Is Israel Buying for the Last War?
Here is Israel’s shopping list from this year: In May, after the air war with Iran, the government approved a fourth squadron of F-35s and a second squadron of F-15IAs, about 25 aircraft each. In October it signed for 12 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, worth about a billion dollars, after missing an ordering deadline amid budget trouble. The Apaches arrive in the early 2030s. The jets will fly into the 2050s and beyond. Then, on November 3, President Trump announced that American military aid to Israel would end at the close of this year. Two weeks later, Finance Ministry officials told a Knesset committee that more than $31 billion in defense purchases had been planned on the assumption of American money. Roughly $25 billion of that is aircraft.
So the question is no longer academic. From January, Israel pays its own way, and I want to ask whether this is the right shopping list. My objective is simple. These aircraft are superb at what they do, which is destroy targets. But the wars Israel is actually fighting are increasingly decided by something else: cheap drones, artificial intelligence and cyber attacks on the systems a society runs on. By the time the new aircraft arrive, the decisive blows may come from code and cheap autonomous machines.
Three things have already changed
First, the war is already being fought in code. Predatory Sparrow, a hacking group widely believed to have links to the Israeli state, has claimed attacks on Iran’s fuel distribution in 2021, its steel mills in 2022, and Bank Sepah and the Nobitex currency exchange in 2025. Iran answers in kind. In April 2020 it tried to take over the controls of several Israeli water facilities, reportedly to raise chlorine levels. In 2023, hackers tied to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards hit Israeli-made controllers at small water utilities in the United States. By March this year, Israel’s national cyber chief said Iranian-linked hackers had wiped the data of more than 50 small Israeli businesses. Look at the targets: gas pumps, a bank, water, company servers. The weaker side answers jets with code, and code goes straight into daily life.
Second, cheap beats expensive. In Ukraine, drones costing a few hundred dollars now cause most Russian equipment losses, 60 to 70 percent according to the Royal United Services Institute in London. Artificial intelligence lets those drones find their own way to a target after jamming cuts the link to the pilot. An interceptor, meanwhile, often costs far more than the drone it shoots down. That arithmetic, not a lack of will, is behind the interceptor shortages that Israel and the United States both face.
Third, the money is Israel’s own. Until now a skeptic could say the aircraft were bought with American aid that had to be spent on American platforms, so they did not compete with Israel’s own spending on cyber and AI. From January that argument is gone. The aid was worth about 12 billion shekels a year. Every shekel that replaces it on an aircraft contract is a shekel that cannot protect a regional water utility or a payment system.
Israel already sees it
To be fair, Israel is moving. In September the army announced a new branch for unmanned systems and AI. Hermes drones now carry onboard AI that detects and classifies targets. The Iron Beam laser, operational since late 2025, shoots down drones for roughly the price of electricity, and is alleged to have been used in combat for the first time in March. Israel’s cyber capability, from Unit 8200 to its private industry, is among the best in the world. So the question is not whether Israel understands the shift. It is whether the budget reflects it.
Why nobody says it out loud
I have spent about forty years assessing infrastructure systems in emerging markets. The first lesson of that work is that an attacker goes for the weakest node, not the most impressive asset. Israel’s weakest nodes are not its airbases. They are its payment systems, its ports and its regional water utilities.
Governments rarely describe threats they cannot yet answer, and there are sound reasons for that: you do not tell an adversary where you are weak. But silence has a cost. The war a country is comfortable describing, with jets, strikes and interceptors, drives its budget. The war it may actually face, with drones, AI and cyber attacks on water, power and banks, stays in the shadows and never competes for money. A fighter jet is easy to explain. Protecting a bank’s payment system is invisible until the day it fails.
The best argument against my view
It was manned aircraft, not drones or code, that reached Iran’s nuclear sites in 2025 and again this year. No cyber tool replaced them. Visible hardware also deters, and deterrence is partly a matter of what an enemy can see. I accept that. But those strikes did not settle the question they were meant to settle: the International Atomic Energy Agency says it still cannot account for Iran’s enriched uranium. And timing matters. These platforms arrive in the 2030s and serve into the 2060s. Israel is not buying for the last campaign. It is buying for the next forty years.
The question for the next defense budget
So here is the question I would put to the next government, whoever forms it. When Israel writes its first defense budget without American aid, what share should go to protecting water, power, ports and banks against cheap AI-driven attacks, and what share to platforms built for a war that may not come in that form? I do not know the right number, but I am fairly sure it is not the one implied by this year’s shopping list.
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