When Universities Decide Who Counts
Yochanan Schimmelpfennig 2026
Ten pairs of shoes were supposed to be displayed at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. Instead, the exhibition was cancelled, and its author, Israeli designer Shelly Satat-Kombor, became the subject of a controversy over academic freedom, political responsibility, and the boycott of Israeli institutions.
I want to begin by expressing my solidarity with the artist. She deserves the opportunity to present her work, explain her decisions, and be judged as an individual rather than as a representative of her country. I believe her exhibition should have taken place, with room for critical discussion. An academy devoted to art should be particularly reluctant to replace an encounter with an artist’s work with a decision that prevents that encounter from happening.
This does not mean that an artist’s activities should be exempt from examination. Bezalel Academy’s own publications from 2023 document Satat-Kombor’s participation in organizing the production of equipment for Israeli soldiers following the October 7 attacks. This is relevant information, and it deserves serious consideration. It does not establish responsibility for war crimes, nor does it automatically justify excluding her work. Solidarity with an artist does not require suspending critical judgment. On the contrary, it requires the willingness to distinguish documented actions from collective accusations and to allow the person concerned to speak.
But there is something else about this controversy that deserves our attention.
In my recent article, “Can You Buy a Voter? Ask Academia. Then Ask Israel,” I examined how money, prestige, and institutional authority can influence the conditions under which ideas become visible and judgments acquire legitimacy. Elon Musk’s political expenditures offered one example of the limits of institutional influence. Academic authority presented another. An institution may possess resources, reputation, and the power to certify particular interpretations without thereby guaranteeing their correctness. The most serious problem arises when institutional recognition begins to substitute for independent judgment, or when established interpretations become resistant to correction.
The Warsaw controversy raises a related question from a different direction. Who decides which activities deserve moral scrutiny, whose participation becomes publicly significant, and which consequences remain outside institutional attention?
The cancellation of an exhibition is a visible institutional decision. Its consequences can be identified immediately. But universities also participate in activities whose effects are less conspicuous, although they may be far more extensive. They educate specialists, authorize expertise, advise governments, and provide the intellectual foundations for decisions affecting employment, housing, healthcare, energy, and retirement. Their influence does not end at the university gate.
Consider the ordinary language of government expertise. Economists calculate the circumstances of households. Energy specialists examine consumers. Pension analysts study contributors and beneficiaries. Housing experts investigate mortgage borrowers. Demographers classify working populations and age groups. These are legitimate categories, necessary for producing reliable knowledge.
Yet something remarkable happens when those separate calculations become the basis of government decisions.
A forty-year-old employee paying a mortgage, raising children, contributing to the pension system, and supporting an elderly parent appears in several different analyses as several different subjects. Each expert examines a particular aspect of that person’s circumstances. Each recommendation may be technically justified. But all the resulting decisions converge upon one human life.
The state counts this person repeatedly, yet may never examine the full consequences of what it is asking that person to endure.
A pension reform may be justified by demographic projections. An energy transition may be supported by environmental and economic calculations. Housing policies may follow financial models, while changes in healthcare expenditure are explained through the necessity of controlling public costs. None of these objectives is inherently unreasonable. The problem is that their consequences do not remain separated in the lives of those who must bear them.
Rising energy costs reduce savings. Mortgage obligations restrict the freedom to change employment. Caring for an elderly parent limits professional opportunities. Reduced access to public services increases private expenditure. A family may consequently abandon the possibility of another child, while an employee may become unable to leave an increasingly difficult job.
These restrictions do not simply accumulate. They change one another’s consequences. Losing a relatively small financial reserve may eliminate the possibility of changing employment. Reduced professional mobility may increase dependence on an employer. Greater insecurity may postpone parenthood until it is no longer possible.
At that point, what has disappeared is not merely a measurable amount of money. An entire possibility of life has disappeared.
