The Last Tsar of Israel

Benjamin Netanyahu gets a lot of antisemitic press comparing him to all sorts of despotic leaders — mainly Hitler — but perhaps the most apt comparison in terms of his leadership style is that of Tsar Nicholas II. When it came to ruling his empire, the Tsar was a dogmatic decision maker, a style that often led him to ignore advice from well-informed people. And when it came to the First World War, the most dangerous & existential conflict for the Russian Empire, his disastrous need to be surrounded by “yes men” was his downfall. He and his wife removed everyone from power who disagreed with them, didn’t suit their ideological objectives, or who would push back (often on their ‘inexplicable’ relationship with Rasputin). He fired people leading the war, people with actual military experience, to take over leadership himself. But more importantly, he sought to surround himself with sycophants who would toe the party line at the expense of the needs of the country, the wants of the population, and in a desire to keep himself on the throne. His obsessive need to maintain the autocracy, to not relinquish any power, engineered a situation that was disastrous for the Russian Empire. In the waning days of his rule, as hundreds of thousands took to the streets in St. Petersburg and Moscow while he was at headquarters in Mogilev, he had no real understanding of just how rapidly the revolution was spreading or how big it was growing— such was the impact of his sycophantic ministers. Anybody who was not easily controllable, anyone not under his thumb, had long since been relieved of their positions. Competency, if it meant pushing back on said poor decisions, was a liability. 

Netanyahu is similarly dogmatic and his obsession with maintaining his own hold on power at the expense of the needs of the army and the country is as disgraceful as it is anticipated. Gallant reports that he was fired (for the second time) for three reasons: that he insisted that Charedim could not be draft evaders (much less receive daycare benefits), his insistence on the feasibility of a hostage deal, and that he demanded a comprehensive investigation into the failures of October 7th. Fundamentally, all three of these things are threatening to Bibi’s tight hold on the levers of power. The ultra-orthodox draft evasion is fundamental to many in his coalition, and both that and the hostage deal have repeatedly been held up as things that would bring down the coalition and government. Despite the fact that Israel cannot continue to fight this truly existential war on seven fronts with an exhausted army and insufficient manpower. That the majority of Israelis want a hostage deal is apparently irrelevant. That betraying the hostages is not only a betrayal of Jewish law on the subject, but also a tearing of the social contract that Israelis and their governments have also appears not to matter much. If citizens are required to protect their state, their state has an obligation to protect them. It is one of the fundamental bedrocks of the Israeli state. And of course Bibi does not want a comprehensive investigation into the failures of October 7th, because it could not be anything but catastrophic for him. From meetings with the IDF leadership (ignored) about terrorists seeking to take advantage of the political disarray, from the warning received by Egypt 3 days in advance, to even the failure to recognize the significance of 1000 Israeli SIM cards being turned on just after midnight in Gaza — the failures will be many and damning. After all, the buck stops with him. 

But from firing Gallant and replacing him with a “yes man” to attempting to fire an AG who stubbornly refuses to agree that prevent Charedi enlistment is ‘legal,’ his refusal to deal with competent leaders who would push back on his decisions is on full display. Much like the late Tsar, Bibi’s choice of replacement indicates his insistence on political survival over the needs of the state he serves. His replacement of Gallant with yet another “yes man” can in no way be interpreted any other way.

Yoav Gallant is an experienced, successful defence minister, fiercely intelligent and competent. His life’s work has been the preservation of Israel’s security. He has handled this horrifying war in a way that has managed to restore Israeli deterrence and decapitate much of the Iranian proxy leadership. He is well-respected and liked by his soldiers. And he is being replaced by a former transportation minister with little military experience. That’s an interesting choice for defence minister at a time when Israel is fighting a war on seven fronts.

At their most dangerous, most existential moments, both men remove people of competence from positions of power, merely because that competency threatened their ideological bedrock. Bibi already proved his desperation to stay in power when he aligned with people that he had regularly dismissed as “unfit to hold office,” people who were so ideologically and morally bankrupt that they lionize a terrorist and mass murderer. His firing a military leader, one that the State of Israel needs to fight this war, and replacing him with someone who will just toe the party line, is just another in the long line of decisions that will one day come to haunt him. Let us hope that the end of his political career is not nearly as tragic as the end of Nicholas II’s.