Divide-and-Rule: Netanyahu’s Flawed Strategy

Binyamin Netanyahu’s political beliefs have been open-ended since inception albeit glossed over by the international community.

A lot has changed, since his election as Likud party chairman in 1993, yet trends and tactics remain the same. A policy of ‘land for security’ still dominates Israeli politics, yet it is Netanyahu who taken such doctrine to the extreme: settlement expansion, co-option, and ‘disengagement’, in name only, has killed off the prospects for any viable Palestinian state.

As much as politicians flip flop on policy, Netanyahu has consistently refused to engage in any genuine negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian state. Instead, a policy of de facto annexation – backed by the Israeli state – has followed in his footsteps.

Netanyahu’s Support for Outpost Construction: 1990s

Netanyahu took Likud policy to the extreme even during the years of Oslo, by speeding up the legalization of outposts. Though settlement expansion follows every Israeli prime minister, in living memory, after 1967; Netanyahu and his Likud parties’ retroactive legalization of illegal outposts is a unique phenomenon. It is worth noting that Israeli outposts are illegal, even under Israeli domestic law.

Outpost construction, since the unravelling of Oslo, has operated as an effective tool of ‘land for peace’ with the seizure of land state policy in Judea and Samaria. Outposts begin as illegal holdings, often lived on by settlers and their lobbied sources of funding via the Central Fund of Israel, financing far-right settler groups – such as the Nachala movement – whose land grabs are later legalized by the Israeli Knesset.

Open Wounds, With No Where to Go: Factionalism

Netanyahu and successive Likud leaders could therefore use settler expansion, via outpost legalization, as a means of ‘securing Israel’s borders’ for domestic politics whilst appearing to give the PNA-approved authority hope amongst the wider international community.

In turn, Netanyahu could offer the PNA enough hope to keep to the plan of ‘Palestinian governance’ alive, whilst using outpost legalization as a backdoor for the annexation of a fragmented reality in the oPt: a West Bank carved from A to C.

According to sources, Ehud Olmert offered the PNA 90% of the terms demanded by the Palestinian Authority in 2008 yet the Palestinians refused such a deal. Sources point to conflicting accounts of why Abbas refused such a deal: factors range from Abbas’ political position, Olmert’s position as a lame duck, and the lack of full sovereignty to the Palestinians.

However, divisions in the Israeli and Palestinian camps became open after the assassination of Rabin and Second Intifada with armed resistance gaining legitimacy whilst peace via negotiation perceived to be losing favor with either population. Hamas’ wave of terror attacks in 1996 followed the assassination of Rabin.

Ehud Olmert attempted to reboot the peace camp before Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited ‘Temple Mount’ preceded five years of consecutive violence by armed factions.

Internal factionalism, in the form of Islamism, reared its ugly ahead by undermining any viable negotiating partner in the Palestinian camp. Rabin and Arafat were on to something, with Oslo, however, the PLO’s credibility amongst the Palestinian population hit rock bottom after the collapse of Oslo and the violations of sovereignty seen after.

To this day, Palestinians are divided between those who support civil and armed ‘resistance’: a key division in the Palestinian camp. Israelis, however, are also very much divided on the day after in Gaza although 70% of Israelis disapprove of Netanyahu’s ongoing military actions in Gaza. Together, though, both Palestinians and Israelis distrust each other: a key barrier to any peace process going forward.

Netanyahu’s Support for Co-option: Oslo Onwards

Between ongoing outpost legalization across the newly divided West Bank, coupled with a spiraling series of violent attacks on Israelis, the collapse of Oslo and Sharon’s incitement of violence reaffirmed the need for managing the Palestinian issue… not just by settlement, but also security cooperation.

The revolving door policy, championed under the Likud party, specifically Netanyahu, saw closed door cooperation between the Shabak and PNA to eliminate security threats to Israel in exchange for keeping the PNA in power. Fatah-controlled PNA would keep the lid on armed resistance in the West Bank, specifically Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Hebron, Nablus, and Jenin, whilst keeping the authority weak enough to attract disdain from their own population.

