Could Bangladesh Become South Asia’s Next Ukraine?
The possibility of Bangladesh becoming South Asia’s next Ukraine may sound extreme, but two major security developments have made the question harder to dismiss. Dhaka is considering the Makkah Pact while preparing to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets. India has now said publicly that it is watching developments that could affect its security.
None of this means that India is likely to attack Bangladesh. The greater danger is the period before Bangladesh receives any firm defence guarantee. During that time, Dhaka’s political signals could alarm India without giving Bangladesh reliable protection.
What Has Changed?
The Makkah Pact was signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan on August 7. It states that an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all. This collective-defence promise explains why Bangladesh’s possible membership has attracted India’s attention.
On August 25, foreign-affairs adviser Humayun Kabir said Bangladesh viewed possible membership in the Makkah Pact positively. Two days later, Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman told parliament that Bangladesh had not yet decided whether to join.
Khalilur said Dhaka would consider membership if Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan issued an invitation. He described the pact as a self-defence system for the Muslim world and called it an internal matter of the “Muslim family.”
On August 27, Kabir met Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Jeddah. He delivered a written message from Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The official Saudi account said the letter concerned bilateral relations and ways to strengthen them. It did not say that the Makkah Pact was discussed, and the complete letter has not been published.
Bangladesh has therefore expressed political interest, but it has not joined the Makkah Pact. No formal invitation or accession document has been made public. There is also no membership timetable or detailed defence guarantee.
The pact remains a possibility, but it is not the only security development attracting attention. Bangladesh is also moving forward with a major Chinese arms purchase, and that plan has reached a more advanced stage.
Government documents show an in-principle plan to buy 20 J-10CE fighters in a package worth about $2.3 billion. A committee has held negotiations and prepared a draft agreement.
The package would include training, logistics, construction and other support. However, no final contract, payment schedule or delivery date has been publicly confirmed.
Bangladesh is also moving to buy attack helicopters and unmanned aircraft. These purchases have no formal link to the Makkah Pact, but their timing may lead India to see them as part of a wider change in Bangladesh’s defence policy.
India Is Now Watching Publicly
On August 28, Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said New Delhi was following all developments that could affect India’s security. He added that India would take all necessary steps to protect itself.
Jaiswal was answering a question about Bangladesh’s comments on the Makkah Pact. He did not threaten Bangladesh or mention military action, but his response showed that India was examining the pact as a possible security issue.
India will look beyond the agreement’s name. New Delhi will want to know whether Bangladeshi membership could bring Pakistani military advisers, intelligence officers or weapons close to India’s eastern states.
The J-10CE purchase will receive similar attention. Pakistan is currently the only confirmed foreign operator of the aircraft, while China is its producer.
There is no public evidence that Pakistan is involved in Bangladesh’s purchase. However, India will watch for any future Pakistani role in training, weapons or technical support.
India may be less concerned about the aircraft than the military network built around them. It will watch who trains Bangladeshi pilots, supplies missiles, supports radar systems and manages military communications.
Bangladesh has the sovereign right to choose its partners and modernize its armed forces. The danger begins when Bangladesh sees protection while India sees strategic encirclement.
India Strengthens Its Major Relationships
India’s recent diplomacy with China and Russia has also raised questions. On August 25, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi co-chaired border talks in Beijing.
The two sides agreed on several steps to improve border management and military communication. These included new meeting points, additional hotlines and further talks on the boundary dispute.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also visited Moscow on August 23 and 24. His official agenda covered trade, energy, science, technology and wider cooperation with Russia.
Neither visit was officially connected to Bangladesh or the Makkah Pact. It would therefore be wrong to present them as proof that India asked China or Russia to oppose Bangladeshi membership.
However, the wider pattern still matters. Calmer relations with China and strong ties with Russia could give India more diplomatic freedom during any future crisis with Bangladesh.
Chinese President Xi Jinping is also likely to attend the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13. Reports suggest that he could arrive with about 400 officials, although Beijing has not confirmed his final programme.
A large delegation could prepare several agreements, but it does not prove that India and China have solved their disputes. It also provides no evidence of a secret agreement concerning Bangladesh.
Ukraine Is a Warning, Not a Map
Russia invaded Ukraine before Ukraine became a NATO member. NATO countries could support Ukraine, but they were not required to enter the war under Article 5.
However, Ukraine was not about to join NATO in February 2022. It had no fixed membership date, and the invasion followed years of conflict, including Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
Bangladesh is in a very different position. India has no public territorial claim against Bangladesh and has not demanded that Dhaka reject the Makkah Pact.
There is no public evidence that India is preparing either a full invasion or a limited military strike. Diplomatic, economic and border pressure remain far more likely than war.
The useful part of the Ukraine comparison is the timing problem. A smaller country can alarm a stronger neighbour by moving toward an alliance before receiving real protection from that alliance.
During this period, the smaller country may carry the political risks of membership without enjoying its military guarantees. The stronger neighbour may believe that pressure will become harder after collective protection begins.
NATO and the Makkah Pact are also very different. NATO has military commands, common planning and decades of experience, while the Makkah Pact was signed only on August 7.
The pact’s rules for accepting new members and responding to an attack remain unclear. The Ukraine comparison should therefore be treated as a warning about miscalculation, not a prediction of war.
What Should Be Watched Now?
Military force is not India’s most likely response simply because Dhaka is considering the pact. An attack would increase anti-India anger and push Bangladesh closer to Pakistan and China. India’s more likely tools are diplomacy, trade, visas, border controls, intelligence work and shows of military readiness.
New Delhi may ask Saudi Arabia and Turkey whether Bangladeshi membership would allow Pakistan permanent military access. It could also seek assurances about foreign bases, intelligence facilities and joint military planning.
These steps could still create a dangerous cycle. Bangladesh might see Indian military preparations as evidence of an approaching attack and ask Pakistan for faster support. India could then treat the arrival of Pakistani personnel as proof that Bangladesh had become a threat.
The first development to watch is whether Bangladesh receives and publishes a formal invitation. The second is whether Tarique Rahman visits Saudi Arabia and signs a defence document. The terms of any agreement will matter more than public speeches.
The final J-10CE contract will also be important. India will study the missiles, radar, training and communication systems included in the package, especially any future Pakistani technical role.
For Israeli readers, Bangladesh matters less as a direct threat and more as a test of whether the Makkah Pact can expand beyond its three founding members. Syria makes that question more urgent because Damascus is also studying membership while Israel is already striking Syrian targets and opposing possible Turkish military access.
Bangladesh is not in the same position as Syria. India is not attacking Bangladesh, and no Pakistani military deployment there has been announced.
There is also no public evidence that the pact is directed at Israel. However, Syria could become its first immediate military test, while Bangladesh could become its first major strategic test in South Asia. In both cases, the real question is whether a political promise develops into a working military network.
Bangladesh is not South Asia’s next Ukraine today. The conditions for such a disaster do not exist, and there is no evidence that India is preparing an attack.
The real risk is a security dilemma. Bangladesh may see new partners as protection, while India may see the same moves as encirclement. Each defensive step could then make the other side respond.
Before joining, Bangladesh needs clear answers about who would defend it, how quickly and under whose command. It must also know whether membership would allow foreign military personnel, bases or intelligence facilities.
Bangladesh should assure India that its territory will not be used against a neighbour. India, in return, should respect Bangladesh’s right to choose its defence partners and address its concerns through diplomacy.
The lesson from Ukraine is not that India will copy Russia. It is that smaller countries face their greatest danger when they signal a new alignment before their protection becomes real. That is the gap both Dhaka and New Delhi must manage.
August 29, 2026
Tokyo, Japan
