Why Mogadishu Cannot Simply Recognize Somaliland
Constitutional limits, political survival, and the SSC-Khatumo challenge
Somaliland’s long campaign for international recognition is often framed as a test of whether Somalia’s leaders will accept political reality. From Mogadishu’s perspective, however, recognition is not a simple diplomatic choice. It would collide with Somalia’s constitutional order, threaten the federal government’s governing coalition, unsettle a fragile federation and risk renewed conflict in contested northern regions.
Even leaders who favor compromise face a basic constraint: Somalia is not yet institutionally or politically equipped to negotiate and enforce a binding separation agreement.
The Constitution Leaves Little Room
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution treats the country as one sovereign state within its pre-1991 borders. The federal executive has no clear power to surrender territory or recognize secession. A president or cabinet trying to do so could face impeachment, parliamentary revolt, and accusations of violating the state’s most basic constitutional duty.
Recognition would therefore require far more than a deal between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. It would need parliament, federal member states, northern representatives, and a broad national process to agree on a constitutional settlement. That consensus does not currently exist.
Recognition Could Topple a Government.
National unity remains one of the few causes that can mobilize support across Somalia’s divided political landscape. Any administration seen as “giving away” Somaliland would face fierce resistance from parliamentarians, clan elders, civil society, regional leaders, and nationalist constituencies.
The federal government also rests on delicate power-sharing arrangements. Northern unionist politicians hold seats in parliament and cabinet, while other blocs support the government through fragile coalitions. Recognition could dissolve that support and trigger a no-confidence vote or constitutional crisis.
It would also set a difficult precedent. Puntland, Jubaland and other member states already dispute the division of power with Mogadishu. If Somaliland gained independence through negotiation, others might demand looser confederal ties, separate foreign agreements, or wider territorial claims. For a federation still being built, that risk is profound.
SSC-Khatumo Changed the Political Map
The biggest obstacle to a simple Somalia–Somaliland settlement is that northern Somalia is not politically united. Many residents of Sool reject rule from Hargeisa and identify with Somalia’s federal project. They cannot credibly be treated as territory to be transferred through a deal negotiated elsewhere.
The 2023 conflict in Las Anod made this reality impossible to ignore. Local forces expelled Somaliland troops, and SSC-Khatumo aligned itself with Mogadishu. The outcome weakened Hargeisa’s claim to effective control across the former British Somaliland protectorate and ended the old assumption that Mogadishu and Hargeisa alone could speak for the south and north.
A settlement based solely on colonial boundaries would therefore confront communities that reject Somaliland’s authority. Mogadishu could be accused of abandoning unionist populations, while any attempt by Hargeisa to impose the agreement could draw Puntland and other regional actors into renewed fighting.
A Treaty Needs Institutions That Can Deliver
Formal partition is not achieved by declaration. It requires long negotiations over borders, airspace, maritime zones, debt, public assets, citizenship, property, trade, security, and freedom of movement. It also requires governments able to implement what they sign.
The FGS is already stretched by the fight against Al-Shabaab, security transitions, limited revenue, internal disputes, and uneven territorial control. Its leaders operate in crisis-management mode, leaving little capacity for the sustained legal and administrative work a separation treaty would demand.
Enforcement is the larger problem. Mogadishu cannot guarantee compliance in contested northern districts, while Hargeisa does not control all the territory it claims. A treaty that neither side can conduct would not settle the dispute; it could simply provide diplomatic cover for another conflict.
What Productive Dialogue Could Achieve
None of this makes dialogue pointless. Mogadishu and Hargeisa can still negotiate practical issues: aviation, trade, security coordination, humanitarian access, and movement of people. Limited agreements could reduce tensions and build trust without forcing an immediate decision on final status.
Future talks, however, cannot assume that two governments alone can decide the fate of every northern community. SSC-Khatumo and other affected constituencies now form part of the political equation and need meaningful representation.
The Bottom Line
Somaliland recognition is not blocked only by sentiment or bad faith in Mogadishu. It is constrained by constitutional law, coalition politics, federal fragility, limited state capacity, and contested authority on the ground. A rushed recognition deal could destabilize the federal government while igniting new conflict in the north.
The realistic path is incremental: manage practical disputes, broaden representation, improve security, and strengthen the institutions that would have to uphold any future settlement. Until those conditions exist, formal recognition will remain beyond what Mogadishu can responsibly and credibly deliver.
