Two struggles, one goal
At a press conference in February, French President Emmanuel Macron came out with a surprisingly hawkish statement on Russia. He made it clear that the West, within the framework of NATO or an EU defensive coalition should consider militarily intervening in Ukraine in the case that Moscow’s forces were to breakthrough Ukraine’s last defensive lines. Whilst his comments triggered a wave of criticism targeted at the Élysée Palace from his domestic audience and his foreign counterparts, he nonetheless managed to get the West thinking seriously about the return of armed conflict to our post- unipolar moment world and about the true scope of the challenges the liberal order currently faces.
Concomitant to those remarks were repeated calls for an “urgent ceasefire” in Gaza (with him now going so far as to call for an arms embargo against Israel for weapons used there), brushed off by Jerusalem. But by trying to avoid heightened social tensions at home by upping the ante on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, Macron has omitted from his thinking the multifaceted nature of the threat that the West and his allies in Ukraine face. Historically, Paris’s Middle East policy was (and to a certain extent still is) based on a slightly more pro-Arab “Gaulliste” tradition and increasingly, on a fear of repercussions on the streets at home. However, if Macron wishes to pick up the mantle of leading Europe and the free world through these foreboding times he, alongside others, must be able to see that the conflicts in Ukraine and the broader Middle East, alongside great-power tensions in the Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked to one another, as they are simply battlefields and geopolitical arenas where Cold War tensions are now manifesting themselves. Understanding this requires a fundamental reevaluation of where threats are coming from and who they benefit on the part of Western (particularly European) leadership. Each and every leader, whether they reside in the White House, Downing Street or the Élysée must imperatively acknowledge that in this second Cold War, Russia’s gains are Iran’s gains, Iran’s gains are Russia’s gains and above all, these two actors’ gains are China’s gains. By hindering these malicious revisionists’ efforts to undermine Western interests in their respective regions, the West, Europe and leaders such as Macron will be able to better support allies against adversaries.
In her recent Foreign Affairs essay, “What Russia wants in the Middle East,” CSIS Eurasia expert Hanna Notte points out that whilst the Kremlin’s Putinist tenants don’t see any benefits in a larger Middle Eastern conflagration, they certainly do see one in keeping the region constantly on edge, with the peace always ready to be shattered by its Iranian ally and its proxies. Keeping US and Western attention focused on the region diverts further diplomatic and military bandwidth that could be used to support Ukraine more effectively, and on top of that, a volatile Middle East is a gift for Moscow in the sense that it derails Washington’s long-term goal of pivoting away from the region to focus on other areas of the globe. Continued US presence and belligerence in the perpetually tumultuous region serves Russia’s military, geopolitical and rhetorical interests as it can carry out its war in Ukraine with a certain form of overshadowed impunity, be certain that the bulk of Washington’s strategic elite will be more concerned about finding solutions to their regional ails, allow for them to sow discord, threatening Western hegemony, in other contested regions of the globe such as the Sahel, and can serve their public diplomacy efforts as they can claim to act on behalf of a disillusioned Global South. Vladimir Putin’s sustained support for Bashar Al-Assad’s regime and his forces’ leverage over Israeli fighter jet flight paths towards Iran over Syria makes of him a regional actor to be taken into account, and should force officials to consider his own interests and how they could be derailed. A complete decimation of Khamenei’s “axis of resistance” (the strategy that Israel seems to be pursuing) would bring an end to Russian hopes for a continuously volatile region that consumes policy making oxygen in the West and would see Russian forces in Syria more isolated from regional partners such as Lebanese Hezbollah, which it has previously transferred weapons to within the context of its participation in the Syrian Civil War. Setting off Moscow’s plans to exploit regional security dynamics to its own advantage by allowing Israel to continuously strike at the heart of the Iranian regime and its web of alliances can deal a blow to its aspirations of engulfing the world in a state of upheaval, paving the way for China to then construct a new international order safe for authoritarianism.
