When Arab Votes Become Part of the Battle to Form a Government
Electoral Disqualification in Israel: When Arab Votes Become Part of the Battle to Form a Government
The decision by the Israeli Central Elections Committee to disqualify the two main Arab lists, the United Arab List (Ra’am) and the Joint List, along with candidates Ofer Cassif and Sami Abu Shehadeh, should not be interpreted as merely a legal procedure concerning the eligibility of lists or candidates to run in the upcoming elections. While the decision is still subject to appeal before the Israeli Supreme Court, it brings to the forefront a deeper question concerning the limits of political participation for Arab citizens and the nature of the relationship between the rules of the Israeli electoral system and the principle of political representation.
However, these decisions are not yet final. The Supreme Court is scheduled to review the appeals next week, and the decisions to disqualify individual candidates require ratification before they can take effect. Therefore, the final shape of the electoral landscape is still undecided, and the Elections Committee’s decisions cannot be treated as a final outcome. But the significance of this development lies precisely in the fact that it comes at a highly sensitive political moment, where the formation of the next government seems largely dependent on the ability of the various political blocs to assemble a parliamentary majority of 61 seats. In such an environment, the votes of Arab citizens and the seats of Arab parties become part of the broader political equation, whether within coalitions, through supporting governments from the outside, or by influencing the balance of power in the Knesset.
Article 7A: The Legal Framework for Disqualification
The debate surrounding the disqualification of lists and candidates is based on Article 7A of the Basic Law: The Knesset, which outlines three main grounds for barring a list or candidate from running in elections: denying Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state, inciting racism, and supporting the armed struggle of an enemy state or a terrorist organization against Israel.
This article has historically become one of the most sensitive instruments in the relationship between the Israeli electoral system and Arab society, as it sets legal boundaries for what can be considered legitimate political activity within the parliamentary system.
The use of this article is not new in Israeli political history. Previous elections have witnessed attempts and decisions to disqualify lists and candidates, most notably the Arab Land Party in 1965, while the Kach movement, founded by Meir Kahane, was later disqualified. However, comparing these different cases still requires considering the distinct legal and political contexts surrounding each one.
From the Central Elections Committee’s Powers to the Supreme Court’s Review
What makes the current development even more significant is that the legal battle is no longer confined to the Central Elections Committee, but has effectively moved to the Supreme Court, which will ultimately determine whether the grounds for disqualification meet the required legal standards. This highlights the importance of the variables surrounding Sami Abu Shehadeh’s case in particular.
The first of these variables is the position of the head of the Central Elections Committee, who this time supported the disqualification, whereas in previous cases he abstained from voting. The second relates to the position of the Attorney General, who recommended that the court review the disqualification, a shift from previous stances characterized by reservations regarding such measures. The third, and most politically sensitive, variable concerns the current composition of the Supreme Court itself. The composition of the court has undergone changes in recent years, linked to broader transformations in the Israeli judicial system. This makes monitoring how judges handle cases of electoral disqualification particularly important.
However, simply labeling the judges as right-wing is insufficient to predict the outcome. Ultimately, the case will be decided based on legal texts, judicial precedents, and the facts presented to the court, not solely on the judges’ presumed political affiliations or classifications.
Who determines the limits of representation?
The fundamental question this case raises is not merely about the fate of Ra’am, the Joint List, or Sami Abu Shehadeh, but rather about the limits of political participation for Arab citizens within the Israeli parliamentary system.
Legally, Arab citizens possess the right to vote, run for office, and be represented in parliament. However, Article 7A simultaneously imposes constitutional limits on certain forms of political discourse or activity. Herein lies the tension between two principles: the right to political participation, on the one hand, and the legal restrictions on political aims or positions, on the other. This tension is not unique to Israel; it manifests in various democracies when the state attempts to define the boundaries within which political actors can operate, especially when these boundaries are linked to issues of national identity, security, racism, or the very nature of the state.
However, the distinctiveness of the Israeli case lies in the fact that these boundaries directly intersect with the question of the relationship between the state and its Arab citizens, and with the ongoing debate surrounding the definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state,” and the place of Arab citizens within this definition.
A Battle for Seats or for the Limits of Political Participation? Given that no political bloc, based on the expected Knesset composition, can easily reach the 61-seat threshold, Arab participation becomes an unavoidable factor in parliamentary calculations.
Therefore, the exclusion of Arab lists or candidates, if it becomes final, will not only have legal ramifications but could also have political repercussions on the distribution of seats and the ability of different parties to form coalitions or parliamentary arrangements. But more important than the numerical calculations is that the issue presents the Israeli political system with a test concerning the limits of pluralism
The Supreme Court Faces a New Test
The upcoming battle will not only be about the fate of Sami Abu Shehadeh, Ofer Cassif, or the two Arab lists, but also about the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the line between legitimate political opposition and the circumstances under which the law permits barring electoral participation.
Therefore, the significance of the case may be greater than its immediate outcome. If the court upholds the disqualification decisions, it will establish a new debate regarding the scope and limits of Article 7A. If it overturns the committee’s decisions, it will legally reaffirm the court’s continued central role in regulating the use of the electoral disqualification mechanism.
In either case, the upcoming elections will not only be a test of the balance of power among Israeli parties, but also a test of the relationship between electoral democracy, political pluralism, representational rights, and the constitutional identity of the state
