When “Close to Trump” Becomes a Liability

For years, Benjamin Netanyahu’s closeness to Donald Trump was one of his most reliable political assets — a symbol of access, influence, and the ability to shape American policy toward Israel.

Likud once expected to make that relationship a centerpiece of its next campaign.

That campaign has now been quietly shelved.

According to reports, Likud pulled back from a planned push highlighting Netanyahu’s ties to Trump after concluding it would not help the prime minister’s electoral prospects. The decision came as Trump finalized a U.S.–Iran agreement that many Israelis view with deep unease. In a matter of weeks, what had been a boast became a complication.

Gil Samsonov, Ph.D., one of Israel’s leading advertising executives and a former Likud campaign manager, framed the shift this way: “Campaigns are ultimately exercises in association. For years, the association was simple: Netanyahu and Trump meant strength, influence, and access to Washington. The moment a campaign decides not to highlight that relationship, it is acknowledging that voters are processing new information. Whether that change is temporary or permanent is the real political question.”

That question may help define the next Israeli election: Can Netanyahu restore the political value of his Trump relationship before voters go to the polls?

From asset to complication

Netanyahu’s reelection argument rests on two familiar pillars: that only he can protect Israel, and that his relationship with Trump gives him unique leverage in Washington. Both are now under pressure.

A KAN News poll found Yashar — the centrist party led by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot — rising to 21 Knesset seats, while Likud fell to 23 and the Bennett-Lapid Beyachad party dropped to 17. The coalition bloc now stands at 52 seats, while the opposition reaches 57.

The poll’s most striking finding concerns the U.S.–Iran agreement itself: 55% of Israelis oppose it, compared with only 18% who support it. Seventy percent say they remain afraid Iran is still a threat even with the agreement taking shape.

Polling cannot prove that the Iran deal alone is driving Likud’s decline. Israeli voters are also weighing October 7, the Gaza war, coalition politics, the economy, the Haredi draft issue, and broader fatigue with the government. But the timing has clearly reinforced a question Netanyahu would rather not face: does personal closeness to Trump still translate into Israeli security?

Earlier polling from the Israel Democracy Institute found that only 44% of Israelis believe Israel’s security is a central consideration for President Trump — a sharp decline from earlier measurements. For a prime minister whose brand has long depended on being America’s indispensable partner in the region, that erosion matters.

The opposition’s American argument

Netanyahu’s rivals are not arguing for a weaker U.S.–Israel relationship. They are arguing for a better-managed one.

Eisenkot’s Yashar party has taken a disciplined line: focus on Netanyahu’s security failures, demand an independent commission of inquiry into October 7, and present a vision of a professional, depoliticized defense establishment.

When voters were asked who should lead the opposition bloc, Eisenkot led Bennett 32% to 22%, with 31% saying neither should lead. Those numbers have fueled speculation over whether Bennett should step aside and join forces behind Eisenkot. Bennett, for his part, has declined to rule it out, saying: “I will not let ego be a factor.”

Meanwhile, Beyachad has dropped from 22 seats just two weeks ago to 17 — an 11-seat decline from its peak. The Bennett-Lapid merger may have generated initial excitement, but voters now appear to be gravitating toward Eisenkot’s more sober, security-focused alternative.

The result is a rare political moment: centrists are criticizing Netanyahu, while some conservatives in Netanyahu’s own bloc are uneasy with Trump’s Iran policy. That cross-pressure has changed the political meaning of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship.

What voters are reconsidering

The shift is not anti-American. Israelis continue to value the U.S.–Israel alliance and want strong American support.

What is changing is the assumption that personal closeness between leaders automatically produces security. Many Israelis may dislike the Iran agreement while still believing Netanyahu is the best person to manage Trump. That tension explains why Netanyahu remains personally competitive even as Likud weakens.

On suitability for prime minister, Netanyahu leads Eisenkot 41% to 33%, with 26% saying neither is suitable. That suggests many Israelis still see Netanyahu as someone they would want in the room during a crisis.

But suitability is not the same as trust in his government. The gap between Netanyahu’s personal standing and Likud’s falling seat count suggests voters may be separating Netanyahu the security figure from Netanyahu the incumbent.

The 60-day clock — and the September question

Likud still has reason for cautious optimism.

The U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding reportedly sets a 60-day window for negotiating the hardest issues: uranium stockpiles, centrifuge capacity, inspection access, and sanctions relief. That window will close well before Israel’s election.

If the framework produces verifiable steps — real dismantlement, intrusive inspections, and measurable reductions in Iran’s nuclear capacity — public sentiment could shift. Netanyahu would argue that his Washington relationship delivered results no other Israeli leader could have achieved.

There is also the possibility of a Trump visit to Israel in September. Before recent tensions, there was serious speculation about such a trip. If it happens, and if it is paired with visible progress on Iran, it could significantly reshape the campaign narrative.

A Trump-Netanyahu appearance in Jerusalem would give Likud powerful imagery: two leaders side by side, presenting the Iran framework as a shared achievement. It would allow Netanyahu to argue that the relationship was never broken, only tested.

That outcome is far from guaranteed. It depends on whether the Iran negotiations produce enough progress for both leaders to claim credit, and whether Trump wants to offer Netanyahu that political boost. Trump’s instincts are transactional, and a September visit would need to serve American audiences as well as Israeli ones.

Likud strategists likely understand this. The decision to shelve the Trump-focused campaign may not be an abandonment of the relationship as an asset. It may be a tactical pause — waiting to see whether diplomacy, imagery, and timing give them back the story they wanted to tell.

As Samsonov put it: “Political brands are like stocks. They rise, they fall, and sometimes they recover. The question isn’t whether Netanyahu is close to Trump. Everyone knows he is. The question is whether Israeli voters still see that closeness as adding value.”

What comes next

Three variables will shape how the Trump factor plays before Israelis vote.

First, whether the Iran framework produces concrete, verifiable progress — or confirms Israeli fears about ambiguous diplomatic outcomes.

Second, whether Trump visits Israel in September, and whether that visit looks like a restored partnership, a transactional photo opportunity, or a genuine diplomatic success.

Third, whether Eisenkot and the opposition can consolidate, including whether Bennett ultimately steps behind him, or whether fragmentation allows Netanyahu to assemble a coalition despite Likud’s diminished standing.

This election is not simply a referendum on Netanyahu, Trump, or the Iran deal. It is becoming a referendum on what Israelis want from their most important ally: a relationship built on personalities and moments, or one grounded in shared interests, clear limits, and the understanding that real security cannot rest on any single friendship — however warm it may appear.