Sharing Russian interests in keeping the region on edge but avoiding all-out war is Iran. Mirroring how Russia sees an opportunity to advance its own interests through the Middle East, the Ayatollah’s regime conversely sees an opportunity to advance its own strategic interests through Russia’s war in Ukraine. Similarly to how the Kremlin views continued Western involvement in the Middle East, Tehran believes that by devoting more time to Ukraine, the West will have to overlook certain Iranian advances. By transferring home-made weapons systems such as Shahed suicide drones and Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine, Tehran sees a chance at gaining an insight into how their armaments perform when put up to the test against Western technology such as the Patriot missile defence system. In exchange for these transfers, the Iranians are also equipped with high-tech, battle hardened, Russian systems. Though their main concern is a military one, the Mullahs also believe that they can gain economically from their relationship with the Kremlin and supporting its assault on Ukraine, as Russia never heeded the call to impose sanctions on Iranian oil, allowing for Tehran to trade extensively with Putin’s regime. Despite the dire economic situation that has existed in Iran since former (or perhaps soon to be) US President Donald Trump exited the JCPOA in 2018, reinstating sanctions on Iran, Tehran can still bring in revenue by exporting goods across the Caspian Sea and importing products which can stimulate their disaster of an economy. Naturally, like any reasonable state, Tehran then uses its revenue to fund terrorist activities to threaten the prevailing balance-of-power in the region in the name of avenging historical grievances, the desire to lead the Islamic world as a Shia-majority state but above all, keeping the regime in power. For these reasons, given the historic opportunity that Israel now has to inflict catastrophic damage to the Iranian regime’s malevolent schemes, the US and other nations should unwaveringly (or at least tacitly if they fear their public opinion) encourage the IAF to strike armament production sites of ballistic missiles and drones which are used to launch assaults on both Israel and Ukraine. For the Israelis, destroying the vectors which would be capable of delivering nuclear payloads would render Iran’s nuclear programme far less threatening and for the Ukrainians would diminish the amount of Iranian equipment threatening their military positions and civilian infrastructure. If Macron wishes to see Mirage fighter jets in Ukrainian skies then there is no reason for him to be averse at the prospect of Rafale jets in Iranian skies, when looking at it from a broader strategic perspective. Within that line of thinking, Anna Borshchevskaya from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy wittingly suggests that the West should allow Kyiv to strike targets on Iranian soil, a scenario in which the West would potentially see Ukrainians and Israelis closely coordinating on matters related to Iran. In fact, Kyiv should already be in close contact with Washington and Jerusalem regarding retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets for the October 1st ballistic missile attack on Israel. Ukraine, already in a state of war, should have no restrictions imposed on it when it comes to targeting hostile foreign military sights or supply chains, especially when it is in its full right to do so. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s forces would carry out the strikes that very few have the courage to undertake, essentially doing many states a favour and would underscore Western unity on this issue. The very image of Russia’s adversary striking their foes in Iran could also downgrade relations between Moscow and the important Gulf states. Whilst it should be glaringly obvious that Iran and Russia profit off of each other’s strategic posture to serve their own interests, which happen to converge, far too many capitals have failed to see how these rogue actors are in cahoots with one another and have failed to encourage their partners to replicate their adversaries’ strategy by allowing for Ukraine and Israel in particular to strike a common foe in pursuit of converging interests.
But if anything, this joint Russo-Iranian aggression must provoke a fundamental recalibration of sorts and a reevaluation of threats to national security interests. Western leaders must understand the major strategic shifts taking place but most importantly should understand what they are fighting to preserve. France for example, despite its special relationship with the Lebanese people must acknowledge that it shares the same enemies in Hezbollah and Iran, with 58 French paratroopers losing their lives to a 1983 Hezbollah terror attack against French positions in Beirut. Understanding that Israel, in its fight against Iran’s axis, is fending off threats to European security as a whole. France is particularly important when it comes to considering a recalibration of priorities in certain Western countries as it is one of three powers to have bases and personnel in the region, alongside the US and Britain, but also because of its autonomous nature which in this case encourages it to pursue goals that are arguably not in the national interest. But more broadly, officials and foreign policy thinkers across the free world should accept the fact that we find ourselves in a Cold War against an axis spearheaded by Beijing with the ultimate aim of reversing a hard-won liberal order which has allowed for the world at large to bask in a period of unprecedented prosperity and stability (up to recently that is).
When looking at the global strategic landscape, one would have a hard time not noticing the emerging blocs that define contemporary international relations. But whilst one bloc has clearly demonstrated that it is determined on achieving its goals by acting in unison, the other side, the side engaged in a struggle to preserve an order built from the ashes of WWII has not yet understood the truly globalised nature of the threat it is currently up against. Just as with the last one, Cold War II will be defined by the liberal order’s ability to set realistic but also ambitious targets for itself to achieve, one of those critical targets should be the ability to continuously establish deterrence against adversaries by supporting partners and allies which share common interests and values. Encouraging global allies to adopt a more hawkish approach to the regime in Tehran in order to suffocate the Russo-Iranian axis would deal a decisive blow to the world’s revisionists not only in Tehran and Moscow but also in Beijing, Pyongyang, Caracas and Damascus. Squeezing Russia’s room for manoeuvre in the region by isolating it militarily and diplomatically would hamper its ability to strike critical Ukrainian targets with Iranian weapons and would hinder its ally’s efforts at reshaping the strategic landscape of a region of great value. Understanding the common goals that Ukraine and Israel share whilst also undertaking a recalibration of priorities to then take action based on those conclusions is the only way leaders such as Macron will be able to preserve their credibility in the face of a totalitarian onslaught which Ukraine and Israel are currently on the frontlines of.