What Does Khamenei Mean When He Says the US and Israel ‘Can’t Do a Damn Thing’
On 4 June 2025, during his annual address commemorating the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader (rahbar) Ali Khamenei once again invoked a well-worn phrase: “The United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing.” Although long circulated as revolutionary rhetoric, its repetition in the current climate—marked by heightened tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme—demands more than political interpretation. For external observers, this statement may be perceived as ideological bravado or religious sloganeering. Yet within Iran’s theocratic-constitutional order, the speech is regarded as very different. In the legal architecture of the Islamic Republic, such pronouncements by the Supreme Leader are not merely symbolic; they can constitute a constitutional act.
This post offers a legal reading of Khamenei’s statement. The argument is that the Supreme Leader’s public language—particularly on institutional occasions—functions as a performative legal directive within the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic. His words may exert binding authority across the state apparatus, regardless of their formal codification. Clarifying the legal status of the statement is the objective, rather than evaluating its truth or wisdom. To grasp how a single sentence can shape decisions on war, diplomacy, or nuclear policy, one must take seriously the unique fusion of theology and constitutionalism that characterizes Iranian governance.
Background: Iran’s Nuclear Program from the JCPOA to the Present
A protracted dispute regarding the scope of international oversight and uranium enrichment is the foundation of the nuclear standoff between the United States and Iran. Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. This agreement stipulated that Iran would restrict certain aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. These obligations included reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium, capping enrichment levels, and granting enhanced access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However, in May 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA under President Donald Trump, citing concerns over Iran’s missile program and regional interventions. The reimposition of US sanctions prompted Iran to incrementally breach the JCPOA’s constraints, including increasing enrichment to 60% and restricting IAEA monitoring of its nuclear facilities.
In recent years, indirect negotiations have been attempting to revive some form of nuclear arrangement, frequently mediated by Oman. Iran’s enrichment activities have been subjected to stringent restrictions by the United States, which has also requested the surrender of its enriched uranium stockpile. Nevertheless, Iran regards these demands as a violation of its sovereign rights and maintains that it is entitled to pursue peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any proposals that would necessitate Tehran to cease enrichment or transfer its stockpile abroad have been consistently rejected.
At the heart of the impasse lies a fundamental disagreement: the United States seeks to eliminate any pathway to potential weaponization, while Iran asserts its right to nuclear development as a matter of national sovereignty. This legal and strategic deadlock continues to obstruct diplomacy and heighten tensions across the region. It is against this volatile backdrop that Khamenei’s declaration—that “the United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing”—must be read. For external observers, it may register as a provocative slogan. However, from the perspective of Iran’s constitutional framework, where the Supreme Leader functions as the embodiment of both state sovereignty and legal authority, such language is more than just political defiance. It carries constitutional significance.
Khamenei’s Word as Law: Constitutional Power and the Threat of Escalation
In colloquial Persian, the phrase “hīch ghalatī namītavānd bokonand”—literally, “they can’t make any mistake,” or more idiomatically, “they can’t do a damn thing”—is commonly used to signal defiance or dismissiveness toward a perceived threat. When used in informal settings, it indicates that the speaker is confident that their adversary is unable to respond in a meaningful way. The phrase, however, acquires a distinct legal and political significance when uttered by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s distinctive theo-juridical architecture is the foundation of this performative constitutional utterance, which is no longer merely a rhetorical flourish.
The expression is deeply rooted in revolutionary tradition. It was first used by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in November 1979, after the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by Islamist revolutionary students. In response to the United States’ threat of military retaliation, Khomeini issued the following statement: “Āmrīkā hīch ghalatī namītavānad bokonad.” At the same time, this declaration marked the commencement of one of the most significant international legal disputes of the Islamic Republic’s early years. Iran was accused of violating international law by the United States for failing to safeguard diplomatic personnel and embassies in a case initiated before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined in 1980 that Iran had violated its obligations under the Vienna Conventions and customary international law. Although the Court initially found that the embassy seizure was carried out by non-state actors and could not be directly attributed to the Iranian state, it concluded that the Iranian authorities subsequently ratified and adopted the militants’ actions—transforming them into acts of state. The Court ordered Iran to release the hostages, restore the premises, and make reparations, reaffirming the foundational principles of diplomatic inviolability. Iran did not participate in the proceedings or comply with the judgment, despite the ICJ’s binding ruling. This constituted an early precedent for the state’s defiance of the international legal order under the guise of revolutionary legitimacy.
This legacy of resistance persists in the rhetoric of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. When Khamenei recently used the same phrase, asserting that “the United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing,” he was not merely reiterating revolutionary nostalgia. Rather, he was issuing a constitutional signal within the logic of Velāyat-e Faqīh (Guardianship of the Jurist), the foundational doctrine of Iran’s political system. Consequently, the Supreme Leader is not merely a political overseer or religious figure under this system. He holds unreviewable jurisdiction over the strategic, judicial, military, and religious domains, and is the highest legal authority in the state.
