Trump’s Dangerous Exit Strategy

Donald Trump may see a concentrated military offensive as a way out of a costly stalemate with Iran. But destroying targets is easier than securing a lasting settlement, and the consequences of failure could extend far beyond the battlefield.

The timing of the next phase of the Iran war may depend as much on electoral arithmetic in Washington as on military calculations in Tehran. With Israel heading into an election and America preparing for midterms, Donald Trump faces a difficult choice: preserve a fragile pause in hostilities or resume bombing in the hope of securing a victory he can sell to voters.

For Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, the political incentives point toward renewed military action. Trailing the opposition in most polls, he had reportedly planned fresh strikes against Iran for October 10. Trump overruled him, wary of returning the war to the headlines, driving energy prices higher and damaging Republican prospects before the November midterms.

The president has repeatedly said that American attacks will not resume before the elections, while leaving open the possibility of military action afterward. Reports that his administration is considering the use of the most powerful conventional bomb in America’s arsenal, the Massive Ordnance Air Blast weapon, or MOAB, have added to speculation that Washington is preparing a more concentrated offensive.

Diplomacy, meanwhile, has not disappeared. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, have visited Tehran separately. Qatar says its channel of communication between Washington and Tehran remains active. Yet the gap between the two sides’ demands suggests that a negotiated settlement remains elusive.

The diplomatic deadlock

Iran wants Washington to abandon its threats and negotiate on the basis of a seven-day proposal presented during indirect talks on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Much of that proposal resembles the terms of a memorandum of understanding signed by the two countries on June 17 before the arrangement unraveled. The proposed measures included lifting the American blockade and sanctions on Iran, ending hostilities and threats, and releasing frozen Iranian assets.

In return, Tehran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day after Washington accepted the agreement and begin discussions on its nuclear program the following day. The principal Iranian concession would be to bring the nuclear issue to the negotiating table within a week rather than wait a month, as envisaged in the original memorandum.

Trump, however, has little appetite for returning to the earlier agreement. He wants Iran to make substantial nuclear concessions before the United States delivers on its own commitments. Among his principal demands are that Tehran transfer more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% out of the country and restore inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA.

Iran has compelling reasons to resist.

Transferring the enriched uranium abroad would be difficult to reverse. By contrast, Washington could reimpose sanctions or restore its blockade after securing Tehran’s concessions. For Iran’s leadership, the prospect of surrendering a significant bargaining asset in exchange for American promises is hardly attractive.

IAEA inspections present another concern. Access to nuclear facilities could reveal the precise locations of uranium stockpiles, potentially exposing them to further American or Israeli attacks. Tehran has reportedly made these objections clear to Lavrov and Munir.

The impasse is therefore not simply a matter of competing demands. It reflects a profound lack of trust. Each side wants the other to make the first irreversible move, while retaining the freedom to abandon its own commitments.

That makes a diplomatic breakthrough difficult, though not impossible.

Why the stalemate cannot last

Washington has two broad alternatives: continue its policy of neither war nor peace, using sanctions and a naval blockade to pressure Iran into concessions, or resume military operations.

The first option has obvious attractions. It avoids the immediate costs of another bombing campaign while keeping economic pressure on Tehran. But it also assumes that Iran will eventually yield without finding a way to impose greater costs on its adversaries.

That assumption looks increasingly questionable.

Iran’s leadership has endured severe economic pressure without capitulating. The country has also retained the capacity to threaten shipping around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints. The recent increase in attacks on vessels near the waterway illustrates how quickly Tehran could raise the stakes.

For Washington, maintaining an effective naval presence indefinitely would be expensive and operationally demanding. The United States would also face mounting pressure from Gulf states whose economies depend on the uninterrupted movement of oil, gas and other essential commodities through the strait.

Those governments have little reason to welcome a prolonged confrontation that threatens their trade, infrastructure and security. They may support efforts to contain Iran, but they have strong incentives to oppose a wider regional war.

The resulting dilemma is uncomfortable for Trump. Economic pressure alone may not deliver the concessions he wants, while renewed military action could produce another cycle of retaliation without resolving the underlying dispute.

A short war by design

The indications are that Washington and Jerusalem are preparing for the possibility of renewed strikes after the midterms.

The outcome of the American elections may influence the timing, but it is unlikely to eliminate the administration’s strategic incentives. Even if Republicans lose control of both chambers of Congress, Trump could still pursue military action, although the political costs would rise. In Israel, a change of government would not necessarily produce a more restrained approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Yet eight months of conflict have demonstrated the limits of military coercion. Iran has suffered damage, but repeated attacks have not persuaded its leadership to accept Washington’s terms.

Nor is America’s capacity to sustain another extended campaign unlimited. Its forces have expended substantial quantities of interceptors and long-range missiles, while Iranian attacks have damaged American facilities in the region. These pressures do not prevent further operations, but they complicate the prospect of a prolonged offensive.

A new campaign would therefore be more likely to emphasize intensity than duration.

American and Israeli planners could concentrate on nuclear facilities, missile infrastructure, launch sites and radar installations, seeking to inflict maximum damage over a relatively short period. One potential target is the Pickaxe Mountain facility, where Washington suspects Iran is developing a clandestine nuclear installation.

