Israel Must Not Be America’s Cannon Fodder
Washington and Jerusalem may be ready to confront Iran again. But do they agree on what victory means?
Tomorrow, Americans vote in their midterm elections. Days after Israel’s own election, the Middle East is bracing for another possible escalation with Iran. The Times of Israel reported on preparations for possible renewed US-Israeli strikes after November 3. But planning is not an order, and neither the timing nor the decision to attack is certain.
Before Israel participates in another round of fighting, we need to ask a question that is too easily lost amid talk of military readiness:
Are Washington and Jerusalem fighting for the same objectives—and do they agree on what would constitute victory?
A shared enemy is not necessarily a shared endgame!
I believe the Islamic Republic represents a profound, long-term threat to Israel and regional security. Its nuclear ambitions, missile programs, and support for armed proxies cannot be dismissed as temporary problems that will disappear after the next diplomatic breakthrough.
For me, the ultimate hope is an Iran no longer governed by a regime that threatens its neighbors—an Iran whose citizens can choose a peaceful, democratic future. I would support decisive action against the Iranian threat only as part of a credible strategy for lasting security, rather than another round of destruction followed by rebuilding and renewed threats.
But there is no magic military shortcut to democracy. Bringing down a regime is not the same as establishing stable, representative government. The Iranian people must determine their own future, and any strategy premised on regime change must confront the risks of prolonged conflict and instability.
Ready to fight—but for what?
A November 1 report by Yonah Jeremy Bob in The Jerusalem Post crystallizes the concern. It says Israel is ready to participate in renewed strikes if asked, but significant disagreements remain over the goals. Trump and his advisers are described as concentrating on nuclear concessions, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and keeping any renewed fighting short. Netanyahu continues to speak of regime change. Within Israel, the report also distinguishes the IDF’s focus on reducing specific threats from the Mossad leadership’s reported interest in broader political change.
In other words, this is not simply a disagreement between two countries, each speaking with one voice. Even within Israel, priorities differ. Both governments may be prepared for military action without a fully shared definition of success.
America has legitimate reasons to focus on the Strait of Hormuz, oil markets, shipping, and the economic disruption caused by the conflict. The vulnerability of other maritime routes, including the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, also matters. Washington has every right to protect its economy and seek an enforceable nuclear agreement.
But imagine a scenario in which a short offensive pushes Tehran into reopening shipping lanes and making limited nuclear concessions. Trump declares victory, energy markets calm, and Washington turns to other priorities. What if the same regime retains the means and determination to rebuild its threats against Israel?
What counts as a satisfactory outcome for America might not be a satisfactory—or lasting—outcome for Israel.
The United States is entitled to put American interests first. So is Israel!
Our alliance is vital. We benefit enormously from American support, cooperation, and shared security interests. But allies do not surrender their independent judgment. When priorities coincide, we should act together. When they diverge, Israel must be willing to say so—and, if necessary, decline to join a campaign whose endgame fails to protect Israelis.
That is not disloyalty. It is the responsibility of sovereign governments to their citizens. Being willing to fight the same adversary does not mean agreeing on the purpose of the fight.
And if it goes wrong—who gets the blame?
An investigation by Nancy A. Youssef and Jonathan Lemire in The Atlantic, published November 1, reports that Trump has been asking associates about the performances of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine as the Iran war has dragged on. The Times of Israel summarized the report on November 2. The White House, for its part, publicly expressed confidence in both officials.
The reported search for someone to blame concerns American officials—not Israel. There is no evidence in these reports that Trump intends to blame Israel or Jews. Still, it raises a question I cannot ignore: if another operation fails to deliver the promised results, might Israel eventually be accused of having drawn America into an unpopular war?
Jews have too often been cast as convenient explanations for other people’s failures. We should not assume that will happen here, but neither should we be casual about exposing Israel to that risk. We must not sacrifice Israeli lives for a campaign whose objectives we do not share—and then be left carrying the blame if it fails.
Two political clocks … one lasting reality!
Trump’s term ends in January 2029. Tomorrow’s midterms could weaken his freedom to maneuver, although no one yet knows the results. Netanyahu, too, faces political uncertainty after Israel’s October election. These circumstances do not prove that either leader would choose war for political advantage. They do make it all the more important that military decisions be defended on their strategic merits—not their political timing.
America can change administrations, redefine its priorities, and eventually negotiate an arrangement it considers acceptable. Israel will still be here, living with the consequences—and within reach of threats that may survive any short-term agreement.
That is why I would ask our government to insist on a clear answer before agreeing to participate: Is the objective a temporary reduction of Iran’s capabilities, a negotiated settlement, or a durable transformation of the threat? What would Israel gain? What risks would Israeli civilians and service members bear? And what happens if Washington declares the war over before our security concerns have been resolved?
Allies, yes – Cannon fodder, no!
I am not opposed to confronting Iran. I am opposed to another open-ended or half-finished confrontation in which Israel carries risks without confidence that the outcome will make us safer. There may be sound arguments for limited action, and regime change itself offers no guaranteed path to peace. Those realities make honest agreement about goals more important, not less.
We should seek the closest possible cooperation with the United States. But if our governments cannot agree on the purpose, limits, and desired outcome of renewed fighting, Israel should not join simply because Washington is ready.
What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. America must look after American interests. Israel must look after Israeli interests. Our alliance matters enormously—but our long-term security must come first.
