Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan has run into a problem familiar to diplomats: the two sides agree on the destination but not on who moves first. Hamas wants an Israeli withdrawal before surrendering its weapons; Israel wants Hamas disarmed before pulling back. The Gulf Arab states may have the money, diplomatic access and political leverage to help bridge that gap. But they are increasingly convinced that the obstacle lies in Jerusalem—and Israel’s October election could determine whether the deadlock finally breaks.

Can the Gulf Unlock Gaza?

Nearly a year after Donald Trump unveiled his ambitious plan for ending the Gaza war, the diplomatic machinery surrounding it has stalled.

The broad framework remains in place. Israeli hostages have been released, Hamas and Israel have formally accepted the plan, and Arab governments have backed the idea of a transition towards reconstruction and a new governing arrangement for Gaza.

But the next stage is proving much harder.

At the center of the impasse is a deceptively simple question: who moves first?

Hamas has resisted surrendering its heavier weapons without an Israeli military withdrawal and an end to Israeli operations. Israel, meanwhile, says it cannot withdraw while Hamas retains its military capabilities.

The result is a diplomatic stalemate in which each side wants the other to make the first irreversible concession.

Trump continues to argue that the broader process is under control. But the second phase has yet to get properly underway. His envoy Jared Kushner and Nikolay Mladenov, director-general of his Board of Peace, have encountered the central difficulty of the plan: dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure is considerably more complicated than agreeing that it should happen.

The Gulf has a stake

Arab Gulf governments have more at stake than simply the success or failure of an American diplomatic initiative.

The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have spent years building themselves into indispensable players in Middle Eastern diplomacy. They have financial resources, channels to Washington and varying degrees of access to Israeli and Palestinian actors.

The UAE is particularly important. It established diplomatic relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords and has simultaneously become one of Gaza’s most significant humanitarian donors.

That combination gives Abu Dhabi an unusual position. It can cooperate with Israel while maintaining credibility with Arab governments and Palestinian constituencies.

But patience has limits.

In August, eight Arab and Muslim countries—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey—criticized Israel’s resistance to the next stage of Trump’s Gaza framework.

Their preferred outcome broadly combines several elements: Hamas and other armed groups relinquishing their weapons, Israeli forces withdrawing, an international stabilization presence being established, Palestinian administration being restored and reconstruction beginning.

That is a considerable diplomatic package. It also reveals where Arab governments believe the current blockage lies.

Money cannot solve the political problem

The Gulf states can provide something Gaza urgently needs: money.

The UAE alone has become a major source of humanitarian assistance. It has also backed plans for training a new Palestinian police force intended to provide security after the war.

But money cannot substitute for political agreement.

Reports that Israel prevented vetted Gaza police recruits from leaving the territory for training in Cairo illustrate the problem. Even preparations for a postwar security structure remain dependent on Israeli decisions about movement and access.

This leaves Gulf governments in an awkward position.

They can fund humanitarian operations and contribute to reconstruction. They can support a future security architecture. They can lobby Washington and maintain channels with Israel.

They cannot, by themselves, determine whether Israel withdraws or Hamas disarms.

That decision remains fundamentally political.

Saudi Arabia has a different calculation

Saudi Arabia’s position is even more consequential.

Riyadh has resisted pressure to normalize relations with Israel without a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Trump has sought to connect a wider Saudi-Israeli diplomatic breakthrough to his broader Middle Eastern strategy, but the Saudis have shown little appetite for abandoning their central condition.

That gives Riyadh leverage, but it also imposes constraints.

Saudi leaders want closer relations with Washington, economic investment and greater regional security. They also want to retain their position as a leading Arab power. Appearing to sacrifice Palestinian aspirations for a bilateral deal with Israel would carry political costs.

The Saudi calculation therefore differs from that of the UAE, even though both governments have strong reasons to support regional stability.

The Gulf is hardly a single diplomatic bloc.

Israel’s election changes the equation

This is why Israel’s October election is attracting attention in Gulf capitals.

A change of government could create room for a different approach to Gaza and the West Bank. Opposition politicians have argued that Arab governments should play a greater role in a future Palestinian settlement, with Saudi Arabia potentially occupying a particularly important position.

A new Israeli government could also take a different approach to Palestinian administration in Gaza and to settler violence in the West Bank.

That does not mean an opposition government would simply accept Hamas retaining its weapons. Israeli politics remain considerably more hawkish on security than many foreign observers appreciate. Any government would have to convince voters that its Gaza policy would not recreate the conditions that produced October 7.

But the diplomatic tone could change.

And tone matters when a peace process depends on governments that distrust one another enough to demand guarantees before taking even the smallest step.

The risk of the alternative

If Israel’s political direction remains unchanged, the Gulf states may face a harder strategic choice.

Further Israeli settlement activity in strategically sensitive parts of the West Bank could make a future Palestinian state harder to establish. Continued fighting in Gaza would deepen the humanitarian crisis and make reconstruction increasingly difficult.

The longer the stalemate lasts, the more difficult it becomes to construct the postwar arrangements envisioned in Trump’s plan.

That could eventually force Gulf governments to consider whether humanitarian assistance and diplomatic criticism are sufficient.

For now, they appear reluctant to escalate beyond those tools. Sanctions against Israel or direct American coercion would represent a much more consequential step and could damage the relationships Gulf states have spent years cultivating.

Their preference is therefore understandable: keep the American framework alive, maintain humanitarian support, press Israel diplomatically and wait for circumstances to change.

Trump’s leverage

The person with the greatest potential leverage may still be Trump.

The Gulf states have relationships with the American president that could give them an avenue for pressing Washington to intervene more forcefully. But they have so far shown little inclination to abandon the broader Trump initiative.

That is significant.

The Gulf monarchies are not rejecting the American framework. They are effectively asking Washington and Jerusalem to make it workable.

The distinction is important because the Gulf’s strategy is not to replace American diplomacy. It is to reinforce it.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar can supply money, political legitimacy and regional access. Washington can supply diplomatic pressure and security guarantees. Israel controls the territory and possesses the military leverage. Hamas retains the capacity to block progress by refusing to surrender its remaining weapons.

No single actor can unlock the process.

Waiting for the election

For now, the Gulf states appear to be waiting.

Humanitarian assistance will continue. Public criticism of Israeli policies will probably intensify if the Gaza stalemate persists. But the Gulf monarchies are unlikely to abandon Trump’s framework unless the diplomatic situation deteriorates substantially.

Israel’s election could alter that calculation.

A new government willing to engage Arab states more directly could give the Gulf a larger role in shaping Gaza’s political and security future. A government that maintains the current approach could leave Arab governments facing a choice between accepting prolonged paralysis and increasing pressure on Israel.

Neither path is attractive.

The tragedy is that Gaza cannot wait indefinitely for the diplomats to settle their sequencing dispute. Reconstruction requires security; security requires a political arrangement; and a political arrangement requires both Israel and Hamas to accept risks neither currently appears willing to take.

The Gulf states can help bridge that gap.

They cannot cross it for the Israelis and Palestinians.