What many came to label the ‘occupation,’ changed to incorporate another ‘occupation’: the Israelis and Mahmoud Abbas’ corrupt Palestinian Authority. Of course, security concerns demanded cooperation – just like the ones Tel Aviv champion with its other Arab neighbours, the Jordanians, yet to many Israelis, including Netanyahu, this strategy froze the conflict on acceptable terms, justified intransigence to negotiation, whilst ‘managing the conflict’ via security measures: settlements for security.

Put simply, who can negotiate with partners who can’t even control their own house?

Netanyahu’s Support for Division after Disengagement: 2005-2025

If the First Intifada was perceived to be bloody, the reaction to the collapse of the Oslo Track II, reared its ugly head between 2000-2005. The reaction would set the stage for the military, political, and international stalemate both Israelis and Palestinians face today.

Disengagement suggests withdrawal, which in part is true albeit misleading at best. Israeli forces left Gaza in 2005 despite maintaining full sovereignty of the maritime, aerial, and land borders in and around the Gaza Strip.

The Second Intifada paved the way for democratic elections in Gaza, electing Hamas as the enclave’s political authority to the shock of the PNA in the West Bank. The elections proved the illegitimacy of the PNA whilst championing ‘concrete action against occupation’ by other groups, namely Hamas.

Hamas posed as much as a security threat as other armed groups in the West Bank, yet balancing all sides became the (un-)official policy of the Israeli security apparatus. Security cooperation with Abbas’ PNA continued, to counter the very force, that the IDF facilitated Qatari funds to Hamas in Khan Younis while undermining the PNA.

Balancing both sides of the Palestinian polity, whilst annexing territory via outpost legalization became official policy under the Likud party up until the darkest day in Israeli history: the 7^th of October.

The Same Tactics, With Nothing But Fear (The 7^th of October –)

Media headlines, just last week, outlined Netanyahu’s use of the same tactics although this time with the aim of splintering the very entity it once propped up: Hamas.

According to Israeli security chiefs – under the orders of Netanyahu – are supplying arms to a Gaza-based militia in southern Gaza to “protect Israeli lives.” The same logic applied to Israel’s security strategy after the 2005 disengagement yet supporting Hamas, albeit (in-)directly, provided Hamas with external legitimacy, from Hizbullah to the Houthis, whilst consolidating internal rule in Gaza and delegitimizing the only viable option for genuine peace between Israelis and Palestinians: the PNA.

Israeli Politics & European Policy Shifts

Important choices are pending decision by the Israeli coalition and its European partners in coming days that could shift the dial on the war and any future ‘day after.’

Netanyahu’s coalition is likely to fall when the ultra-Orthodox party, Shas party, pull their support from the coalition paving the way for early elections in Israel. Opinion polls suggest former PM, Naftali Bennett, will win providing a similar albeit less damaging repetition of the same tactics and trends the Israeli-right have used to consolidate control and deter peace in Israel.

Bennett, like Netanyahu, champions settlement expansion despite holding better international standing. Israeli sources claim that Bennett would offer the same tactics and trends as Netanyahu albeit wrapped up in a more credible style of diplomacy. Bennett could end the war, with the return of the hostages if a deal is agreed with Hamas, although don’t expect any sudden shifts ‘the day after’.

With that in mind, it is about time that the Europeans step up and leverage their soft power to bring political change inside Israel. Sanctions, arms restrictions, and trade re-negotiation should all be on the table.

The European Union is already on the ball with the EU-Israel Association Agreement pending re-negotiation, whilst the UK and France reportedly backtrack all talk of ‘recognition’ at the upcoming June summit in New York. Belgium has already called for the suspension of arms licenses to Israel whilst Spain is also leading calls on formal arms and trade restrictions.

If recognition doesn’t come now, the very least should prioritize sanctions, arms, and trade. Europe should look further than mere statements of condemnation and take affirmative action for the good of peace, integration, and reconciliation.

If Israelis seek true integration, it is in the spirit of the Abraham Accords that dialogue, sovereignty, and credible partnerships are put forward rather than talk of peace, dialogue, and tolerance with the explicit paradox that is Netanyahu and Likud party policy.

The Abraham Accords can only work if real hope and a genuine alternative to violence is supported by either camp.