Energy infrastructure could also come under attack, according to reports. Such strikes would raise the risks considerably, not least because Iran could respond against regional infrastructure or seek to disrupt commercial shipping.

The underlying calculation would be straightforward: inflict enough damage to weaken Iran’s military capabilities, declare the operation a success and avoid becoming trapped in another open-ended conflict.

But a concentrated offensive would not necessarily achieve its political objectives. Nuclear facilities can be damaged, equipment destroyed and infrastructure degraded. Preventing a determined state from rebuilding its capabilities is a much harder undertaking.

A military operation can produce a dramatic result without resolving the problem that prompted it.

The Gulf’s exposure

The countries surrounding the Persian Gulf would have considerable reasons to fear a renewed offensive.

Saudi Arabia is particularly exposed. Its geographical position leaves it vulnerable to threats from Iran to the east, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq to the north and the Houthi movement in Yemen to the south. An expanded conflict could place pressure on several fronts simultaneously, threatening energy facilities, shipping routes and wider economic activity.

Kuwait faces its own vulnerabilities. The reported withdrawal of American forces from Iraq last month could complicate its security environment, particularly if Iran-aligned militias across the border become more active. Bahrain, too, could face heightened risks if Tehran seeks to widen the confrontation.

Iran has also threatened to target American-linked data centers and undersea cables in the Gulf. Such threats extend the potential battlefield beyond conventional military installations. Digital infrastructure underpins financial services, communications and increasingly important artificial-intelligence operations. Damage to these networks could carry economic consequences well beyond the immediate theater of war.

Tehran’s foreign minister has reiterated Iran’s willingness to pursue a diplomatic settlement based on the seven-day proposal, while warning that renewed strikes would threaten regional stability, civilian lives and the global economy.

Iran has an obvious interest in deterring another attack, and its warnings should be read in that context. But the capacity for retaliation is real enough to complicate any American or Israeli decision to escalate.

The Gulf states may have limited influence over Washington’s ultimate choices, yet their opposition to a wider war could become an important constraint. They would bear some of the consequences of a conflict they did not initiate, including disruption to trade, threats to critical infrastructure and uncertainty over the future of regional security.

Trump’s search for a victory

For Trump, the political attraction of a decisive offensive is clear. He has repeatedly declared on Truth Social that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon. After months of fighting and mounting costs, he needs an outcome that can be presented as proof that the campaign has achieved its central objective.

A strike on Pickaxe Mountain using a powerful conventional weapon could offer the administration an opportunity to make precisely that claim. If American officials concluded that the operation had destroyed a suspected clandestine nuclear facility, Trump could declare the threat neutralized and announce an end to the war.

The MOAB’s destructive power would make for a dramatic demonstration of American military strength. But the weapon is not a specialized bunker-buster, and its use would not by itself establish that a deeply buried nuclear facility had been destroyed. Any claim of success would depend on the target’s characteristics, the weapons employed and the evidence gathered afterward.

The political appeal of such an operation could nevertheless be substantial. Trump might argue that he had denied Iran a nuclear weapon, degraded its military capabilities and created the conditions for an end to hostilities. He could then insist that responsibility for maintaining security in the Strait of Hormuz should fall primarily on the countries that depend on Gulf energy supplies.

That position would be consistent with his longstanding insistence that American allies should shoulder more of the burden of their own security.

But declaring victory and achieving a stable outcome are different things. Iran could rebuild damaged facilities, retain undeclared capabilities or retaliate against American interests and regional partners. Even if its nuclear infrastructure suffered severe damage, the political dispute over its nuclear program would remain.

The United States might also find that Gulf governments, rather than welcoming a clean American exit, expect Washington to remain engaged to protect the shipping routes and infrastructure placed at risk by the conflict.

The cost of walking away

Trump may conclude that a short, intense offensive offers the least unattractive option available. The diplomatic route is blocked by mutual distrust, while the strategy of economic pressure and naval containment has yet to deliver the concessions Washington demands.

But the logic of escalation contains a dangerous contradiction. The more the administration relies on overwhelming force to demonstrate success, the greater the pressure on Iran to retaliate or rebuild its deterrent. A campaign designed to end the war could instead establish the conditions for another round of fighting.

There is also a broader strategic cost. If Washington launches a war, inflicts substantial damage and then leaves regional partners to manage the consequences, its allies may question the reliability of American security commitments. Conversely, remaining indefinitely to police the Gulf would undermine Trump’s argument that other countries should assume greater responsibility for protecting their own interests.

Neither outcome offers an easy exit.

The midterms may determine when Trump feels able to act, but they cannot settle the deeper question of what American military power can accomplish in Iran. A concentrated offensive could give the president a dramatic announcement, a claim of victory and a way to shift attention away from an increasingly costly conflict.

It would not guarantee that Iran’s nuclear ambitions had been permanently contained, that the Strait of Hormuz would remain secure or that the region had moved closer to peace.

Trump may be able to end this phase of the war with a spectacular display of force. Whether he can prevent the next one is a much harder question.