“Totally Unacceptable” – the Infinite Sequel
In March 2025, Hamas rejected a ceasefire proposal from U.S. Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, which would have seen 11 hostages released in exchange for a 60-day truce, a partial Israeli withdrawal from positions in Gaza, increased humanitarian aid, and a mass release of Palestinian prisoners including murderers. Witkoff called Hamas’s rejection “totally unacceptable” but reportedly urged Israel to hold off on military action as long as talks continue.
In its rejection, Hamas insisted on an end to the war and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, demands that remain unchanged since Israel’s invasion in October 2023. Talks continued. Israel sent five IDF divisions into Gaza in preparation for Operation Gideon’s Chariots, which would seize and hold all of Gaza and flush out what remains of Hamas.
Weeks passed. The IDF destroyed tunnels, eliminated Hamas fighters, and killed Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Muhammad Sinwar. In May, Witkoff advanced a similar ceasefire framework and once again asked Israel to delay escalating military action. Once again Hamas rejected Witkoff’s proposal, repeating its unchanging insistence on an end to the war and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Steve Witkoff called Hamas’s rejection “totally unacceptable.” Hamas responded by calling for more talks.
What accounts for this seemingly endless loop?
Following the money always leads to Qatar. The sheikhdom’s fingerprints are visible in U.S. President Donald Trump’s confident but ultimately false assertion a few days ago that a truce was imminent. Where would he have gotten that idea? Witkoff and his boss listen to Qatar, which has made a big investment in both of them. Qatar supports Hamas and represents its interests while posing as a neutral mediator – a double game Witkoff praises as “God’s work.”
Qatar wants the war in Gaza to end with Hamas alive and Israel out. You can imagine the sheikhs pretending to lament Hamas’s intransigence while asking Witkoff to coax just a bit more flexibility from the Israelis. They are succeeding. Witkoff’s first “totally unacceptably” rejected framework did not mention an end to the war; the new outline requires negotiations on a potential settlement to end the war. Progress in baby steps. Maybe the next proposal will require “good faith” negotiations, then maybe some definitions around what the “end” of the war means.
The Arabs have a long and successful history of using the U.S. as a lever to force more and more Israeli concessions while giving away nothing. The U.S. cooperates because, in any conflict, histrionic media coverage stokes domestic political pressure and Israel, which needs U.S. weapons, has to listen. The other side doesn’t. Qatar adds the personal touch to this strategy with lavish gifts and business deals (for Trump) and a $654 million hotel bailout (for Witkoff). God’s work indeed.
The unanswered question is whether U.S. pressure explains Israel’s hesitance. The Israeli government has made it clear that once Gideon’s Chariots begins in earnest, there will be no going back – no relinquishment of territory, no ceasefires. Is the U.S. restraining the IDF? Or is Israel indefinitely delaying military operations that will endanger, if not doom, those who remain in captivity?
Maybe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is determined to exhaust every possibility to secure the release of as many hostages as possible before taking that step. If so, he has gone the last mile and failed. Or maybe Gideon’s Chariots is an empty threat. Perhaps it’s all “deal pressure” to project seriousness and overwhelm Hamas psychologically, and Netanyahu has no intention of actually following through. The government has set numerous deadlines but stayed the IDF’s hand as each passed. With Hamas showing no signs of cracking, could Netanyahu be waiting for the Nobel-chasing Trump to demand an end to hostilities so Netanyahu has someone to blame?
Who knows. At this point, however, it’s hard to see how Israel benefits from a repetitive theater of endless negotiations, prime ministerial bluster, fake deadlines, and serene intransigence on the part of Hamas. The terrorist group has never flinched when its leaders were killed; there are always more. Even as its organized military units crumble, Hamas has demonstrated its ability to survive as cells of fanatical jihadis who quickly coalesce and direct lethal operations from hospitals and shelters. Its leaders orchestrate policy from luxurious Doha highrises.
There are only two possible outcomes: Israel occupies Gaza until Hamas is destroyed or Hamas survives and reconstitutes as it has done after every previous conflict. The only question is how much time and sacrifice – in soldiers’ lives, in hostage suffering, in demands on reservists – Israel remains willing to pay before ending up with one outcome or the other. Nearly 20 months after the worst pogrom since the Holocaust, Hamas is still in charge of Gaza and holds Israelis captive. Tens of thousands of citizen-soldiers fight on in Gaza, risking and regularly suffering death or injury, while Hamas, with deep-pocketed support, awaits salvation. The more time that passes, the more likely that salvation is to arrive. The end will come, and for Hamas, the later the better.