The Supreme Leader is granted extensive authority to oversee the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and intelligence services, command the armed forces, determine the general policies of the state, and appoint or dismiss key officials, as outlined in Article 110 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution. These powers are not subject to democratic counterbalance or judicial oversight. The Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts are functionally subordinate to his authority, and no court in Iran has the power to overturn his decisions. Additionally, the Supreme Leader’s decrees and directives, particularly those articulated in the form of ḥukm-e ḥokūmatī (governance orders), are considered to have the force of law and are protected from judicial review by constitutional immunity. The Supreme Administrative Court of Iran’s jurisprudence has reaffirmed that governance orders of this nature are not subject to administrative or judicial scrutiny. This reinforces the principle that the legal pronouncements of the Supreme Leader are normatively binding and institutionally unchallengeable within the Iranian legal system.
Seen in this light, Khamenei’s assertion that “the United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing” is not simply ideological bravado. It constitutes a directive that shapes Iran’s posture toward negotiations, military engagement, and nuclear policy. By framing the interpretive boundaries of permissible state action, his words elicit immediate alignment among subordinate institutions. For instance, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran declared that nuclear development would continue “with full force,” while the General Staff of the Armed Forces cautioned of a firm response to any “strategic miscalculation.” These responses serve as an illustration of how what may appear to be populist language to external observers functions internally as a binding signal of state doctrine, embedded within the framework of constitutional authority and immune to legal challenge.
Trump’s Response: “Time is running out” and the Push for a Decision
Just hours after Khamenei’s defiant remarks, US President Donald Trump publicly commented on the situation, stating that during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, they discussed the issue of Iran. Trump declared: “The fact [is] time is running out on Iran’s decision pertaining to nuclear weapons, which must be made quickly!” He added that “we will need a definitive answer in a very short period of time.”
Trump’s language, though informal, was unmistakably urgent. It replicated a well-established approach of applying time constraints to compel diplomatic concessions, portraying the situation as one of imminent decision-making and implicitly threatening repercussions if Iran were to fail to comply. Whether Trump’s statement was a genuine diplomatic deadline, or a performative gesture aimed at strengthening Washington’s bargaining position remains unclear. Nevertheless, what is extraordinary is that he seemed to either downplay the significance of Khamenei’s constitutional statement or to provide the Supreme Leader with a final opportunity for negotiation behind closed doors.
This is not the first time Trump has escalated pressure on Tehran with the threat of force. During his presidency, he repeatedly warned that failure to reach a deal with Washington could lead to military strikes, especially if Iran were perceived to be nearing weaponization. The danger was more subtly conveyed in this most recent episode, but it was still present. His rhetoric emphasized that Iran was responsible for promptly responding to U.S. demands, thereby reinforcing the notion that any delay would result in negative repercussions. Just hours later, Trump also signed an executive order that prohibited entry into the United States from twelve countries, including Iran, in an effort to “protect Americans from dangerous foreign actors.”
From Rhetoric to Practice: The Structural Pathway to War
Khamenei’s speech on June 4th serves as an illustration of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s convergence of constitutional and theological authority in the singular figure of the Supreme Leader. In reality, what may appear to observers, both within academia and beyond, as ideological bravado or rhetorical defiance is a performative legal utterance that is binding upon Iran’s executive, legislative, and military institutions. These declarations are not merely expressions of opinion within the context of Velāyat-e Faqīh; they are directive speech acts that establish the legal boundaries of state behavior.
In addition to political hazard, this legal performativity creates a structural pathway to escalation when combined with the Islamic Republic’s ongoing legitimacy crisis, which is characterized by widespread popular dissent, economic deterioration, and paralyzing international sanctions. When confronted with internal collapse and a growing sense of alienation from the populace, the regime may seek strategic advantage by externalizing the crisis. A limited military conflict could be used to reassert ideological coherence and halt domestic contestation, thereby extending the system’s time and authority.
It is in this context that Khamenei’s statement must be interpreted not as symbolic defiance but as a binding operative act that narrows the permissible space for de-escalatory diplomacy. Its repetition at a moment of acute geopolitical tension signals not merely resolve, but a readiness to constitutionalize confrontation under the dual banners of religious obligation and national sovereignty. Misreading this speech act as empty rhetoric is not simply an analytical oversight—it is a strategic miscalculation.
In addition, while the Supreme Leader’s fatwā against the acquisition, development, and use of nuclear weapons has often been invoked by Iranian diplomats as a moral constraint, it should not be treated as a permanent or irrevocable legal rule. In accordance with Shīʿī jurisprudence, al-aḥkām al-ḍarūriyya (secondary or necessity-based rulings) allows the jurist-ruler to modify or suspend previous fatāwā in response to evolving circumstances. In the past few months, clerics and jurists within Khamenei’s close advisory circles have publicly expressed the possibility of re-evaluating the nuclear fatwā in light of evolving threats and strategic imperatives. This theological flexibility, rooted in the logic of fiqh al-hukūmah (governance jurisprudence), renders the boundary between religious restraint and legal escalation perilously thin.
The international community must therefore cultivate a more sophisticated grammar of engagement with the Islamic Republic—one that recognises the legal potency of language within its constitutional-theological order. Serious consideration must be given to the authority of the Supreme Leader’s pronouncements in diplomatic calculus.
Missiles are not always the initial act of war in this system. Initially, it may commence with a sentence!
