Houthi attacks Saudi Arabia as Mecca Pact remains non operational

Missiles and drones have targeted civilian, military and economic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has also reported attempted attacks against the capital, the area around Makkah and infrastructure connected with Yanbu on the Red Sea.

The attacks have inevitably brought Pakistan and Türkiye into the equation. Both countries committed themselves at Makkah to collective defence, and sustained attacks against Saudi territory are forcing that commitment out of the diplomatic sphere and into military planning.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye condemned the attacks and reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s right to defend itself under Article 51 of the UN Charter. They also called for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs to consider assistance to Riyadh under the Makkah agreement.

The three military chiefs subsequently met in Riyadh, where discussions covered intelligence sharing, military coordination and integration of capabilities. They also reaffirmed the principle of collective defence.

Islamabad’s position is particularly relevant for India. Pakistan has described the agreement as defensive and an instrument of “collective deterrence”, avoiding any suggestion that Pakistani forces are preparing for offensive operations in Yemen. At the same time, it has unequivocally supported Saudi sovereignty, territorial integrity and the kingdom’s right to protect its population and strategic assets.

Pakistan does not need to enter the war in Yemen for the agreement to acquire military substance. Intelligence sharing, air and missile defence, surveillance, technical personnel, logistics and the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure would already constitute substantial Pakistani involvement.

Nor would such cooperation begin from scratch. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had a close military relationship for decades. Pakistani personnel have served in the kingdom, Saudi officers have trained with Pakistan’s armed forces and the two militaries conduct regular exercises. The Makkah agreement places this established relationship within a new trilateral structure that includes Türkiye.

The three countries also bring very different capabilities to the arrangement. Saudi Arabia combines financial resources with sophisticated Western military systems and control of strategically vital territory. Türkiye has developed a formidable domestic defence industry and accumulated operational experience across several theatres. Pakistan contributes one of the region’s largest professional militaries, considerable missile capabilities and is the only nuclear-armed member of the pact.

There is no public evidence that Pakistan has extended a nuclear guarantee to Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. Its participation nevertheless gives the arrangement a strategic dimension that would not otherwise exist.

The Houthi campaign has also exposed an ambiguity in the agreement. Its collective-defence provisions are now being tested by an armed movement rather than by another state.

The Houthis control much of Yemen and have received political, technological and military support from Iran. Tehran rejects the description of the Houthis as an Iranian proxy and maintains that the movement takes its own decisions. So far, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye have concentrated their public condemnation on the Houthis rather than directly attributing the attacks to Iran.

Ankara has been careful to state that the Makkah Pact is not directed against Iran. Türkiye maintains extensive political and economic relations with Tehran and has coupled its condemnation of the Houthi attacks with calls to prevent further regional escalation.

Pakistan’s balancing act is even more delicate. It shares a long border with Iran and has political, security and economic interests there. Islamabad has little interest in seeing the Makkah Pact develop into an explicitly anti-Iranian military bloc.

This leaves considerable room between doing nothing and participating in strikes against Yemen. Intelligence cooperation, integrated air defence and protection of critical infrastructure offer Pakistan and Türkiye ways of supporting Saudi Arabia without automatically entering another regional war.

The Houthis occupy territory overlooking Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow maritime passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Instability there affects international shipping, energy flows and traffic towards the Suez Canal.

Yanbu creates an additional challenge. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline carries crude from the kingdom’s eastern oilfields to the Red Sea, providing an export route that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. Threats to infrastructure around Yanbu therefore connect two of the world’s most sensitive maritime energy corridors, Hormuz and the Red Sea.

India has obvious interests in both. It remains heavily dependent on Gulf energy, while millions of Indians live and work across the region. The Red Sea is also India’s principal maritime route towards Europe and central to the commercial logic of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Disruption around Bab al-Mandeb consequently has direct implications for Indian trade and connectivity.

Egypt is watching developments from an equally exposed position. Cairo has joined Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye in condemning the Houthi attacks and supporting Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and right of self-defence. Egypt is not, however, a member of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.

Its economic exposure to Red Sea instability is considerable. Persistent disruption of maritime traffic translates directly into reduced Suez Canal revenues. Egypt’s future relationship with the pact will therefore be worth watching, particularly if its members begin developing permanent mechanisms for Red Sea security.

A grouping that eventually brought Egypt together with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan would stretch across an extraordinary strategic space, from the eastern Mediterranean and Suez to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. It would also bring together some of the largest armed forces in the Muslim world.

For now, the three Makkah signatories are moving cautiously. There has been no announcement of Pakistani or Turkish participation in offensive operations against the Houthis. Instead, the emphasis after the Riyadh meeting has been on intelligence, coordination and military integration.

Those measures may prove more significant than dramatic declarations of solidarity. Intelligence networks can be linked. Air-defence information can be exchanged. Military commands can establish permanent channels. Contingency plans can be prepared and critical Saudi infrastructure can be protected with capabilities drawn from all three countries.

The Houthi attacks have accelerated that process. Pakistan and Türkiye are unlikely to want another war in Yemen, and neither has an interest in turning the Makkah Pact into an automatic mechanism for confrontation with Iran. But allowing repeated attacks on Saudi territory to pass without a collective response would weaken an agreement built around collective deterrence.

The compromise taking shape is therefore military cooperation without an immediate commitment to offensive war. For India, Pakistan’s role deserves close attention. Islamabad is positioning itself inside a security structure linking South Asia with the Gulf, Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean. If the military coordination now being discussed in Riyadh develops into permanent mechanisms, the Makkah Pact will have consequences considerably beyond the present confrontation with the Houthis.

The attacks on Saudi Arabia may be remembered as the moment when the pact began to move from paper to military practice. The question is whether it will really happen.