Trump’s Ultimatum: How a Ceasefire Became the Only Option
The ceasefire-hostage deal (if it gets over the line) was long overdue. The war had been dragging on for months for no discernible gain, soldiers losing their lives, Gazans’ misery deepening. Short of killing every single Hamas member (impossible) it’s not clear what continuing the war was achieving.
The terms of the deal are obviously not ideal, but I guess that’s what makes it a deal. The most worrying aspect by far is the murderous terrorists being released from Israeli prisons – though one would hope there are better contingency plans this time and that we don’t get another Sinwar situation (the dearly departed Hamas leader was released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap in 2011 and went on to mastermind October 7).
There are concerns that Hamas will use the deal to cling to power, but I think that’s unlikely. Hamas are pretty much spent as a political force – firstly because they’re militarily decimated, but more importantly, they have no remaining political capital: the Gulf states are dead-set against them returning to power, their backers in Iran have been severely weakened, the US won’t countenance it and of course neither will Israel (up until 7 Bibi turned a blind eye and even helped prop them up to an extent – but of course that would no longer be the case).
Hamas are also hated by the majority of Gaza’s population – according to recent and reliably independent polls, only 7% of Gazans want Hamas to continue governing the strip, and almost 90% of the population hold Hamas responsible for the current conflict.
What finally (hopefully) sealed the deal? Sorry Trump fans, it’s unlikely that the incoming US president’s “there will be hell to pay if you don’t release the hostages” threat against Hamas played much of a part. It’s unclear practically what he would have done to Hamas that Israel hasn’t already tried to do. At this stage Hamas have been reduced to a band of underground guerilla fighters, and for all his bluster, Trump would have run into the same difficulties rooting them out that Israel has.
Where Trump most definitely did exert pressure was on Bibi (“the war in Gaza must be over by Jan 20”, Trump reportedly told the Israeli Prime Minister at their meeting in Mar-a-Lago a few months back). Bibi looked like he was trying to ride out the Biden presidency, hoping Trump wouldn’t pose any conditions – in the end Trump posed the ultimate condition, a clear ultimatum.
Arab leaders involved in the negotiations have said Trump’s envoy Witkoff swayed Netanyahu more in one meeting than Biden has in a year. The simplest explanation for this is because Bibi realized the game was up and he had no choice – without American support for continuing the war, he had no basis for doing so.
That said, by many accounts, Witkoff is an impressive guy and a formidable negotiator, and he’s been adamant that the war must end.
The funny thing is, if people were saying the same thing about Biden or Harris or any of the Dems, the right would be up in arms – “how dare they interfere” – not praising their negotiation skills and heralding the deal as a major achievement.
Which it is. Hopefully.