Indonesia, BRICS, and Global Geopolitical Dynamics

The official announcement of Indonesia’s joining of the BRICS Organization has become important geopolitical news this week, not only for domestic audiences like me, but also for global audiences, both BRICS member countries themselves and developed countries.

It seems sudden and slightly deviates from public assumptions because the news that was previously touted by the media was the opportunity and prospect of Indonesia joining a more neutral Organization, namely the OECD. It was even reported some time ago that Airlangga Hartarto, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, had found a point of agreement with the OECD regarding Indonesia’s plan to join.

However, apart from that, of course this news is also not something strange, because there are many things that indicate that Indonesia is indeed more inclined to BRICS, rather than to the OECD, especially from a geopolitical perspective. Just look at Indonesia’s reaction when Russia, one of the bigwigs in BRICS, invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Indonesia’s attitude was exactly the same as the attitude of the BRICS member countries. Indonesia has never openly stated its rejection of the invasion. There was even news that Indonesia would import oil from Russia, considering that at that time world oil prices were rising high on the one hand and Russia was pricing its oil below market prices on the other hand, although this plan did not materialize in the end.

And after that, to show Indonesia’s impartiality, Jokowi then visited Kiev and Moscow simultaneously, just to save Indonesia’s interests related to wheat imports from Ukraine. At that time, Jokowi’s meeting with Putin was quite warm, with no signs indicating that Indonesia, represented by Jokowi, had any objections to Putin’s actions against Ukraine.

Indeed, after 2022, the position of BRICS looks increasingly contrasting and contradictory to its competitors from developed countries, namely the G7. However, if we look further, this has actually happened since BRICS was founded, although it peaked after Russia invaded Ukraine and the West increased its economic sanctions on Russia. As a result, countries in the world, especially countries that are members of BRICS, must also show their attitude, although not too firm, but symbolic, to other BRICS members.

In her book “Russia, BRICS, and The Disruption of Global Order” (2019), Rachel S. Salzman beautifully describes how Russia very cleverly used BRICS as a geopolitical shield to provide a counterbalance to the West, long before the Russia-Ukraine war took place. As a result, in the end it seems that the geopolitical aspirations of BRICS are not too different from the geopolitical aspirations of the Kremlin.

So that the Organization that was initially introduced by one of GP Morgan’s senior analysts that was only a representation of the economic strength (its economic contribution/GDP to the global economy) of several emerging markets transformed into a geopolitical shield for developing countries to face western hegemony. And that is exactly what Russia wants.

Of course, it is not only Russia that stands out in it, but geopolitically, whether it is recognized or not, Russia’s voice or aspirations are much more dominant. Meanwhile, China geopolitically still seems to be trying to play it safe, because of its interrelation and economic interdependence with the western world. However, economically and geoeconomically, it is undeniable that China’s dominance is an undeniable fact in BRICS. So like it or not, the take and give process is inevitable between the two countries.

Russia is trying to be as friendly as possible to all of China’s interests, starting from opening itself wider to Belt and Road Initiative projects and their accompanying derivative products on the one hand and accepting the yuan as an informal means of payment for BRICS members on the other. As a concession, Russia can still have a large market for its mainstay commodity, namely oil and gas, even at a very competitive discount price. So after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China and India suddenly became the largest consumers of oil and gas from Russia.

Indeed, Japan and South Korea have also reportedly diversified their oil and gas imports to Russia. However, as far as I know, they did this after coordinating intensively with US. The goal was to prevent world oil prices from rising too sharply, which would actually make Moscow very happy. By diverting some of their oil and gas import sources to Russia, Japan and Korea were also participating in suppressing world oil demand in the formal market, which could potentially depress prices. The reason is, the increase in world oil prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has worsened the economic prospects of world countries, especially European countries that are US’s strategic alliances.

So what is the impact on world geopolitics after Indonesia joins BRICS? Of course, symbolically, it will strengthen the bargaining power of southern countries, especially BRICS members themselves, when dealing with developed countries. The organizational ties of large countries that are also developing will be seen as increasingly close. Symbolically, Indonesia’s joining will further enhance the positive image of Russia and China in front of other developing countries on the one hand and western countries on the other.

This means that after the worsening image experienced by Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Indonesia has now chosen to be in one big boat with Russia. Of course, this will be a very valuable “geopolitical victory” for Russia and Putin in front of developed countries led by US, because it is considered to still be a magnet that can attract other countries to be in one big boat with Russia.

