Wartime Thoughts about Responsibility for Civilians in Hostile Territory

When an army has defeated its enemy, taken control of the territory of the enemy home base, and faces little armed opposition in that territory, it has responsibility for the well-being of the hostile population.  It must provide for the needs of the defeated civilians, and the surrendered military.

When an army engages in active combat, with an enemy well-entrenched in its home base, the army should try to fight against combatants, while minimizing injury to non-combatants.  However, I believe that the army has no responsibility for humanitarian aid to the civilians across the border behind enemy lines.  Supplying the necessities, of food, water, electric power, or allowing other entities to supply these necessities, inevitably means supplying those necessities to the opposing military forces as well.  That would result in prolonging the war, facilitating the death in battle of the army’s own soldiers, and increasing the possibility of complete mission failure.

Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox in large part because his army was starving. In the period leading up to that surrender, the Union army properly treated anyone aiding the flow of food toward the Confederacy as smugglers, not as humanitarians.  Humanitarian aid to the Secessionists would have prolonged the war, increased casualties on both sides, and possibly led to the success of secession. After the surrender, the Union had responsibility to the defeated South.

When Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies on May 7, 1945, German civilians and military were starving.  Humanitarian aid to the Axis in the months leading up to the surrender could have prolonged the war, increased civilian and military casualties, and allowed Nazi genocide to continue longer.  The Allies rightly did not provide humanitarian aid to Nazi-held territory until after the surrender.  After the surrender, the Allies had responsibilities to the defeated country.

But there exists an intermediate state, where the territory is neither pacified nor fully at war.  Can the army have responsibility for providing or allowing humanitarian assistance to a contested area, where guerrilla forces have considerable freedom of action?  The question of the moral need to provide humanitarian aid may depend on the relative power of the guerrilla forces.

Consider the possibilities: If the army itself brings in and distributes the humanitarian aid, will the army then simply provide targets for the still-active guerrilla forces?  If the guerilla force has that much power, then the army cannot have responsibility for providing humanitarian aid. If the guerilla force cannot effectively interfere with the aid, then the army should provide it.

What if a neutral organization brings humanitarian aid into the contested area?  Will the enemy forces in fact control how the aid gets distributed? If the guerrilla forces will have that power, then the aid will certainly strengthen the enemy forces, endanger the army’s own troops, prolong the war, or even lead to defeat.  The army must not allow the neutral organization to bring aid to the embattled civilians under those conditions, as harsh has this may seem.