The Road Ahead for Syria: Lessons from Iran, Turkey and Egypt

Understandably, there is much speculation about the future of Syria following the revolt that toppled the authoritarian and brutal 50-year dictatorship of the Assad family. There is a wide range of emotions, from the joy of the Syrian people to be liberated, to concerns that an Islamist extremist group might end up as the new rulers of the country. 

The speculation is natural — but what is clear is that uncertainty about the future is the most realistic reaction. Indeed, anyone who insists they know exactly how things will turn out should not be taken seriously.

What is instructive may be the instances over the years where Islamist groups succeeded in gaining power and how those instances turned out. The three major countries that went through this process were Iran, Turkey and Egypt, each with very different outcomes. 

Iran, of course, is the most extreme case for which the region and the world are still paying a heavy price to this day. The revolution against the longstanding regime of the Shahs was up front in arguing for an Islamic Iran. Still, since it was the human rights record of the Shah that was the focal point of the revolution, there was hope that democratic institutions and values would be a part of a new regime.

Unfortunately, the extremists seized power early on, executed democratic and moderate opponents and established iron rule over the country in a strange way that is most reminiscent of the Soviet control over the former Russian empire despite a very different ideological base. Extremist rule produced internal domination that was particularly painful to women and minorities such as the Bahais and Jews. 

And externally, the Islamic Republic of Iran became the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, an enemy of the Jewish state, and an expansionist force in the Middle East. 

While the Islamist experiences in Turkey and Egypt were very different from Iran in not becoming totalitarian regimes, they also were very different from each other because of the behavior of their respective leaders. 

In 2002, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul with links to the Muslim Brotherhood, rose to power in Turkey. The very fact that the country had a history of democratic elections, though to say the least not a perfect democracy, differentiated it from Iran and Egypt. Most importantly was the way Erdogan conducted himself immediately upon taking office. Rather than enforcing his Islamist straitjacket on the Turkish society, he focused on improving the economic lives of average Turks. By creating middle class lives for millions of Turks, he gained legitimacy, becoming a hero for millions of his followers. Erdogan’s consolidation of power, coupled with his effective delivery of services, allowed him to win successive elections. 

It was only later, his support now well established among the Turkish public, that Erdogan revealed his true Islamist colors. On the domestic side, he started imposing his Islamist outlook to uproot the secular Turkish tradition, including restrictions on women, and the symbolic effort to transform the historic Hagia Sophia church from a museum into a mosque. 

Meanwhile, Turkey became a major supporter of Hamas and its terrorism and led on the international front in demonizing the state of Israel. Today, while remaining officially connected to the West by its membership in NATO, Turkey is a leader in the anti-Western Islamist front. 

Meanwhile Egypt, the largest Arab country, was undergoing monumental change during the Arab Spring. Its longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak was facing increasing internal pressure in a country in which people were not only living under authoritarian rule but were suffering from powerful economic challenges. 

Finally, in 2012, Mubarak was toppled and the country, without any serious democratic roots, turned to a national election to choose a new president. 

The strong winner of that election was a Muslim Brotherhood politician, Mohammed Morsi, a close ally of Erdogan. In Israel, there was particular concern since its peace with Egypt since 1979 had been the fundamental piece of Israeli security. Israelis worried about the direction of the new government. 

What evolved in Egypt over the next year was truly fascinating. Unlike Erdogan’s brilliant strategy of downplaying his Islamist ideology and honing in on economic challenges as a way to broaden his public support, Morsi, in a country where economic issues were the prime matters affecting the public, immediately turned to imposing his Islamist ideology. 

This was a complete misreading of the public’s priorities. 

It finally resulted in a massive uprising which upended the new regime after Morsi sought a presidential decree to give himself power beyond the courts to make sure an Islamist dominated committee could develop a new constitution. The uprising returned Egypt to a government that more resembled the Sadat-Mubarak regimes than the Islamist one of Morsi.

There were three different outcomes for Islamist regimes and there are no clear lessons for what may take place in Syria. Having said that, the claims by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham leader Abu Muhammad Al-Julani that he no longer supports extremism could well reflect the Turkish approach that in some ways has succeeded in Turkey but has subsequently also contributed to the chaos in the region.