpose of using force is not to create deterrence but to deny the enemy the capabilities to attack. In the Middle East, the only reliable deterrence comes from denying the enemy those capabilities. Once they are restored, deterrence evaporates. For now, Israel has weakened Hezbollah enough to deter it temporarily, but that balance could change.
Another critical consideration is that any decision to bring Hezbollah into a war following an attack on Iran will be made primarily in Tehran, likely depending on how seriously the regime perceives the threat to its survival. If a military campaign against Iran ends without toppling the regime and Hezbollah stays out of the fighting to preserve its strength, the result could be the false impression that deterrence is working. In reality, Israel would be left facing two adversaries rebuilding their military capabilities in parallel. Israel’s test in the north, therefore, is not today’s quiet but its determination to deny Hezbollah tomorrow’s capabilities.

