This deal only confirms what we have long known

“Release the hostages or keep Hamas in power?” That was the dilemma that has accompanied us over the past two years. Without hesitation, I would argue that bringing the hostages home is a far superior cause. First and foremost, it is clearly the moral, just, and humane thing to do: they were abandoned when the state failed to protect them, and therefore, it bears the responsibility to bring them back. But even from a practical perspective, it is difficult to imagine how an army can sustain itself if its soldiers believe that if they were to be kidnapped, the state would not do everything in its power to rescue them.

However, at a deeper level, this dilemma is built on a false premise. We were never able to remove Hamas from power by military force. In fact, the death of each father in Gaza drove his children to join Hamas. That is one of the reasons Hamas found itself, after two years of war, with nearly the same manpower it had at the beginning. Many have argued that the only way to dismantle Hamas’s armed and political dominance in Gaza is by building an alternative to it, something which Netanyahu’s government has not devoted a single moment to since the war began.

From what we know of the recent deal, it seems we find ourselves, after two years of fighting, right back where we started: Hamas remains the dominant power in the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli government’s failure to address the day after, throughout the entire course of the war, did not stem from a lack of options. It is simply a continuation of the same policy Netanyahu has pursued throughout his premiership: Hamas is an ally. Netanyahu and Hamas share a crucial political interest: both stand firmly against achieving peace.

For years, Hamas has been central to Netanyahu’s strategy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: to prevent its resolution through a two-state solution, or any resolution at all. If Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) rules over the West Bank, how can a Palestinian state come into being? Moreover, every time the PA and Hamas have engaged in reconciliation talks, Netanyahu has launched a global campaign portraying the PA as “collaborating with terrorists.” But every time, when asked why he does not negotiate with Mahmoud Abbas, his answer remains the same: “He doesn’t represent all Palestinians.”

In his book The Road to October 7 (הדרך לשבעה באוקטובר), historian Adam Raz details how Netanyahu systematically weakened the PA and strengthened Hamas in order to preserve his vision of an endless conflict. A few examples speak for themselves:

For the past 15 years (except during the brief “change government”), Netanyahu fought against any military or political initiative that might have ended Hamas’s rule in Gaza. He ignored the smuggling of weapons into the Strip. During Operation Protective Edge, he leaked to the media an IDF presentation about the implications of a ground invasion, intended to stir public opposition and prevent a move that could threaten Hamas’s control. And, of course, there were the Qatari “suitcases of cash,” which, according to Ehud Olmert, saved Hamas’s Gaza from economic collapse.

The recent deal is no different. Netanyahu’s refusal to seek an alternative to Hamas while fighting a war he knew would not eliminate it, reinforces the same message to Palestinians he has sent for years: the way to achieve political goals from prisoner releases to international attention is through murdering and kidnapping Jews.

I want to be explicit on two points: that those who have murdered Israelis should not go free, and that the PA is not an ideal partner. But unlike Hamas, the PA maintains security cooperation with Israel, which Israeli security officials consistently describe as essential to thwarting terrorism. It has also renounced violent resistance, as Abbas said in a 2012 interview with Chanel 2: “We will not return to terror and violence. We will act only through diplomatic and peaceful means.” Yet Netanyahu has never given the PA any reward for this strategic choice. In contrast, Hamas, despite its barbaric and unimaginable violence, has repeatedly been allowed to reap political rewards, reinforcing its support among Palestinians.

Wars should be fought with a clear political objective. Netanyahu never had one. He knew that the only viable alternative to Hamas is the PA and that this would undermine the central project of his political career. Without Hamas, how could he continue to block a peace process under the pretext that “there’s no partner”?

To Netanyahu’s regret, the war could not go on forever. But in the meantime, he kept Hamas in power, leaving us Israelis once again facing the same danger and the same reality we had before October 7: no vision, no strategy, no hope for a better future. If nothing changes, the same cycle of violence will merely keep repeating itself.