Eyal Propper

What is the cost for China’s support in Gaza?

A short time after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 on the Gaza crisis, which was proposed by the United States, US President Donald Trump tweeted and thanked the various countries. China was first on Trump’s list of thanks, followed by a number of other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. Israel was left off the list because it is not considered a player in the “great game” of the superpowers and key Middle-Eastern states.

A reader is going to ask, “Why thank China?” After all, China and Russia did not vote in favor of the resolution. However, because they did not vote against and hence did not veto the resolution, the practical meaning is approval, allowing the US to carry out the plan. In his speech at the White House reception for the Saudi Crown Prince, President Trump positively noted China’s abstention.

The Chinese vote contradicted China’s strong stance toward the US in general, and the US handling of the Gaza situation in particular. In his post-vote statement, the Chinese ambassador Fu Cong pointed out that the American resolution “is vague and unclear on many critical elements, does not demonstrate that Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people, and while there remained major concerns and serious differences among members, the penholder forced the Council to take actions on the draft resolution.”

So why didn’t China veto US policy on Gaza, as it already did under President Joe Biden, and what could be behind this vote?

In my opinion, there are two options. The first, with a modest probability, is that the two superpowers have implicit agreements that allow the Chinese to take a more moderate stance toward the US. About two weeks ago, at the start of Trump and Xi Jinping’s summit in Seoul, Xi openly stated that China respects Trump’s efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Gaza. What happened afterwards in the closed room? The Chinese recognize how important the Gaza process is to Trump, and it is a well-known Chinese tenet that they do not give things away for free if they can charge for them.

In this situation, do they expect quiet “policy benefits,” such as in the context of US policy toward Taiwan, which is China’s most important core interest? Trump kept mute after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a Chinese attack on the island would result in a Japanese response. At the same time, Trump approved hundreds of millions of dollars in defense assistance for Taiwan this week.

In the context of implicit agreements, it is worth going back in time: following the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989, when the Chinese army killed protestors, effectively ending anti-government protests, the American administration carried out sanctions aimed at isolating China. Beijing countered this by strengthening ties with a number of countries, including Israel. However, China’s opportunity arose in the fall of 1990, when the United States needed it in a Security Council vote for UN authorization for a military response against Saddam Hussein, who had invaded Kuwait. Although China opposes military intervention, it abstained in exchange for a concession from the United States to reduce sanctions and restore normalcy in ties.

The second, more likely option claims that China was in a position of substantial political weakness vis-à-vis the US in connection with this vote, mainly due to the Trump administration’s success in enlisting all Arab countries on its side and receiving public support from the Palestinian Authority. The Chinese ambassador more than hinted at this in his explanation after their vote.

What can we learn from this about China, the US, and the process in Gaza? The fact that Trump understood the Chinese concession and thanked them could signal the possibility of quiet partnerships between the US and China within the framework of a “great game” among the superpowers, in an issue that is not in the immediate area of ​​influence, Asia or South America.

It is not impossible that when practical actions begin to stabilize the multinational force and perhaps tenders for the reconstruction of Gaza, we will also see China invited to take part, in cooperation with key countries in the region.

About the Author
Dr. Eyal Propper is a researcher and lecturer at Reichman University. He was on the team that opened the Israeli embassy in China in 1992 and later served as the DCM in Beijing and consul general in Shanghai. His doctorate was published in the book "Panda or Dragon – Changes in the Management of the Chinese Foreign Affairs during the reforms." He initiated and edited "The Red Book – A Guide to Contemporary China."
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