Paula Slier
Modern conflict, narratives and the battle for truth

When freedom of speech depends on who is speaking

Three recent controversies in Europe raise an important question: who decides who gets to participate in public debate, and on what grounds?

At Oxford University on Tuesday, protesters gathered outside Oriel College to oppose a talk by Nathan Cofnas, an academic whose views on race have attracted widespread criticism. Some protesters attempted to prevent people from entering. The event, organised by a student society, went ahead.

In London, Britain’s Home Office has been accused of pressuring local officials over an event featuring Swedish academic Andreas Malm and Palestine Action co-founder Huda Ammori. The event, organised by the socialist magazine Tribune, took place on 4 November, with both speakers participating remotely. Documents reported this week showed that the Home Office had raised concerns with Hackney Council, the venue’s owner, about possible breaches of counterterrorism law. The Home Office denies trying to have the event cancelled.

Meanwhile, in France, a petition calling for the right-wing television channel CNews to be taken off the air attracted more than a million signatures. A parliamentary committee rejected the petition, but the National Assembly is preparing to debate wider questions of media pluralism and regulation.

The circumstances are different, but all three cases raise questions about who controls access to platforms for public debate.

Having the right to express an opinion doesn’t automatically mean having the right to a university lecture theatre, a municipal venue or a broadcasting licence. Institutions have responsibilities, from protecting public safety to complying with the laws governing their facilities.

But how much discretion should they have? Should a university cancel a speaker because students find their views offensive? Should a municipality refuse an event because the speakers’ political positions are unpopular? Should a broadcaster lose its licence because large numbers of people object to its editorial stance? Restrictions may be justified by unlawful incitement, threats or genuine security risks.

Disagreement alone is another matter. What happens when institutions become reluctant to host discussions that might provoke objections? It may become easier to avoid difficult subjects than to give people opportunities to challenge them. We could end up with fewer places where opposing views can be heard and tested.

For Jewish and Israeli audiences, this is particularly relevant. Earlier this month, Maastricht University in the Netherlands cancelled a meeting organised by the Jewish student association IJAR. Israeli lecturer Eli Sapir was due to speak about the third anniversary of the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. In its official statement, the university explained that pro-Palestinian groups had announced plans to prevent the event from taking place. A pro-Israeli organisation subsequently urged supporters to gather in Maastricht.

The university said the competing calls for mobilisation had created unacceptable uncertainty about safety. It offered to hold the event online instead, but the organisers decided not to proceed. It said its decision was unrelated to the lecture’s content and regretted the impact on its Jewish-Israeli community. On 17 November, IJAR expressed concern that discussions about Jewish students’ safety were taking place without their direct involvement.

The university had a responsibility to protect those attending. But the decision meant that Jewish students could no longer hold their planned meeting at the university. Should a group lose access to a venue because others threaten disruption? And doesn’t that risk encouraging intimidation as a way of preventing people from expressing views others oppose?

Jewish students should not have to accept intimidation as the price of discussing their history or their connection to Israel. Nor should Israeli speakers be excluded simply because of their nationality or because others object to Israeli government policy. Criticising Israel is legitimate. Preventing people from speaking solely because they are Israeli or Jewish is something quite different.

But consistency matters. If we object when Jewish or Israeli speakers are excluded, what happens when the person facing cancellation holds views we strongly oppose?

I believe in freedom of expression. But I don’t believe every institution is obliged to provide a platform to everyone who requests one. If a university invites someone who has advocated violence against Jews, for example, it is entirely reasonable to challenge that invitation. Institutions cannot ignore credible threats or unlawful incitement. Equally, strongly disagreeing with someone’s views shouldn’t, by itself, be grounds for denying access to a venue.

In Oxford, protesters had the right to demonstrate peacefully against Cofnas. The college also had obligations concerning lawful freedom of speech. Allowing the talk to proceed did not mean endorsing his views.

In London, the issue was whether officials were raising legitimate concerns about counterterrorism law or applying inappropriate pressure to prevent a lawful event. The allegations and the Home Office’s denial both deserve consideration.

And in France, citizens are entitled to campaign against a broadcaster they consider harmful or irresponsible. But a petition, however popular, does not itself establish legal grounds to close a television channel.

Whether I agree with those involved is beside the point. What matters is how decisions about access are made. In more than 30 years of journalism, I’ve seen how quickly people stop listening when they become convinced that the other side has nothing worth saying. I’ve also seen how propaganda, incitement and the deliberate dehumanisation of others can contribute to violence. Both realities matter.

We should ask who makes these decisions, what rules apply and whether they’re applied consistently. Is there a genuine safety concern? Has the speaker engaged in unlawful conduct? Is the objection to what someone has said or done, or simply to their identity or political position? Can a refusal be challenged?

Allowing someone to speak at a public venue doesn’t mean endorsing their views. And cancelling an event affects more than the speaker. It also affects those who want to listen, challenge the arguments or protest.

The disputes in Oxford, London, France and Maastricht show why these decisions matter. We must be free to challenge views we find offensive or dangerous. But when we demand that someone be denied access to a platform, we should be prepared to explain why.

The real question isn’t whether everyone deserves a platform. It’s whether the people deciding who gets one can justify their decisions fairly, consistently and according to the law.

About the Author
Paula Slier is an international journalist, war correspondent and speaker whose work focuses on modern conflict, information warfare and the battle for truth. For more than three decades, she has reported on international affairs, including more than two decades reporting from 25+ conflict zones across the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Asia. Her work explores how narratives, emotion, technology and information shape what people believe - and how those forces influence public opinion, political decision-making and modern conflict. She is the founder of NewsHound International Media and NewsHound Academy, and contributes to international publications.
Related Topics
Related Posts
Sign in or Register
Please use the following structure: example@domain.com
Or Continue with
By registering you agree to the terms and conditions
Register to continue
Or Continue with
Log in to continue
Sign in or Register
Or Continue with
check your email
Check your email
We sent an email to you at .
It has a link that will sign you in.