Retirement policy provides a particularly revealing example. In its 2025 Economic Survey of Poland, the OECD considered scenarios for raising the retirement age and estimated potential long-term economic benefits. Such projections deserve serious examination. Yet an increase in future GDP does not answer questions about the actual health of older workers, differences in remaining life expectancy, or the circumstances of women who must maintain their homes on reduced incomes after their husbands die.
Energy transition presents a similar difficulty. Modernizing heating systems may produce substantial benefits over twenty or thirty years. But a seventy-year-old person living on a modest pension must bear certain costs now. The environmental necessity of transformation does not automatically justify every distribution of its financial burden. A benefit projected for 2050 cannot be treated as an individual compensation for restrictions experienced today by someone who may never personally enjoy it.
Nor are these burdens simply distributed between generations. The same people who currently finance pensions, repay mortgages, sustain public institutions, and raise children are also expected to contribute to energy transformation. When they approach retirement, they may encounter additional reforms justified by new expert assessments. Governmental priorities and statistical categories change, but the people carrying these obligations do not acquire new lives with every reform.
This is why the question cannot be reduced to whether economic models are accurate. A calculation may be mathematically correct and still fail to recognize what happens when its recommendations are combined with other decisions. Two individuals may suffer an identical financial loss while experiencing radically different consequences. For one, the loss is inconvenient. For another, it eliminates the last remaining margin of independence.
The same amount of money does not represent the same degree of freedom.
None of this constitutes an argument against statistics, academic expertise, or the necessity of difficult political decisions. Researchers increasingly examine the distributional consequences of reforms, and many explicitly identify vulnerable populations. The problem concerns the point at which specialized knowledge acquires the authority to justify interventions beyond the circumstances it was constructed to describe.
An expert is not responsible for every subsequent government decision. Political authorities may disregard recommendations, and unforeseen circumstances can alter outcomes. But researchers and the institutions supporting them should remain responsible for the assumptions they employ, the limitations they recognize, and the consequences they claim their analyses can adequately assess.
Who, then, examines the combined consequences of policies that are individually justified by separate branches of expertise? Who asks whether the people described as taxpayers, consumers, borrowers, workers, and pensioners are actually the same people, whose possibilities are being restricted repeatedly?
This brings us back to Shelly Satat-Kombor.
The point is not to equate her participation in activities supporting soldiers with the work of economists or public policy advisers. These involve different actions and potentially very different moral consequences. The comparison concerns the willingness of institutions to examine participation and responsibility consistently.
If a university considers the professional activities of a visiting artist relevant to its ethical obligations, it should also be prepared to examine the consequences of expertise produced under its own authority. If academic freedom matters when scholars challenge governments, it must also matter when an artist’s work becomes politically controversial. And if institutions claim the right to make judgments about responsibility, those judgments must remain open to evidence, criticism, and reconsideration.
The ancient Hebrew expression אֶבֶן וָאָבֶן, “a stone and a stone,” from Deuteronomy 25:13, prohibits the use of dishonest weights. Its significance extends beyond the familiar accusation of double standards. It concerns the integrity of measurement itself.
Universities should not use one measure of responsibility when examining others and another when examining their own participation in governmental decisions. Nor should expert calculations be considered sufficient merely because every administrative category has been measured correctly. The person who appears separately in those categories remains one person, with one finite life.
That is the deeper connection between the artist whose work disappears from an exhibition and the people who disappear inside governmental calculations. The circumstances are different, but both invite us to examine the authority of institutions to determine what becomes visible, what deserves judgment, and what can be ignored.
I would rather see Shelly Satat-Kombor’s work exhibited and critically discussed than see an institution resolve the controversy by removing the occasion for discussion. And I would rather see universities examine the actual consequences of their own expertise than rely upon their institutional prestige as evidence of responsibility.
The most important intellectual task is not to defend an institution’s authority to judge. It is to ensure that its judgments remain answerable to what they claim to understand.
A government can revise its calculations. A university can reconsider its decisions. But a human being cannot recover an unlived life.
Yochanan Schimmelpfennig
