The Prime Ministers Who Put Israel First

Shortly after Hamas’s October 7 invasion, I argued that presidents—not prime ministers—ultimately end Israel’s wars. Donald Trump has once again demonstrated the truth of that observation. But history also shows that Israeli prime ministers once accepted that while the United States is Israel’s indispensable ally, no American president can be allowed to dictate Israel’s security policy.

In 1948, Israel fought for its survival despite fierce opposition from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. Although President Harry Truman recognized the new state, he also approved an arms embargo. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion nevertheless refused to accept American efforts to deny Israel the Negev and fought until Israel secured its vital interests.

After Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran and sponsored years of terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip, Ben-Gurion secretly coordinated with Britain and France to launch the 1956 Sinai campaign without President Dwight Eisenhower’s approval. Eisenhower eventually forced Israel to withdraw, but Israel had reopened the Strait of Tiran and dramatically reduced cross-border attacks.

Ben-Gurion also repeatedly rejected President John F. Kennedy’s demands for intrusive inspections of Israel’s nuclear program. Despite sustained American pressure, Israel developed the strategic deterrent that has arguably been the bedrock of its national security ever since.

In 1967, after Egypt again blockaded the Strait of Tiran and massed its army on Israel’s border, President Lyndon Johnson warned Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.” Eshkol chose to go alone. Israel launched its preemptive strike and won one of history’s most decisive military victories despite an American declaration of neutrality and another U.S. arms embargo.

After the war, Eshkol extended Israeli law to East Jerusalem despite Johnson’s objections. The United States not only refused to recognize the move but also supported both General Assembly and Security Council resolutions criticizing Israel’s action.

Menachem Begin proved equally unwilling to subordinate Israeli security to Washington’s preferences. He negotiated directly with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, bypassing President Jimmy Carter’s plan for an international peace conference. Begin also refused Carter’s demands for a long-term settlement freeze, establishing a precedent that every subsequent Israeli government has followed.

In 1980, Begin’s government enacted the Jerusalem Law, declaring Jerusalem the united capital of Israel. Washington rejected the move and continued to oppose Israel’s position until President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017.

A year later, Begin extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights despite explicit American objections. President Ronald Reagan responded by suspending the U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation agreement and supporting a UN Security Council resolution declaring Israel’s decision “null and void.” Nearly four decades elapsed before Trump recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan.

Begin also ignored Reagan’s warnings when he ordered the destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. The United States condemned the strike, supported a UN resolution against Israel, and temporarily suspended F-16 deliveries. History ultimately vindicated Begin’s decision.

Even Israel’s pursuit of peace sometimes proceeded without American approval. In 1993, Yitzhak Rabin secretly negotiated the Oslo Accords behind Washington’s back. Once the agreement became public, President Bill Clinton embraced it and made himself its principal sponsor.

In 2002, Ariel Sharon launched Operation Defensive Shield to crush the terrorist infrastructure driving the Second Intifada. President George W. Bush repeatedly demanded that Israel withdraw “without delay” and supported a Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire. Sharon pressed ahead until Israel had broken the back of the terror campaign.

Five years later, when Israel discovered Syria’s covert nuclear reactor, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert first asked President Bush to destroy it. Bush refused, preferring diplomacy. Olmert ordered Israel to act alone. Unlike Reagan’s response to Osirak, the Bush administration neither condemned nor punished Israel after the operation.

The contrast with Benjamin Netanyahu is clear.

For decades, Netanyahu warned that a nuclear Iran posed an existential threat, yet he was unwilling to incur the wrath of the United States by launching a military strike. When the opportunity finally came to eliminate that threat, Israel did not act independently. It waited until President Trump agreed to join the campaign, effectively handing Washington a veto over the timing and scope of Israel’s military action.

The same pattern arose in Gaza. Netanyahu repeatedly vowed to destroy Hamas, yet the campaign ended before that objective was achieved, after pressure from Trump. According to recent Israeli military assessments, Hamas now controls every area vacated by the IDF and is rebuilding its military capabilities. Intelligence reports indicate the organization is manufacturing hundreds of explosive devices and anti-tank missiles every month, recruiting new fighters, retraining its elite Nukhba force, rebuilding its tunnel network, and smuggling drones and communications equipment into Gaza from Sinai in preparation for renewed fighting with Israel.

Lebanon tells a similar story. Just as Israeli forces began striking Hezbollah’s strongholds in Beirut, Washington insisted on a ceasefire. Instead of finishing the campaign, Israel accepted an arrangement based on the hope that Hezbollah would be disarmed—a promise repeated for nearly two decades without success.

Iran follows the same pattern. Trump told Israel to halt military operations before completing its objectives and now watches as the president negotiates an agreement that leaves the regime in power, fails to address its support for proxies or ballistic missiles, and may allow Tehran to continue to enrich uranium.

History does not suggest that defying an American president is easy or cost-free. Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Begin, Sharon, and Olmert all paid diplomatic and political prices. They faced embargoes, condemnations, suspended agreements, and public rebukes. But they accepted those costs because they believed Israel’s security required independent action.

Today, the balance appears to have shifted. Trump is the first president to publicly state that Israel’s prime minister will do whatever he tells him to do. Rather than persuading Washington to support Israeli strategy—or acting independently when necessary—Netanyahu has allowed American decisions to define Israel’s military and diplomatic options. That constitutes a profound departure from the tradition established by Israel’s earlier prime ministers.

Israeli voters will soon have an opportunity to decide whether that approach has enhanced Israel’s security—or whether the country once again needs a leader willing to accept friction with even its closest ally when Israel’s vital interests are at stake.