Palestinian Statehood Conference Impacts on Israel

Last week, the French and Saudi envoys at the United Nations underscored that the forthcoming Palestinian statehood conference must chiefly seek to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In reprisal, the Israeli government unveiled plans for a military occupation of the Gaza Strip, asserting an intention to claim up to three-quarters of the Palestinian territory. Meanwhile, the UK, Canada and France have publicly condemned Israel’s conduct towards civilians in Gaza. Spain has gone further yet, convening both European and Muslim states to demand an immediate halt to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding there. Israel must therefore fully appreciate the profound ramifications of the impending summit.

First and foremost, regardless of whether the summit achieves a formal resolution, Israel will confront immediate political pressure from the international community. President Macron proposed the initiative on the grounds that Palestinian statehood is indispensable to Israel’s long-term security, especially in light of recent Israel Defence Forces operations in Gaza. In addition, the UK, Canada and France have threatened to impose targeted sanctions should Prime Minister Netanyahu persist in facilitating settlement expansion across the West Bank or intensify military offensives in the Gaza Strip. Such measures would represent a significant diplomatic rebuke, even if their economic effect remains to be determined.

Interestingly, China has likewise declared its support for a two-state solution and intends to participate in the statehood conference, yet it has stopped short of introducing sanctions against Israel. As a result, Israel’s two largest trading partners — the United States and China — have not exerted substantial economic pressure on Jerusalem. The Netanyahu administration, long accustomed to international criticism regarding alleged human-rights abuses in the occupied territories, is unlikely to see its economy severely undermined by the relatively modest sanctions contemplated by the UK, France and Canada. Nevertheless, the symbolic weight of global censure should not be underestimated.

However, the firm stances adopted by the UK, France and Canada merit careful scrutiny and possibly recalibration. It is unusual for America’s closest allies to advocate so vigorously for the Palestinian cause. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly castigated figures such as Sir Keir Starmer, President Macron and Prime Minister Carney — labelling them as supporters of Hamas and excusers of violence against Israeli civilians. Although these Western governments are not uniformly pro-Israel, each hosts sizable Jewish diasporas and influential community leaders. Hence, Israel must navigate its diplomatic relations with London, Paris and Ottawa with particular subtlety and adaptability.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s endorsement of the summit adds another layer of complexity to Israel’s relations with Arab states. Since the Trump administration initiated the Abraham Accords, Riyadh has tacitly permitted its Gulf neighbours to normalise ties with Israel, but has made its own participation conditional upon the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state. Concurrently, Israel and Saudi Arabia have engaged in informal, US-mediated intelligence cooperation for several years. Depending on the conference’s outcome — and on any shifts in Washington’s posture — Netanyahu will need to recalibrate his discreet rapport with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, particularly regarding future normalisation efforts.

Looking ahead, the summit will centre on the Palestinian Authority’s claim to full sovereignty, and Israel is likely to face two principal security scenarios. In one, the conference fails to secure concrete agreements or merely produces additional diplomatic recognitions of Palestine by non-US Western states. Since such recognition is largely symbolic, the Israel Defence Forces would continue to administer security across the occupied territories, and daily governance would remain essentially unchanged. International law would offer moral leverage, but on-the-ground realities — checkpoint operations, settlement policing, border controls — would proceed much as before.

Alternatively, should the summit culminate in a favourable UN General Assembly resolution admitting Palestine as a full member state or in the formation of a durable coalition expressly supporting Palestinian sovereignty, Israel would confront significant new security complexities. Presently, Israel retains control of security along the Jordan-West Bank and Egypt-Gaza frontiers; a shift towards Palestinian sovereignty could necessitate a fundamental reconfiguration of those arrangements. Furthermore, Israel’s continued occupation of the territories would become an even more contested issue, subject to renewed legal challenges and international demands for withdrawal or troop redeployments.

Regardless of the summit’s result, Israel will encounter heightened scrutiny of its West Bank and Gaza policies. The United Nations identifies both territories as occupied Palestinian lands, yet Prime Minister Netanyahu maintains that the West Bank constitutes a historic Jewish homeland, and President Trump viewed Gaza primarily as a bargaining asset. Post-conference reactions — from formal UN resolutions to civil-society campaigns — will dictate the extent of pressure on Israel to alter settlement and security strategies. Fundamentally, as long as the United States continues to provide robust financial, logistical and military support, the status quo of occupation and settlement expansion is likely to persist.

That said, if — albeit improbably — the White House chose to honour a UN resolution recognising Palestinian statehood, Washington might leverage its influence to require Israel to transfer governing authority over the occupied territories to the Palestinian Authority, in exchange for full diplomatic normalisation with Saudi Arabia and broader Gulf states. While such an accord could formally conclude the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, creating a stable, functioning Palestinian government would necessitate extensive international oversight, security guarantees for both parties, and mutual recognition. For these reasons, it is unlikely that such a comprehensive transfer of authority will occur immediately after the summit.

Ultimately, the Palestinian statehood summit will bear on Israel’s national interests, but the magnitude of its impact will hinge on global attitudes, above all, those of the United States. Israel is well-versed in weathering external criticism; with US backing intact, its economy should prove resilient. Saudi Arabia’s insistence on Palestinian sovereignty poses a notable challenge, particularly in relation to ongoing Abraham Accords negotiations, so Israel must adapt its Arab diplomacy accordingly. In the absence of a coordinated international push for lasting Palestinian statehood, however, the most plausible outcome is the preservation of the current political and security framework.