Even for China, which had stumbled over the issue of being the country of origin of COVID 19, Indonesia’s joining is an extraordinary victory over the US geopolitically at the global level and at the Southeast Asian level. At the global level, Indonesia is one of the big countries that has consistently carried out an active free policy or non-bloc. Although today’s geopolitical divisions are not as sharp as the Cold War era, Indonesia’s joining a big boat, one of which is dominated by China, is a symbol of Indonesia’s shift in attitude that prefers China over US.

And more specifically, Indonesia’s joining BRICS will increase China’s bargaining power within ASEAN, especially regarding the South China Sea issue. Prabowo’s statement that he is ready to help resolve the South China Sea issue bilaterally with China inevitably strengthens China’s approach to ASEAN, namely not making the South China Sea issue an issue that is discussed multilaterally, but bilaterally. Automatically, Indonesia’s entry into BRICS will further open up opportunities for China to “drag” Indonesia out of ASEAN’s multilateral rules of play and into bilateral talks between the two countries, along with the accompanying take and give actions of course.

However, these benefits will only be enjoyed by member countries such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, organizationally, it is not certain that Indonesia’s joining will further strengthen BRICS. The reason is, before Indonesia joined, BRICS is actually filled with “regional great power” countries that had different ambitions, but tried to be in the same container for one goal, namely to balance the power of developed countries that are members of the G7.

Meanwhile, internally, the unity and solidarity among them are not as solid as imagined. When one member country takes a rather far-reaching action, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, although there is no open rejection, there is also no open support received by Russia. Other member countries take an ambiguous stance, by neither supporting nor condemning.

The reason is quite simple, because fellow regional great powers compete with each other and are not willing to provide support to other members that would make the country seem “greater” than them. If China provides open support to Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war, then inevitably it will make Russia feel big-headed because it is considered successful in dictating a country as big as China to support it. The same thing is certainly felt by India, Brazil, and South Africa.

What does it mean? It means that within BRICS itself there is a silent counterbalance action between fellow members. All want to move forward together on issues that will make them grow. If one member tries to “advance” its ambitions outside the corridor of mutual agreement, then the others will take an ambiguous stance, namely not rejecting and not supporting.

Well, Indonesia’s presence may make this internal thread even more tangled, because Indonesia itself wants to be seen as a candidate of regional great power to become a leader in Southeast Asia, which may have a different voice on certain issues, in the name of “Indonesia’s” own pride. In addition, politically, Indonesia is a country that has been categorized as democratic since the 1998 reform, almost with India, Brazil, and South Africa. In other words, Indonesia’s presence in BRICS ideologically will actually help change the political character of BRICS, which has been dominated by two non-democratic countries, especially Russia and China.

Moreover, last year several other countries joined, such as Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE, all of which tend to be less democratic. So that the strengthening of autocratic tendencies in BRICS member countries in 2024 began to be neutralized again at the beginning of this year with the joining of Indonesia, which is seen as the most democratic country in Southeast Asia. Like it or not, there will once again be a balance of power between autocratic and democratic countries within BRICS, which will make this organization internally dynamic on the one hand, but fundamentally less solid on the other.

Very different from the Cold War era, where the bloc led by the Soviet Union was indeed on the same political platform as the Soviet Union itself. If not completely communist, at least socialist and left-wing by the West at that time. While in today’s constellation, democracy versus autocracy on one side and state capitalism vs democratic capitalism on the other. Ideational divisions will occur in the first realm, namely between democratic and autocratic countries. While on issues related to the topic of state capitalism vs democratic capitalism, all tend to unite, because almost all members to this day are observed to adhere to the state capitalism ideology, with its various variations.

Meanwhile, for Middle East affairs, as usual, Indonesia’s position will certainly be increasingly the same as the BRICS member countries, namely demanding the West, especially US, to realize a two-state solution in Palestine, on the one hand and will increasingly criticize Israel on the other hand, because it believes that the BRICS member countries, both openly and symbolically, also prioritize the same interests, namely immediately realizing peace in the Middle East by realizing the two-state solution agreement.

In short, Indonesia’s joining BRICS, however, will certainly have geopolitical impacts at the global level. A country as large as Indonesia, which since its independence has been fought over by geopolitical wings that have competed at the global level, has now become a member of an organization that is often considered a counterbalance to Western power and hegemony.

So geopolitically, this news is a victory for developing countries that are looking for a way to advance outside the path offered by western countries. Also a geopolitical victory for Russia and China per se, because they will be considered as two geopolitical powers today that are much more interesting than US. For Indonesia itself, it is the same, there will be opportunities on one side and new challenges will arise on the other side, both geopolitically and economically. To find out more, of course we wait for what leaps will happen after this. Let’s wait.